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Many features of the Federal Income Tax Code reflect the assumption that
our society is composed of heterosexual married couples, with men occupying
the "public" sphere and women occupying the "private" domestic sphere.'
Social security benefits funded through the payroll taxes, for example, offer
spousal benefits only to legally married couples, and only heterosexual couples
can obtain the tax benefits under the joint return provisions. Once married,
many provisions encourage women to undertake a traditional caretaking role in
the home to the exclusion of work in the paid labor force. By providing only a
limited childcare subsidy, for example, the Tax Code provides financial incen-
tives for women to work in the home after bearing children.2
It is not surprising that the tax laws reflect an image of men as public actors
earning a wage in the market, and that the laws assume women do not and
should not have such roles. Congress devised the Tax Code in 1913 when
many perceived waged labor as a male endeavor and household labor as a
distinctly female activity associated with the social, but not economic, mainte-
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School and Associate Professor of
Law, State University of New York School of Law. I owe special thanks to Mary Becker and Guyora
Binder for the help they provided both in conceptualizing and writing this article. I am also grateful to
Anne .Alstott, Diane Avery, Joseph Bankman, Mary Lou Fellows, Lucinda Finley, Barbara Fried, Barry
Friedman, Edward McCaffery, Stephanie Phillips, Bob Rasmussen, Jeffrey Shoenblum, Katharine
Silbaugh, Judy Scales-Trent, and the participants at the Spring 1995 Columbia Law School Feminist
and Legal Theory Workshop, the 1995 Critical Legal Theory Conference, and the faculty workshops at
SUNY-Buffalo Law School for their help in writing this article. If Congress imposes a tax on the free
labor of helpful law school colleagues, my tax bill will be enormous.
1. Commentators who note problematic gender biases and propose tax reform initiatives also seek to
encourage traditional family structures. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A
Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 1033, 1040-41 (1993)
(arguing Congress should lower married women's tax rates, thereby encouraging women both to get
married and to participate in the waged labor force); see also Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1392 (1975) (noting Tax Code codifies our social mores);
Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY: REv. LESBIAN &
GAY LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1991) (noting that Tax Code provisions are intended to acknowledge and
support heterosexual relationships but not same-sex relationships).
2. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1005-10; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER:
SEX DIsc~iMINATION AND THE LAW 20-21, 41, 44 (1989) (noting federal and state laws maintain
public/private divide and relegate women to their "maternal mission").
3. Not only does the Tax Code assume the husband has a salaried position in the labor force, but it
also assumes and encourages the wife to be financially dependent on her husband by performing
unwaged labor for the household. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 151(b) (1994) (treating spouses as dependents for
joint tax return purposes); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1165, 1177 n.235 (1986) (suggesting
women are "victims of 'forced community' due to their economic and legal dependence on men and
the constraints of the social and sexual roles thought to be appropriate for them").
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nance of the family.4 Many commentators have noted these underlying assump-
tions and the manner in which the Tax Code contributes to women's economic
insecurity by encouraging reliance on men for financial support. Accordingly,
tax analysts almost uniformly propose tax reform intended to enable women to
move more easily into the market. Many argue that by lowering the tax costs
associated with participating in the waged labor market, women will be encour-
aged to substitute marketwork for housework, thereby gaining access to the
wages and benefits tied to traditional market labor.5
The prevailing "market-oriented" approach to women's economic subordina-
tion is based on the belief that housework can be both isolating and demoraliz-
ing. These tax analysts argue that waged labor in the market promotes self-
reliance and individual success, while unwaged labor in the home might leave
women disempowered socially and individually.6 In short, tax reformers have
4. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908) (reflecting notion that women's
mothering responsibilities require them to depend on men for economic subsistence); cf. Reva B.
Siegal, Home at Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor
1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1092 (1994) [hereinafter Siegal, Home at Work] (noting prevailing
view of women as unproductive throughout history); Reva B. Siegal, The Modernization of Marital
Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127 (1994)
[hereinafter Siegal, The Modernization of Marital Status Law] (noting that judges have historically
viewed women's labor as being motivated by love and duty rather than economic need).
Although many women did work primarily in the home in 1913, their work was often paid and,
therefore, key to the family's economic survival. Women in low-income families, for example, were
frequently resourceful contributors to the family economy. They often worked with other women and
children embroidering and sewing to earn a wage. See generally EILEEN BoRIs, HOME TO WORK 81-122
(1994). Women of color also traditionally have had extremely high levels of market participation
despite the prevailing belief that women worked only in the private sphere while men worked in the
public market. See TERESA AMoTr & JULIE MAT-rHAEI, RACE, GENDER & WORK 303 (1991) (noting that
many women of color have participated in the market at high levels); MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE
U.S.A. 81-82 (1992) (discussing Mexican and Chicano women's public and private roles, which are
both equally important to the family's economic survival); cf. Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's
Silence in Law: The Dilemmas of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
886, 892-95 (1989) (discussing belief that law, not surprisingly, reflects a male image and men's images
of women).
5. See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49, 69-71 (1972) (criticizing childcare provisions that
discourage women's waged labor); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1, 32, 42-43 (1980) (arguing that joint return
provisions must be repealed to enable women's greater market participation); Edward J. McCaffery,
Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE
L.J. 595, 602, 657 (1993) (discussing equality in terms of women's market participation and proposing
tax reform intended to provide market incentives); McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1029, 1035 (same);
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 378-94 (1994) (proposing
individual filing system to ensure neutrality toward women's market and nonmarket roles); Note, A
Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 197, 198-99
(1988) (arguing that Tax Code discourages women's efforts to attain financial independence in market);
Note, The Case for Mandatory Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91 YALE L.J. 363 (1981) (same).
But see Jonathan Foreman, Beyond President Bush's Child Tax Credit Proposal: Towards a Comprehen-
sive System of Tax Credits to Help Low-Income Families with Children, 38 EMORY L.J. 661, 688-89
(1989) (proposing that women have access to childcare whether or not they participate in market).
6. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1051-52.
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focused on the perceived oppressive nature of women's caring and nurturing
role in the home and the possibility of using tax incentives to enable escape
from this devalued role.
The market-oriented approach to women's equality and liberation acknowl-
edges the material costs associated with performing unpaid labor and the role it
plays in preventing women from obtaining the level of wages and benefits that
men receive in the market. To remedy this problem, the market-oriented schol-
ars have devised practical solutions that would, in effect, provide women with
greater returns on their market labor. Although this has worthy distributional
effects, focusing only upon women's work outside of the home ignores impor-
tant aspects of women's lives. Indeed, by failing to acknowledge the productive
nature of women's work in the home, tax scholars might contribute to the false
and gendered distinction between paid work outside of the home and unpaid
work inside of it.
Additionally, market-oriented incentives will not enable women to choose
freely between caretaking responsibilities in the home and a career in the
market. In 1994, the majority of women of all races and classes were working in
the market; nevertheless, women continued to be responsible for seventy to
eighty percent of housework responsibilities.7 Providing market opportunities,
therefore, does not cause a corresponding decrease in the level of women's
housework. The market-oriented approach to tax policy also fails to acknowl-
edge that many women do not seek to exchange their household responsibilities
for a greater level of market participation. Many women of color, for example,
believe that in light of health hazards disproportionately suffered by communi-
ties of color, caretaking services that ensure the family's survival can be
personally satisfying and politically important.8
Characterizing household labor as demeaning, isolating, and oppressive, thus,
ignores the valuable and productive aspects of the labor that many women,
perhaps women of color in particular, find important.9 The only general assump-
tions that can and should be made concerning nonmarket labor are that (1)
women, and not men, do the work, and (2) this work does not entitle women to
wages or other economic benefits tied to traditional market employment.
In this article, I argue that rather than maintaining the invisibility of house-
work, feminists should encourage society to value the productive and political
nature of women's labor both in the home and in the market. A recognition of
7. David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic Labor: How
Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM. REL. 323, 326 (1993); see also infra notes 34-57 and
accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
9. Commentators who take an essentialist approach to women's subordination tend to make sex-
based generalizations about all women, regardless of the race, class, and sexuality differences among
women. Many scholars have argued this universalizing approach works to the benefit of some women
while marginalizing others. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585, 591-95, 602-05 (1990) (discussing marginalizing effects of
Catharine MacKinnon's and Robin West's theories of sexual difference).
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the importance of women's work, regardless of the setting, would more accu-
rately reflect women's valuable contributions to the economy. Once formally
recognized, society is likely to value nonmarket housework activities similarly
to market activities, thereby entitling women to social welfare benefits that are
currently tied only to waged labor in the market.
In Parts I and II of this article, I briefly explain how the Federal Income Tax
Code distinguishes between market labor and household activities, and the
rationale underlying this distinction. I then argue that while the distinction is
grounded on fairness and administrative concerns, the treatment between mar-
ket and nonmarket labor has a much greater effect on women than men because
of the current gendered division of labor within the household. Tax scholars
have previously noted that the current tax structure, in effect, encourages
women to perform more housework than if the economic gains of all labor were
taxed;' however, they have failed to acknowledge that exempting household
labor from the tax base also denies women important social welfare benefits
directly tied to taxation. Thus, in addition to the unfortunate behavioral effects,
nontaxation of women's household labor also causes women to lose important
economic benefits, such as social security, disability, and medicare benefits.
Feminist tax scholars, who focus primarily on the behavioral bias of the Tax
Code, have developed a market-oriented response to mitigate the bias: tax
incentives intended to enable women to move more easily out of the home and
into the market. Part III describes and then critiques the prevailing market-
oriented approach, an approach based on the importance of marketwork over
housework. While the tax incentives developed to encourage women's market
participation will benefit many women, the proposed tax reforms will have only
a marginal effect on women's labor decisions and often fail to account for race
and class complexities. Focusing solely on market labor as a means to economic
independence, for example, fails to acknowledge that many women who cur-
rently participate in the market remain economically vulnerable. Thus, simply
providing women with the option to move out of the home and into the market
will not necessarily ensure women's economic security. In addition, because
many women do not view household labor as oppressive or demeaning, encour-
aging market participation will not always operate to empower women and
could result in compounding existing race and class oppression.
Part IV proposes a solution that would value both market and nonmarket
labor. This Part examines the possibility of valuing and taxing nonmarket labor
in the same manner as market labor. Congress could broaden the tax base to
include the value of women's household labor, thereby subjecting the benefits of
housework to the same tax structure as waged labor. Because taxation of both
market and nonmarket labor challenges the market/nonmarket distinction de-
fended by generations of tax scholars, I first examine the traditional objections
10. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text (explaining traditional view that market/nonmarket
distinction discourages women's market labor).
[Vol. 84:15711574
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to taxation. Valuation, liquidity, and commodification problems have histori-
cally prevented taxation of nonmarket activities. Although these problems
certainly pose difficulties, I argue that they no longer are insurmountable. The
argument for taxation of nonmarket housework, however, remains uneasy. On
the one hand, because social security, disability, and medicare benefits are tied
to taxation, taxation would ensure that women have independent social welfare
benefits based on the economic value of their own labor in the home. Taxation,
on the other hand, would also impose an additional financial burden on women
in the form of increased tax liability. Accordingly, Part V considers devices by
which this adverse economic impact could be diminished. Part VI considers the
tax policy implications of implementing the proposed tax.
This article is, therefore, an exploration of the previously unexamined advan-
tages and the traditionally overstated disadvantages of taxing household labor.
Taxing household labor is not an easy answer to women's economic marginaliza-
tion, but it is a far more plausible solution than has been recognized, and one
with some distinct advantages over other tax reform proposals.
I. THE TAX CODE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN MARKET AND NONMARKET LABOR
A. DEFINING TAXABLE INCOME: THE MARKET PROVISO
Congress broadly defined the term "taxable income" in the Tax Code in an
attempt to subject the material benefits of all property and services to taxation. 1
The extensive list of taxable items in section 61 of the Tax Code and the
corresponding Treasury Regulations demonstrate that Congress intended to
subject all income, even income not immediately available to the taxpayer, to
taxation.' 2 Wages and retirement benefits provided by an employer to an
employee, for example, are subject to taxation. In addition to income received
in the formal market, goods and services obtained in the informal market such
as those received in a barter transaction with a neighbor are taxable. 13 Indeed,
Congress even taxes income derived on the illegal market through illicit
11. I.R.C. § 61 (1994); Collins v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 625, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding § 61 of
Code must be broadly interpreted).
12. I.R.C. § 61 (1994) (listing 15 items including compensation for services, interest, rents, royalties,
dividends, alimony and separate maintenance payments, annuities, pensions, and income from dis-
charge of indebtedness that must be included in taxpayer income); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (1994) (listing
additional miscellaneous income including punitive damage awards, prizes, grants, and scholarships).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1994) (explaining method for determining gain in barter transaction).
Barter transactions have been a source of controversy. See, e.g., United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S.
546, 551 (1973) (holding that noncash income is taxed at fair market value, which is defined as the
"price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts")
(quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b)); Collins, 3 F.3d at 633 (holding that noncash compensation of
racing tickets is taxed at retail value); Joslin v. United States, 666 F.2d 1306, 1307 (10th Cir. 1981)
(holding that noncash compensation of silver dollars is taxed at fair market value, not face value); Wills
v. Commissioner, 411 F.2d 537, 543 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that property received as award is taxed at
fair market value at time of receipt).
1996] 1575
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activities, including embezzled monies and profits from the sale of illegal
drugs.' 4 In numerous contexts, courts have recognized Congress's intent to
exert "the full measure of its taxing power" 5 by requiring taxpayers to include
all economic gains, regardless of source or form, within gross income unless
Congress explicitly exempts a particular item from taxation. 16
Despite this extremely broad definition of income, there exists one limitation.
Income is subject to taxation only if obtained in a market transaction. Although
the courts and Congress have not explicitly exempted income from household
activities, there is a widely held but unstated distinction between gains received
in the market context and gains received in the family context. ' 7 Gains obtained
in the formal, informal, and illegal markets are all taxable, while the economic
benefits received from self-supplied services or services from a family member
are exempt from taxation.' 8 This market proviso imposes different tax burdens
on taxpayers who obtain similar goods and services. For example, a household
is not taxed on the value of childcare services provided by a family member;
however, the value of identical services provided by a neighbor or a childcare
center would produce a tax burden.' 9
Many commentators have noted the paradox of taxing the profits of domestic
labor performed in the market while ignoring the value of identical services
14. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961) (holding that embezzled funds consti-
tute taxable income). See generally Ann L. Iijima, The War on Drugs: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation Falls Victim to State Taxation of Controlled Substances, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 101, 101-36
(1994) (discussing state and federal laws imposing a tax on gains received in illegal drug and alcohol
sales).
15. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429,432-33 (1955) (noting sweeping scope
of § 61 of Tax Code and holding that punitive damages for fraud in antitrust litigation is taxable).
16. Id. The courts have struggled with the definition of gross income and have changed the definition
over time. Compare Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408-09 (1946) (holding that illegally
procured gains are not taxable) and Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (holding that
income is gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, "provided it be understood to
include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets" (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.
Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)) with Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1977) (holding
that income is all gains except those specifically exempted); James, 366 U.S. at 218 (holding that
unlawful gains are taxable) and Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 430-31 (abandoning capital-labor
formulation of gross income).
17. Although Congress has not explicitly exempted income from nonmarket activities from tax, this
is the accepted definition of income. See Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family
in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1608 (1977) (noting that
benefits from household services and home ownership are tax free).
18. The value received from nonmarket services is called "imputed income." When the services are
performed in exchange for cash or benefits from another person, the resulting income is not tax free.
See Zelenak, supra note 5, at 356 n.85 (discussing women's household labor).
The market/nonmarket labor dichotomy is frequently mistaken for the labor/leisure dichotomy. The
home is generally perceived as an escape from the work and a haven for leisure activities and emotional
warmth. Indeed, women who work primarily in the home are often perceived as enjoying free time not
available to women in the market. The labor performed in the home is not seen as work, but as a "labor
of love." ROMERO, supra note 4, at 21; see also ANN GAME & RosEMARY PRINGLE, GENDER AT WORK
127 (1983).
19. Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried Cohabitants,
27 UCLA L. REv. 1240, 1248-49 (1980) (stating that cohabitants must pay tax on exchanged services).
[Vol. 84:15711576
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performed for one's own family. For example, in 1920, A.C. Pigou expressed
concern that only services performed by women for a wage counted toward the
gross domestic product.20 Acknowledging the value of women's labor, public
finance theorists, tax analysts, and economists have also noted that an ideal or
21comprehensive income tax should contain a tax on nonmarket activities.
Indeed, Richard Posner in his essay, Conservative Feminism, argues that tax and
feminist theorists should consider the idea of taxing household labor, in light of
the distributional and behavioral incentives of nontaxation.22 Despite the theoreti-
cal support for taxing housework, no adjustment to the tax structure has ever
been seriously considered, and the tax policy literature continues to reflect a
universal acceptance of the market/nonmarket binarism as applied to house-
work.
2 3
The primary objection to taxation involves the perceived administrative
difficulties of measuring and valuing household labor. The extent of the labor is
potentially endless: childcare, gardening, and balancing a checkbook all provide
a benefit to a family member. Because no convenient stopping place exists, tax
analysts have argued that any attempt to tax nonmarket activities is "clearly
hopeless." 24 Additionally, drawing the line between leisure and productive
activities is difficult, if not impossible.25 Would tending the vegetable garden,
20. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 33 (4th ed. 1952) (noting that "if a man marries his
housekeeper or his cook, the national dividend is diminished"); see also Harold C. Havighurst, Services
in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41 YALE L.J. 386, 390 (1932)
(noting paradox that identical services are valued in public sphere but not private sphere).
21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 365 (1980); see also sources cited infra note 23.
22. Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 193-94.
23. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 121 (10th ed.
1994) (arguing taxation of household services is "patently unsound"); MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra
note 21, at 365 (taxing imputed income would be ideal (if impractical) solution on efficiency and equity
grounds); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 53 (1938) (arguing that taxation of nonmar-
ket activities is "clearly hopeless"); Glenn E. Coven, The Decline and Fall of Taxable Income, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1548 (1981) (arguing that conceptual and practical difficulties prevent taxing
self-performed services); John F. Due, Personal Deductions, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 37,
41 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977) (arguing that taxation of imputed income "is so repugnant ... that it
is unlikely to be considered seriously"); Louise Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of
Canadian, American, British, French and Swedish Law, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67, 116-17 (1985)
(taxing imputed income not feasible in light of fact that income in-kind is not worth very much and
political problems of getting proposal through); McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 17, at 1618 (stating
that taxation of imputed income is universally acknowledged to be unfeasible); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr.,
The Parenting Tax Penalty: A Framework for Income Tax Reform, 64 OR. L. REv. 375, 389-97 (1986)
(advocating taxation of household services but at same time supporting complete credit for the tax);
Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 83 (1990) (suggesting taxation of imputed
income would introduce notions repugnant to democratic society); Zelenak, supra note 5, at 404
(suggesting that tax on imputed income creates terrible contortions in Tax Code).
24. SIMONS, supra note 23, at 53; see also McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 17, at 1618.
25. Rather than attempting to distinguish between labor and leisure as economists have recently
begun to do, commentators often list silly examples of activities that produce a benefit but would most
likely not be taxed regardless of the breadth of the tax base. See, e.g., McIntyre & Oldman, supra note
17, at 1610-12 (noting that if Congress taxed all nonmarket activities it would struggle with valuing
activities such as getting up in morning and chewing food).
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for example, be counted as a chore undertaken for the family's economic gain
or as a nontaxable leisure activity?
Moreover, even if labor and leisure could be distinguished, many argue that
the value of the labor performed outside of the market is impossible to quantify
because it is not measured according to objective market standards.26 Unlike
waged labor, the standards of performance for household labor are obscure and
set by the family members themselves. Consequently, tax scholars argue that
Congress could not accurately determine the value of household services with-
out an unparalleled governmental intrusion into taxpayers' private lives.27
Additionally, some commentators argue that taxation of nonmarket gains
might create unfair economic hardship for taxpayers.28 Because household labor
does not produce cash or property that could be exchanged for cash, taxpayers
may not have the resources to pay the additional tax burden. Consequently, tax
analysts argue that the benefits of services should only be subject to tax when
taxpayers voluntarily convert their labor into a marketable form.29 In many
cases, taxpayers can only pay an income tax after entering the market, and
Congress's recognition of this limitation reflects traditional notions of tax
fairness.
Finally, some commentators take the position that if Congress were to tax
household labor, there is a danger that society would commodify women, who
perform the vast majority of housework, by valuing them by the dollar value
that Congress imputes to their labor.3 ° Conceptualizing household labor as
simply an economic endeavor would arguably ignore important aspects of the
work. Mothering activities, for example, include not only childcare and meal
preparation, but also "caring, compassion, and connection."' 31 Some commenta-
tors worry that by valuing housework in purely monetary terms, it will lose
much of its value and become a mere economic enterprise. Additionally,
because the value of women's household labor and a market wage are incommen-
surable, some commentators argue that it would be entirely impossible to value
26. SIMONS, supra note 23, at 51-52; Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Treatment of the
Family, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra note 23, at 205, 224.
27. See KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 23, at 121-22 (explaining administrative difficulties associ-
ated with taxation of women's household labor and concern that taxation would cause governmental
intrusion into our private lives).
28. See Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly into an "Ideal"
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Farfrom Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 838 (1979).
29. See id.; McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 17, at 1612.
30. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (discussing
commodifying effects of using market terminology to analyze nonmarket activities); see also Thomas
D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 378 (1989)
(arguing that imputed income is not and should not be taxed because of "appropriate reluctance to
commoditize nonmarket transactions"); Kelman, supra note 28, at 838-39 (noting taxation of nonmar-
ket services would force taxpayers to commodify their labor).
31. Nel Noddings, Ethics from the Standpoint of Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTrIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE 160, 168 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (criticizing Marxist viewpoint that all labor should
be valued in economic terms).
[Vol. 84:15711578
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32
women's household labor in monetary terms.
This article reconsiders whether the difficulties with valuation, liquidity, and
commodification continue to be sufficient reasons for Congress to leave house-
hold activities untaxed. Upon a close examination of these long-held objections,
I argue that the case against taxation of women's household services has been
overstated, and the potential benefits of taxation have been virtually ignored.33
Although Congress may, nevertheless, decide that good tax policy requires
household services to be exempt from taxation, I demonstrate why the tradi-
tional objections to taxation are no longer persuasive.
Before discussing the possibility of taxing household labor, I explain the way
in which its nontaxation contributes to women's economic vulnerability, taking
into consideration aspects ignored by the current tax literature. I then describe
the problems associated with the market-oriented proposals developed to offset
the economic consequences of women's responsibility for housework. Although
this approach acknowledges that women undertake the bulk of the housework, it
renders the housework invisible by focusing solely on the promotion of wom-
en's market labor. Finding that these proposals might contribute to the gendered
notion of work, I turn to the possibility of recognizing the value of household
labor through tax reform.
B. SEX AND GENDER DIFFERENCES REFLECTED IN THE MARKET/NONMARKET
LABOR DICHOTOMY
1. The Division of Labor in the Household Along Gender Lines
Because both men and women are capable of performing household labor,
Congress's failure to tax housework appears to be sex-neutral. The exclusion of
housework from the tax base, however, affects women to a much greater extent
than men. First, women spend significantly more time on household chores,
performing the bulk of the family's household labor. Moreover, while women
generally consider both market and household labor important, interrelated
aspects of family maintenance, men are more likely to perceive this labor as
dichotomous and often consider household labor to be of secondary or no
importance.34 Women permit and even welcome the intrusion of household
responsibilities upon market responsibilities. In contrast, men tend to let
market activities spill over into what women perceive as "family time." 36
Even men who perceive household labor as valuable and productive tend
32. Id.
33. Most taxpayers would find it offensive that the housewife should pay a tax when she did not earn
any money. Thuronyi, supra note 23, at 84.
34. JULIE A. MATTHAEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 304-07 (1982).
35. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
36. Rachel Kahn-Hut et al., Home Work and Marketwork: Systematic Segregation, Introduction to
WOMEN AND WORK: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 85 (Rachel Kahn-Hut et al. eds., 1982) (discussing
how men separate home work from market labor while same is not true for women).
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only to undertake household jobs that do not interfere with their market labor.37
Men perform household tasks that can be completed at any hour of the day and
those that can be easily postponed, such as fixing the car or mowing the lawn. 38
Women, on the other hand, undertake responsibilities that often prove inconsis-
tent with a full-time market position, such as childcare and meal preparation.39
Sociological studies indicate that despite labor-saving appliances and wom-
en's move into the market, the number of hours women work in the home has
remained constant. On average, women perform approximately fifty hours of
household labor per week.40 Although the precise number of hours is often
closely tied to a woman's marital status, the number of children in the family,
and the woman's level of participation in the waged labor force, time-use
studies uniformly indicate women perform approximately seventy to eighty
percent of all household chores.41 Consequently, women often have two full-
37. Although men in most families fail to perform significant amounts of household labor, men who
are high wage earners are particularly unlikely to undertake household labor. See generally JANE C.
HOOD, BECOMING A Two-JOB FAMILY 11 (1983); JOSEPH H. PLECK, WORKING WIVES/WORKING Hus-
BANDS 27-52 (1985).
38. Demo & Acock, supra note 7, at 325 (stating that women undertake chores such as preparing
meals, washing dishes, and cleaning the house, while men perform jobs like car maintenance).
39. Id.
40. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE 86-87
(1991); see also Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1559, 1598-99 (1991) (citing several time-use studies finding women work significantly more than
men in home); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: The Law of Housework (Jan. 16, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal) (providing detailed breakdown of
the number of hours men and women work in the home and in the market).
41. See EUSTON QUAH, ECONOMICS AND HOME PRODUCTION 213 (1993) (noting women account for
about 77% of household production); Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to
Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 565 (1990) (noting child care is only portion of caretaking services
women provide; the elderly receive care for 18 years while children are cared for on the average 17
years); see also BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 261-69 (1986) (noting
that irrespective of employment status women retain primary responsibility for housework); SARAH
FENSTERMAKER BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF WORK IN THE AMERICAN HOUSE-
HOLD (1985) (same); PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT, AND GENDER: A
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND DEMOGRAPHIC VIEW 94-99 (1986) (integrating individual and structural views
to explain behavior of individuals with respect to housework); MICHAEL GEERKEN & WALTER GOVE, AT
HOME AND AT WORK: THE FAMILY'S ALLOCATION OF LABOR (1983) (using utility maximization model to
develop unified theory of work allocation within a family); EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, ISSEI, NISEI, WAR
BRIDE: THREE GENERATIONS OF JAPANESE AMERICAN WOMEN IN DOMESTIC SERVICE 221-25, 235-37
(1986) (discussing Japanese women's role both in home and in waged labor market); PATRICIA
ZAVELLA, WOMEN'S WORK AND CHICANO FAMILIES: CANNERY WORKERS OF THE SANTA CLARA VALLEY
130-33, 136-42 (1987) (noting that women with seasonal wage work retain primary responsibility as
housekeepers); Donna H. Berardo et al., A Residue of Tradition: Jobs, Careers, and Spouses' Time in
Housework, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 381, 388 (1987) (same); Julie Brines, Economic Dependency,
Gender and the Division of Labor at Home, 100 AM. J. Soc. 652, 682 (1994) (noting the more a
husband relies on his wife for economic support, the less housework he does); Demo & Acock, supra
note 7, at 326 (noting that mothers report spending between 40 and 44 hours per week performing
household chores); Nona Glazer, Everyone Needs Three Hands: Doing Paid and Unpaid Work, in
WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR, 249, 261-68 (Sarah Fenstermaker Berk ed., 1980) (noting many
women are in waged labor force because of need but still retain responsibility for household chores);
Heidi I. Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender Class, and Political Struggle: The Example of
1580
HeinOnline -- 84 Geo. L.J. 1580 1995-1996
TAXING HOUSEWORK
time jobs--one waged job in the market and another unwaged job in the home.
Studies indicate that women who perform these dual roles in the market and in
the home sleep less, enjoy less leisure, and work far longer hours than the
average man.
42
Low-income women, who typically lack the resources needed to purchase
items such as childcare assistance and meals outside the home, are particularly
likely to have a double workday. Although women's dual roles in the market
and home have only recently gained widespread attention, low-income women
have suffered the "doubleday" syndrome for decades.4 3 Even middle-income
women able to afford childcare assistance often do not escape significant
burdens associated with working in the home. For example, the mother gener-
ally employs, schedules, and instructs the hired caregiver.44 Additionally, al-
though full-time day care can alleviate some responsibility for household tasks,
women must still care for sick children and elderly parents.4 5 Even in role-
reversed families in which the mother is the primary wage-earner and the father
is the primary caregiver, women often retain responsibility and assert authority
46
over childcare decisions.
There exists a vast literature that discusses the underlying cause for the
gender-based division of labor within the household. Feminists seeking to
understand the division of labor often look to biological, structural, and psycho-
Housework, 6 SIGNS 366, 385-86 (1981) (citing 1960 studies that indicate that time spent on household
labor does not vary with class, race, and ethnicity); Ziarat Hossain & Jaipaul L. Roopnarine, Division of
Household Labor and Childcare in Dual-Earner African-American Families with Infants, 29 SEX
ROLES 571 (1993) (finding African-American fathers involved in household tasks but women still
overwhelmingly responsible for performing childcare); Joann Vanek, Household Work, Wage Work, and
Sexual Equality, in WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR supra at 275, 277 (noting regardless of employ-
ment status women are responsible for household labor).
42. GLENN, supra note 41, at 221-25, 235-37 (discussing women's desire for their husbands' help
with household chores); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations
of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 85-87
(1989) (noting stress from work-family conflicts is result of inequitable burdens placed on women by
responsibilities at work and at home, and because of the inflexibility of employment schedules);
Williams, supra note 40, at 1599; see also Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987) (stating that
women's hedonic lives matter).
43. ROMERO, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that Chicano women have worked a "doubleday" for
generations); AMOTr & MATTHAEI, supra note 4, at 138-39 (citing several studies indicating immigrant
women and women of color have worked both in and out of home simultaneously).
44. Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1047, 1051 (1994).
45. BARBARA WILLER ET AL., THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF CHILD CARE IN 1990: JoIr FINDINGS
FROM NATIONAL CHILD CARE SURVEY 1990 AND A PROFILE OF CHILD CARE SETTINGS 28 (1991) (noting
that 35% of working mothers reported one of their children was sick on a work day in the preceding
month).
46. See Malin, supra note 44, at 1051 (stating that women exercise power regarding childcare
decisions regardless of whether or not they work); Graeme Russell, Problems in Role-Reversed
Families, in REASSESSING FATHERHOOD: NEW OBSERVATIONS ON FATHERS AND THE MODERN FAMILY
161, 163-64 (Charlie Lewis & Margaret O'Brian eds., 1987) (noting many mothers in reversed-role
families nevertheless retain greater responsibility than fathers for "decision-making, planning, monitor-
ing and anticipating" children's needs).
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logical influences (or some combination of all three). Robin West and Mary
Becker have argued that biological differences make women better suited for
caring and nurturing responsibilities.47 While feminists who focus on biological
differences do not conclude that motherhood is the natural destiny for all
women, they do acknowledge the physically intense experience associated with
pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing, which only women are capable of experienc-
ing.48 This biological difference has prompted Professors West and Becker to
argue that recognizing, valuing, and enabling women to experience these connec-
tions without social or economic consequences could empower women.4 9 Un-
47. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S SToD. 133 (1992) [hereinafter Becker, Maternal Feelings] (noting that women's subjective
experience must be viewed with acceptance and respect); West, supra note 42, at 81-82 (same). Authors
in many disciplines have noted that women's biological roles create a foreseeable period of disability
for working women at relatively early stages in their careers causing a lasting effect throughout their
time in the labor force. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14-37 (1981) (noting that
women's inherent desire for children and concern for their welfare explains sexual division of labor
within households); Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 25,
38-39 (1989) (arguing that on average women have stronger demand for children than men do and have
more concern for children after they are born, causing women to suffer economic disadvantages under
current tax policy); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodat-
ing the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2159-79 (1994) (arguing that if women are to
achieve equality with men in workforce, problem of pregnancy must be reconceptualized to enable
much more economic protection); see also In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1261 (N.J. 1988) (holding
that significant mother-child bond and lesser, if any, father-child bond counsel against placing custody
in father).
48. Sociobiologists have also focused on women's biological connection with children. See, e.g.,
Herma Hill Kay, Perspectives on Sociobiology, Feminism, and the Law, in THEORETICAL PERSPECIVES
ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 31, at 74, 82 (noting sociobiologists argue that woman's genetic
bond with her child ensures the child's survival that the less certain paternal bond is unable to
guarantee). Unlike feminists, some sociobiologists argue that it is women's natural biological function
to reproduce and care for children, making the sexual division of labor within the home also
biologically driven. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 152-53 (1976); EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON
HUMAN NATURE 33 (1979); EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY 159 (1980); see also ALLISON M.
JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983) (describing sociobiological view of sexual
division of labor and feminist criticism of view). Sociobiologists argue not only that women are
biologically destined to undertake a household role, but that " 'even with identical education and equal
access to all professions, men are likely to continue to play a disproportionate role in political life,
business and science.' " Ruth Hubbard, The Political Nature of Human Nature, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN DIFFERENCE, supra note 31, at 63, 72 (quoting Edward 0. Wilson, Human
Decency is Animal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12. 1975, (Magazine), at 38, 50).
49. See supra note 47; see also Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflections on the Gender Gap in
Employment, 82 GEO. L.J. 75, 81 (1993) (arguing any systematic study of women and employment
must take into account biological pressures); Finley, supra note 3, at 1139 ("I sense that we will have
lost something very fundamentally human in such a world of no 'real' differences. My sense of loss
stems from a feeling that I as a woman- want to be able to revel in the joy and virtually mystical
specialness of having a baby."); Virginia Held, Birth and Death, in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY
87, 87 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990) (arguing that giving birth should not be viewed as "essentially
natural," and noting that women's reproductive and nurturing capabilities could be conceived as a
source of "human power"). But see Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market
Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 97 (1993) (noting that there is no clear
demonstration that women possess comparative biological advantage with respect to household labor).
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like some sociobiologists, feminists that have focused on biological differences
do not argue that women are mere instruments for the procreation and survival
of humankind; rather feminists maintain that women are able to experience
human connection in a way that men cannot. Women's greater responsibility for
household labor should be valued and understood in the context of this intense
mothering experience.
Many other scholars contend that the structural conditions of the economy
relegate women to the home sphere. Vicki Schultz, for example, argues that
employer discrimination in the market limits women's opportunity for growth
and upward mobility in the workforce.5 ° Professor Schultz concludes that
because employers view "women as inauthentic workers, uncommitted to wage
work as an important life interest and source of identity,",51 they restrict women
to low-paying and demeaning jobs. Discrimination combined with a generally
harassing atmosphere arguably causes many women to lower their aspirations
and commitment to the waged labor force. 2 Consequently, many women have
no choice but to assume the caretaking role in the household, knowing that it is
difficult if not impossible to achieve individual success in the market. 3
Although the division of labor within the household all over the world generally entails women
working in the home and men working outside of the home, in some societies these roles have been
separated from a person's sex. In some American Indian societies, for example, males who showed a
clear desire to work in the home alongside women were encouraged to do so, and women who desired
to live as a man were entitled to go through the tribal rituals for men and then to live as a man. See
AMOrr & MATTHAEI, supra note 4, at 37.
50. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segrega-
tion in the Workplace in litle VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750,
1799-1815 (1990); see also Patricia Gerald Bourne & Norma J. Wikler, Commitment and the Cultural
Mandate: Women in Medicine, in WOMEN AND WORK: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 36, at
111, 112-14 (exploring how male expectations and assumptions about women's place in medicine
constricts women's options); Martha Albertson Fineman, Preface to MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST
THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD at x-xii (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel
Karpin eds., 1995) (arguing that motherhood is a colonized concept that is imposed on all women in
context of law and legal institutions, regardless of whether women are mothers or not).
51. Schultz, supra note 50, at 1755-56.
52. What are often interpreted as sex differences in work behavior may be more accurately explained
as "organizational behavior." See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Impact of Hierarchical Structures on the
Work Behavior of Women and Men, in WOMEN AND WORK: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 36,
at 234 (arguing that women who are disadvantaged by aspects of market such as wage gap and
discrimination are likely to limit their aspirations and thus are less likely to be perceived as promotable
and more likely to find themselves in low-level and low mobility jobs).
53. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM 22 (1991) (noting contemporary feminist analysis focusing on institutional structures
and their historical inadequacies in incorporating women); Schultz, supra note 50, at 1824-39 (noting
powerful disincentive for women to move into and remain in nontraditional occupations). Indeed, not
only do courts assume that women have gendered preferences to perform household tasks, but even if
women work in the market, courts assume they prefer positions similar to the "social and cooperative
aspects" of the work they seek in the home. See Schultz, supra note 50, at 1799-1814 (explaining that
judicial framework for interpreting sex segregation results in assumption that women form their choices
about work based on biology or on cultural influences, but not because of structural problems in
workforce); see also Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the
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Finally, some feminist scholars note that caretaking roles produce psychologi-
cal differences between men and women that perpetuate the gendered nature of
the household. Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, and Sarah Ruddick, for example,
have all argued that women's mothering capacity and experience can cause
women to focus on the importance of human connection rather than on indi-
vidual autonomy.54 Thus, in addition to physiological traits and institutional
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 38-40 (1986) (analyzing mixed effects of courts'
efforts to enable women into workforce and noting they benefit some women, hurt other women, and
simultaneously help and hurt others).
Some economists argue that women are not relegated but rationally choose to perform greater
amounts of unwaged labor in the household in light of the structural character of the market. In 1990,
women on average earned only 71.8% of what men earned in the market. THE WOMEN'S RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1992-93, at 355 tbl. 7-1 (Paula Ries & Ann J. Stone eds.,
1992). Shifting unpaid household labor to the lower wage earner, therefore, frees the high wage earner
to maximize his earning potential. Gary Becker argues, on this basis, that it is often a woman's
preference to perform all of the household work, making possible greater overall benefits to the family
than if both the husband and wife split waged and unwaged work equally. BECKER, supra note 47, at
14-24. For an excellent summary of the various economic theories that seek to explain the gendered
wage gap, see Hadfield, supra note 49, at 91-94 (outlining theories of demand-side preferences,
strategic employer behavior, supply-side information barriers, productivity mechanisms, and supply-
side preferences). Ironically, as Deborah Rhode has noted, lack of job wage equality between men and
women has created job opportunities because employers preferred female employees that could be paid
less. RHODE, supra note 2, at 30-31.
While the structural aspects of the market are important for understanding women's economic
position, some have argued that focusing only on the structural explanation for economic subordination
is problematic. Michael Buroway points out that such an analysis tends to degenerate into "pessimistic
overestimations of the power of the welfare state, the capitalistic economy, or 'the system.' Too often,
the system is seen as all-determining, so that forms of resistance such as innovation, negotiation, and
rebellion are not taken seriously." Michael Buroway, The Extended Case Method, in ETHNOGRAPHY
UNBOUND: POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE MODERN METROPOLIS 271, 284 (Michael Burawoy et al. eds.,
1991).
54. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 2 (1982) (arguing women's and men's divergent
experiences lead them to develop different perspectives and values); Nel Noddings, Ethics for the
Standpoint of Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 31, at 160,
166-71 (noting that traditional women's work causes women to value caring and human relationships);
Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342-67 (1980) (exploring effect that maternity has
on women's lives). See generally NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALY-
SIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978) (analyzing the impact mothering roles have on women's
lives); DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN
MALAISE (1977) (challenging assumption that woman must be main adult presence in child's life).
Many argue women's caretaking role is voluntary and often comes about because women tend to
think in terms of an ethic of caring and responsibility and view themselves as fundamentally connected
to others. This notion of care "connotes responding to the needs of other persons with whom one is in a
web of relationships, as well as alleviating the suffering of the world." Linda C. McClain, Atomistic
Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1184
(1992). Women's mothering experience is often used as an example of this ethic of care. The
mother-child relationship demonstrates that women, unlike men, routinely and naturally respond to
inequalities by nurturing and caring for a weaker, dependent person. Many feminists argue that
women's ethic of care demonstrates the importance of "women's work" and that relational feminism
should be used to form moral legal theory in general. Id. at 1184-85.
It could be argued, however, that courts and legislators already subscribe to the stereotyped images of
women's natural caretaking role and nurturing sensibilities. See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the
Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 52 (1989) (arguing
that courts have adopted process of valuing wage-earning capacity that devalues women's earning
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structures, the psychological and emotional differences between men and women
arguably contribute to women's greater responsibility over household activities.
The extent of the biological, structural, and psychological influences on the
division of labor between the genders is hotly debated and far beyond the scope
of this article. Regardless of the underlying cause, however, the end result does
not change: women continue to be materially disadvantaged because of their
actual or perceived household responsibilities "despite decades of legislative
efforts to equalize women's position in the waged labor market."' 55 Rather than
having well-paid and prestigious jobs, women often have part-time jobs or jobs
with flexible schedules, low pay, and fewer fringe benefits (e.g., retirement
benefits, health insurance, and holiday and sick leave). 6 Women who occupy
full-time positions in the market are often forced into low-paying jobs with little
possibility of advancement by employers who anticipate that women will exit
the market to undertake household responsibilities.57 The gendered nature of the
household contributes, therefore, to women's economic vulnerability.
2. The Paradox of Housework
It is impossible to generalize about women's views on the relative value of
housework versus marketwork. These views are influenced by a variety of
social factors, including race and class. Some feminists perceive the division of
labor between the genders as oppressive because women "perform a dispropor-
tionate share of work in the household, while men receive disproportionate
potential); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 830 (1989) (arguing
women's choice to stay in home is result of both "seductive compliments" women receive for
domesticity and notion that women are more moral than men). It is not the ethic of care, however, that
is problematic. Rather it is the assumption that goes along with it-that women should provide free
caretaking services for the family, enabling independence for the family while remaining dependent,
herself. A caretaking morality should not be equated with self-sacrifice and giving, although society in
general, and the Tax Code in particular, have encouraged this way of thinking. Women subscribing to
this ethic of care can focus on themselves and their own well-being to attain a sense of personal
integrity and security. McClain, supra at 1196.
55. Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 47, at 157; see also BERGMANN, supra note 41, at 213-14
(discussing need for maternity leave programs to enable women to undertake household responsibilities
without economic penalty); Martha N. Ozawa, Conclusions: Women and Society, in WOMEN'S LIFE
CYCLE AND ECONOMIC INSECURITY: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS 194, 194 (Martha N. Ozawa ed., 1989)
(arguing that social roles imposed upon women lead to inequality in marketplace); Jane Rutherford,
Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 560 (1990)
(discussing how division of labor creates cycle keeping women subordinated by and to men).
56. See SUSAN MOLLER OKaN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 149-56 (1989) (discussing house-
work and cycle of vulnerability it causes for women); Karen C. Holden & Pamela J. Smock, The
Economic Costs of Marital Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate Cost?, 17 ANN. REV.
Soc. 51 (1991) (discussing women's economic hardship following marital dissolution and its multiple
factors).
57. See BERGMANN, supra note 41, at 4 (noting that employers continue to establish work schedules,
leaves of absences, and transfers based on assumptions that workers are men maintaining full-time
housewife); McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1011 (noting that 30% of compensation comes in form of
fringe benefits that are often awarded only to traditional full-time workers).
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advantages in the form of services and access to income.",58 This view, how-
ever, is not universal. Some women view nurturing and caretaking responsibili-
ties as a source of fulfillment and happiness. Thus, although reproductive labor
is "devalued, exhausting, confining and a principal way that women are shack-
led to an inferior status, motherhood is for many women life's greatest joy.",59
In addition, because of the various barriers (e.g., relatively low wages, few
advancement opportunities, and a discriminatory atmosphere) that hinder wom-
en's success in the market, some women perceive control over children and the
home sphere as the only meaningful source of power they experience. 60 Accord-
ingly, women are often unwilling to give up the conventional role in the home
for the stressful and often demeaning atmosphere of the paid labor force.
6 1
Martha Fineman argues that although women suffer the material burdens of
motherhood, the work associated with nurturing and caretaking responsibilities
is not necessarily oppressive. Professor Fineman emphasizes that scholars
ignore powerful aspects of motherhood when they link gender equality solely
with women's potential to enter the waged labor force. Indeed, by recognizing
the value of housework and by creating an explicitly positive symbol of
women's nurturing responsibilities, women's economic status might improve.
Rather than being cast as inconsequential, caretaking responsibilities could be
treated as worthy of economic subsidies and rewards. 62 Fineman concludes that
58. GLENN, supra note 41, at 192.
59. Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REv. 95, 97 (1993) [hereinafter
Roberts, Motherhood and Crime]; see also RHODE, supra note 2, at 134 (homemaker role has been
empowering and enriching as well as confining). But see Jennifer Roback, Beyond Equality, 82 GEO.
L.J. 121, 129 (1993) (arguing that women should not be concerned with negative economic conse-
quences caused by their high levels of household labor because it is valuable labor and "one thing in
life that [is] really worth doing").
60. See HOOD, supra note 37, at 12-13 (arguing that bargaining power, and not the sexual division of
labor, is important for determining gender-equality); PLECK, supra note 37, at 81 (noting that women
may have considerable psychological investment in their relative monopolization of power within the
family and in some cases could feel threatened if their husbands move into this domain); Kanter, supra
note 52, at 234 (discussing institutional barriers to women's market participation causing women to
lower their expectations or leave market altogether). Women who seek to work at home and are able to
negotiate such a role could then be viewed as having power and control in the household.
61. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 32-57, 75-93 (1988) (discuss-
ing institutional and structural barriers to women's economic equality and arguing that although
majority of women have moved into paid labor force, barriers have resulted in women's greater
workload but not greater economic independence).
Native American women have also argued that they historically have maintained real power and
control in the home and have gained social and economic equality despite a traditional sexual division
of labor. AMOTF & MATTHAEI, supra note 4, at 34-38. Many Native American women maintain that
despite women now undertaking traditionally "male" roles in the market, they suffer greater inequality
with men. Indeed, many American Indian women leaders have called for a return to a more traditional
division of labor so women can obtain more equal power with men in the home. Id. at 56, 58-59. But
see McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1051-52 (arguing that women who choose to maintain household roles
suffer from cognitive error; women who choose traditional division of household labor may think they
are serving their own best interests, but are wrong in light of economic and emotional disaster suffered
by these women as result of divorce and widowhood).
62. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
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if the state recognized maternal practices as entitling women to special and
preferential treatment throughout the law, motherhood would be perceived as
"an ethical practice, as embodying an ideal of social 'goodness'... [and] a
societal aspiration for all members of the community." 63
Women of color, in particular, often acknowledge the paradoxical nature of
household labor. Many critical race theorists have argued reproductive labor can
be seen within a "culture of resistance," 64 benefitting the family as a whole, not
just men. Patricia Hill Collins argues household labor can be viewed as part of a
collective effort to create and maintain a family structure in the face of race and
class oppression.65 Many mothers, for example, see threats to their children's
safety and well-being as far more pressing than gender inequality.66 Health
problems associated with environmental hazards (such as toxic waste dumps)
are disproportionately suffered by communities of color.67 Consequently, many
women of color give up wages and benefits by undertaking flexible work
schedules in the market to assume caring and nurturing roles. Collins notes that
the household labor involved in assuring children's survival in the face of these
heightened health hazards is not oppressive, but rather politically empower-
68ing.
Indeed, Dorothy Roberts and Regina Austin suggest that the very act of
bearing and nurturing a child represents an act of resistance against patriarchy
and racism. Both argue that undertaking these responsibilities challenges the
current system that places limits on the ability of black women to have and raise
children. The disproportionate denial of black women's parental rights through
the foster care system, for example, prevents African-American women from
passing on to their children their own cultural identity and practices. 69 Although
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 67-68 (1995) (noting that women's caretaking responsibilities could be
recognized and rewarded through welfare reform and divorce law).
63. Id. at 234-35.
64. GLENN, supra note 41, at 192.
65. Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theory About Motherhood,
in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 56 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994).
66. GLENN, supra note 41, at 192.
67. Judy Scales-Trent, Women of Color and Health: Issues of Gender Community, and Power, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1360-61 (1991) (noting that segregated housing enables polluters to dump toxic
waste into neighborhood causing serious health problems and higher mortality rates); see also Taunya
Lovell Banks, Women and AIDS-Racism, Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351
(1990) (discussing women of color and high incidence of AIDS).
68. See Collins, supra note 65, at 64-65 (arguing women of color are concerned primarily with their
powerlessness within social institutions that impose sterilization or deny items such as health care);
Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Cleaning Up/Kept Down: A Historical Perspective on Racial Inequality in
"Women's Work, '" 43 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335 n.12 (1991) (citing BErY LEE SUNG, THE ADJUSTMENT
EXPERIENCE OF CHINESE IMMIGRANT CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY 151 (1987)) (explaining that Chinese
women often accompany their children to and from school to ensure children's safety even though it
causes women to lose desperately needed wages); Mary Pardo, Mexican American Women Grassroots
Community Activists: "Mothers of East Los Angeles," 11 FRONTIERS 1 (1990) (contending that
Mexican-American women organize as mothers to oppose potential health hazards in community, not to
raise level of men's participation in household activities).
69. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539, 555 (considering whether black single
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both Austin and Roberts see danger in viewing reproductive labor as only
liberating, 70 they see it as potentially empowering to women and their commu-
nity.
Additionally, while many feminists perceive nurturing roles as isolating, this
is not true for all women.7t Professor Roberts notes that motherhood can have
the opposite effect for some women. Black women, for example, have a
tradition of communal childcare that can lead women to become community
activists working for political ends.72 Roberts argues that far from being isolat-
ing and demoralizing, household labor can be closely tied to community goals
such as the elimination of racial discrimination and the empowerment of a
community as a whole.73
Thus, while women are overwhelmingly responsible for providing household
labor, the value women attach to the labor varies widely. Some women view the
labor as isolating and demoralizing, but many others perceive the work as
personally and politically empowering. Regardless of how women personally
experience the labor, it provides important economic benefits to the household.
In most families, if women do not provide the labor, it will be purchased in the
market. By failing to value and tax the labor, therefore, Congress ignores the
productive and political nature of the work. The next Part of the article
examines in more detail the behavioral and distributional effects on women of
Congress's failure to tax the labor.
motherhood can be viewed as having "temerity to attempt to break out of the rigid economic, social,
and political categories that a racist, sexist, and class-stratified society would impose upon them");
Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, I AM. J. GENDER & L. 1,
13, 14 (1993) (discussing manner in which foster care system brutally disrupts black family structures)
[hereinafter Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy]; Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 59, at 120
(discussing difficulty of passing on cultural identity and at same time teaching children to "defy racist
stereotypes and practices").
70. Austin, supra note 69, at 578 (advocating exploration of subordinating and emancipatory aspects
of motherhood); Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy, supra note 69, at 29 (stating that "[iut is difficult to
identify the emancipatory moments that spark within the vast realm of subordination," but self-
desiructive and self-affirming behavior must be distinguished).
71. Women of color often fear separation in light of the policies that historically have been used to
divide families and disempower communities of color. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 65, at 65-66
(noting that Bureau of Indian Affairs often sought to remove Native American children from their
homes for boarding schools, and African American women lost contact with children in slavery
producing fear of losing children); see also Elizabeth Tobin, Imagining the Mother's Text: Toni
Morrison's Beloved and Contemporary Law, 16 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 233, 239-42 (1993) (discussing
representations of fear of separation and disempowerment in Toni Morrison's writing).
72. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 59, at 130-35 (discussing politically and personally
empowering aspects of being a black mother).
73. Id.; see also Dara Abubakari, The Black Woman is Liberated in Her Own Mind, in BLACK
WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 585, 585-87 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1972) [hereinaf-
ter BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA] (noting that caring and nurturing roles can be important for
elimination of racial and gender discrimination); Renee Ferguson, Women's Liberation Has a Different
Meaning for Blacks, in BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra at 587, 587-92 (asserting that black
women seek to assume wife and mother role and often seek to eliminate racial discrimination first, then
sex discrimination).
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II. THE EFFECTS ON WOMEN OF CONGRESS'S FAILURE TO
TAX HOUSEHOLD LABOR
Congress's failure to tax nonmarket activities has both distributional and
behavioral consequences for women. Tax commentators have traditionally fo-
cused on the distributional effects of nontaxation. Many have argued that by
declining to tax the value of household labor, Congress provides valuable tax
benefits to families with stay-at-home spouses. These families obtain the value
of household labor tax-free, while the same labor performed in the market is
subject to taxation. The tax literature has traditionally viewed this unequal
treatment as violating the long-standing and firm principle of tax neutrality.
Despite this perceived unfairness, tax analysts have uniformly taken the position
that administrative difficulties make taxation of nonmarket household labor
impossible.
Recently, feminist tax scholars have begun to examine the behavioral incen-
tive structure of the Code. While these scholars acknowledge the distributional
effects of the Code, they focus on how the tax structure discourages women
from working in the waged labor force. Feminist scholars argue that by failing
to tax the benefits of household labor while at the same time taxing the benefits
of market labor, Congress encourages women to undertake a conventional
household role that makes them dependent on a traditional wage earner and
perpetuates their economic vulnerability.
In this Part, I first explain that while tax incentives exist for women to remain
in conventional household roles, the Tax Code's treatment of housework only
affects the behavior of women on the margin. Indeed, most women are in the
paid labor force despite the tax incentives to remain in the home. I then address
the distributional aspects of Congress's failure to tax household labor. While
exempting the value of household labor provides a tax benefit to the family, this
benefit often does not inure to women due to the unequal sharing of income
within the family unit. Not only do women often fail to benefit from the
family's lower tax burden, but nontaxation also causes women to lose economic
benefits, such as social security, disability, and medicare benefits, which are
calculated according to the amount of taxes paid.
A. THE BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF EXEMPTING HOUSEHOLD LABOR
FROM THE TAX BASE
Although time spent in the household was once viewed primarily as leisure
time, there is now little question that the labor performed in the home is
productive and valuable. Indeed, economists estimate that the value of house-
hold services is equal to at least twenty-five percent of the entire gross domestic
product or approximately $145.6 billion.74 Congress's decision to impose a tax
74. See QUAH, supra note 41, at 96-101 tbl. 4.1 (citing to Johns Kendrick's 1979 estimates of value
of household labor and to 15 other economists' estimates of value of women's household labor and
effect inclusion of value would have on gross domestic product); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being
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only on market activities therefore shelters a significant portion of household
income from taxation.
Although the failure to tax nonmarket labor provides a benefit in the form of
a lower tax liability, many feminist tax scholars have argued it comes at the cost
of encouraging women to undertake a traditional role in the home. Professors
Edward McCaffery, Lawrence Zelenak, Pamela Gann, and Grace Blumberg, for
example, have all argued that Congress's failure to tax household labor makes it
relatively cheaper from a tax perspective for women to work in the home than
in the market.75 Feminist scholars conclude that Congress, in effect, encourages
women to undertake a financially insecure and subordinate role in the household
by failing to tax these services.
To demonstrate why Congress's failure to tax household labor might encour-
age women to remain in the household, consider two hypothetical taxpayers,
Deborah and Ellen, each with two children. Deborah works in her home caring
for her two children. If the childcare services Deborah provides are valued at
$30,000 in the market, she provides that same value to the household. Ellen, on
the other hand, works in the paid labor force earning $30,000. Because the Code
imposes a tax on the income Ellen obtains from her market labor, she will
contribute less than $30,000 to the household. For example, if Ellen's $30,000
is taxed at twenty-eight percent, she would contribute only $24,550.76 Addition-
ally, Ellen's after-tax salary of $24,550 would not be sufficient to purchase
childcare services if they cost $30,000 in the market. Unable to afford childcare
in the market, the Tax Code encourages Ellen to leave her market employer to
perform the household services herself. In short, Congress has made nonmarket
labor more valuable than market labor by exempting nonmarket household
labor from taxation. Congress's failure to tax nonmarket labor could lead
women to substitute nonmarket for market labor.
Congress's failure to tax household labor, however, does not produce a
substitution effect for all women.7 7 As Anne Alstott has succinctly stated in
another context, "it is essential to distinguish disincentives from the effects of
and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (1994) (criticizing gross domestic product as measure of
well-being despite exclusion of goods and services such as household activities).
75. See supra note 5.
76. This number is calculated without accounting for the standard deduction or personal exemption.
Most tax scholars argue that married women in the waged labor force are denied these benefits due to
aggregation under the joint return provisions. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
77. Several studies indicate that taxation impacts the level of women's market labor. Due to the tax
and thus the increased costs associated with market labor, some women substitute housework for
marketwork. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1926 n.86 (1987) (citing numerous economic
studies indicating that married women's compensated elasticity is between 1.0 and .4). Many women,
however, do not experience a substitution effect, but rather they experience an income effect with
higher tax rates. See WALTER BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
23 (1958) (noting that low-income taxpayers are likely to experience income effect, causing them to
undertake additional hours of market labor in response to increased tax rates).
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disincentives on behavior."' 78 While the Tax Code does theoretically establish a
disincentive to work, empirical data is needed to determine whether the Code
has actually affected women's labor decisions. Sociological studies indicate that
the behavioral effects of taxing only market labor depend on a woman's
socioeconomic status. In general, women substitute household labor for market
labor when they have access to resources that enable economic survival absent a
market wage. Wealthy women or women married to middle- or upper-income
men, for example, can substitute unpaid for paid labor without suffering immedi-
ate impoverishment.
Many women, however, do not experience market labor and household labor
as mutually exclusive. Low-income women, for example, do not have the
luxury to leave the market for the home simply because Congress awards tax
benefits for such a decision. Consider again the hypothetical taxpayer, Ellen. If
Ellen is a single mother, she cannot afford to substitute completely household
labor for market labor because her wage provides essential income needed to
purchase necessities for the family. Instead, Ellen is likely to work for a wage in
the market, seeking at the same time low-cost or free childcare from a family
member or friend. Indeed, data unambiguously indicates that low-income women
and single women have traditionally performed the bulk of the household labor,
yet have also had high levels of market participation. 79 Low-income and single
women, therefore, usually do not have the option to substitute home labor for
market labor and instead must work in both spheres to survive economically.80
African-American women of all income levels also have high and steady
rates of labor force participation, despite the tax benefits Congress provides to
stay-at-home spouses. 8' While middle-income white women often substitute the
78. Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare
Reform, 108 HARV. L. REv. 533, 545 (1995).
79. See WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 84-3, FACrS ON WORKING WOMEN 2 (1989)
(finding that single women with children are poorest and that divorced women with children are most
likely to participate in waged labor force); see also AMOTT & MATTHAEI, supra note 4, at 100-01, 113,
117-18 (noting that in nineteenth century, families in need of cash income often sent mothers and
daughters out into paid labor force); GLENN, supra note 41, at 68 (noting Japanese women have taken
important roles in market to help family survive difficult financial years upon immigration to United
States).
80. Of course, the disincentives built into the Code may have only a limited effect on many poor
working women if the exemptions and deductions eliminate all taxes or if the waged labor is left
completely untaxed because it is unreported. The bias in the Code related to Social Security and
Medicare withholding, however, would still exist. See infra text accompanying notes 101-13.
81. See JAMEs A. SWEET, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE 82-87 (1973) (providing data indicating that
women of color in general are more likely to participate in waged labor force than white women);
BETrE WOODY, BLACK WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE: IMPACTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE ECONOMY
14 (1992) ("[b]lack women never question the fact that they will work"); Evelyn Nakano Glenn,
Racial Ethnic Women's Labor: The Intersection of Race, Gender and Class Oppression, in HIDDEN
AsPEcTs OF WOMEN'S WORK 46, 59-61, 66-67 (Christine Bose et al. eds., 1987) (discussing history of
black women's labor market participation); Julianne Malveaux, The Status of Women of Color in the
Economy: The Legacy of Being Other (June 20, 1984) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
Georgetown Law Journal) (providing historical data on black women's market participation rates and
the location of the labor).
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role of market laborer for the role of mother, black women rarely experience
this substitution effect. Rather, black women often add mothering responsibili-
ties to their roles as market workers. Indeed, married black women with
children participate in the waged labor force at a higher rate than any other
group; approximately seventy-five percent of married black women were in the
labor force in 1987.82
More recently, women of all races and socioeconomic classes have moved
into the waged labor force while still maintaining their household responsibili-
ties. Economic downsizing, a desire for greater consumption of goods and
services, or simply a general frustration with domestic roles caused nearly sixty
percent of all women to enter the waged labor force in 1990.83 Thus, while
Congress's failure to* tax nonmarket activities encourages some women to
substitute household labor for market labor, others experience an income effect,
which causes high levels of market participation.84 Consequently, women of
most classes and races constitute a significant part of the market workforce, and
they continue to be responsible for providing seventy to eighty percent of the
unpaid household services.85
B. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE EXEMPTION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR
FROM THE TAX BASE
Although the substitution effect is more limited than might be expected,
nontaxation of household labor nevertheless provides significant benefits to
families in the form of a decreased tax liability. If household labor were
included in the tax base, the family's tax burden would increase by the imputed
value of the labor. A lower tax burden provides a corresponding higher level of
disposable income. If the additional income is shared by each family member,
Congress's failure to tax nonmarket labor would arguably benefit the entire
family.
Families, however, do not act as a single economic unit, and individuals
within the family do not share benefits and burdens equally. To understand the
full extent of the gendered nature of the Tax Code, therefore, we must analyze
the economic position of each family member individually. Once the family is
disaggregated, it becomes clear that women do not always have access to the
82. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN: AN EXPLORATORY
INVESTIGATION 26 tbl. 212 (1990) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N].
83. THE WOMEN'S RESEARCH AND EDUCATION INSTITUTE, supra note 53, at 308 tbl. 6-1; see also
BERGMANN, supra note 41, at 17-39 (arguing that "key to women's economic emergence" is that
market price of women's labor has risen as her time is seen as "too valuable to be spent entirely in the
home"); James P. Smith, Women, Mothers, and Work, in WOMEN'S LIFE CYCLE AND ECONOMIC
INSECURITY: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS, supra note 55, at 42, 45-49 (arguing nuclear family structures,
urban living, and long-term decline in fertility are causing women to work in paid labor force);
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 371 (noting that many women perceive their labor as too valuable to be spent
entirely in home).
84. See supra note 77.
85. See supra notes 34-57 and accompanying text.
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family's greater disposable income. Not only are intrafamily resources not
shared equally, but failure to tax household labor denies women access to social
welfare benefits directly tied to taxation.
In this Section, I first argue that Congress's distinction between market and
nonmarket labor does not provide unfair tax benefits to household laborers, as
many commentators have concluded. I then explain that nontaxation might
economically harm women by denying them access to the social welfare
benefits directly tied to taxation.86
1. The Allocation of Resources Within the Household
Many provisions in the Tax Code indicate that Congress assumes equal
sharing of income within the family. The joint return provisions, for example,
allow couples to consolidate their income as if the couple operates as a single
economic unit. Section 1041 of the Code also assumes that a couple acts as a
single unit by exempting property transfers incident to marriage, thereby encour-
aging couples to share not only income, but also their underlying property.88
Throughout the entire Code, legally married couples are treated as constructive
owners of each other's property rather than as separate individuals.89
86. Commentators traditionally have not been concerned with the gender division of labor within the
household or the effect a Code provision has on a particular individual. Rather, they have been
interested in whether the Code imposes identical tax burdens and benefits upon each household.
Because the household is the unit of analysis, many scholars take the position that Congress's failure to
tax household labor does not harm women, but provides an unfair tax benefit to households with
stay-at-home spouses. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 21, at 385-86 (discussing imputed
income of stay-at-home spouses and unfair benefits of nontaxation); Zelenak, supra note 5, at 362
(noting that one-earner couples are significantly better off because of their greater imputed income from
self-performed services). Scholars point to the unfairness of nontaxation of imputed income when
defending the provisions allowing a deduction or credit for childcare expenses, arguing that the
deduction or credit neutralizes the bias. See, e.g., Michael McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Treatment of the
Family, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra note 23, at 224-225. It is argued that because
taxation of imputed income from household labor is administratively impossible, Congress must
provide a tax benefit to households purchasing childcare in the market. These provisions ensure fairness
among all households: those with a stay-at-home spouse get tax-free labor, and those who hire
caretakers get a tax subsidy.
87. I.R.C. § 6013 (1994); cf Epstein, supra note 49, at 78-79 (assuming the family operates as single
unit when he suggests many women share in gains achieved by men through division of take-home
income inside marriage and in other family relationships). But see Thuronyi, supra note 23, at 69
(arguing that filing provisions, such as joint tax returns and kiddie tax, are adopted for purposes of
administrative ease, not conceptual accuracy).
88. I.R.C. § 1041 (1994) (requiring that basis of assets transferred to spouse or former spouse
remains same upon transfer). For a discussion of the fairness of § 1041, see Michael Asimow, The
Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and Assignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65 (1988)
(defending fairness of § 1041) and William J. Brown, Sexist Sleepers in Domestic Relations Provisions
of the 1984 Tax Reform Act, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 39, 46-47, 70 (1985) (criticizing § 1041 for
creating inequality especially in divorce because it is woman who gets low basis property, which will
produce tax upon resale).
89. The assumption that a couple acts as a single economic unit produces both beneficial and
adverse tax consequences to the family unit. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (1994) (prohibiting deduction for
loss on sale of property between husband and wife); I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (1994) (treating spouse as
constructive owner of stock owned by other spouse); I.R.C. §§ 674(d), 677(a) (1994) (treating trust
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Most studies indicate, however, that Congress's assumption that families
operate as a single economic unit, sharing income and expenses equally, is
flawed. Viviana Zelizer, for example, argues that families historically have
operated as hierarchically structured groups in which one person controls the
allocation and use of money. 90 Many recent sociological studies indicate that in
most cases women do not have meaningful control over family resources. 9'
Although access to and control of resources is often tied to the gender hierarchy,
the extent of women's power over resources varies between families. The
studies discussed below indicate that the control of money is often closely tied
to a woman's marital status and the family's income level.
Single women who are heads-of-the-household, of course, have greater dispos-
able income because Congress excludes household labor from the tax base.
Although data indicates that households headed by single women have far fewer
resources than other families,92 presumably the woman is in complete control
over all available resources. A lower tax burden therefore leaves greater dispos-
able income for single women.
Married women, however, do not necessarily obtain the benefits of nontaxa-
tion. Sociologists have found that women who are married to high-income men
are less likely to have meaningful access to disposable income than women
living in low-income families.93 The extent of a married woman's control over
disposable income thus appears to correspond to her socioeconomic class.
established by taxpayer with spouse as beneficiary as taxpayer's income); I.R.C. § 1239(a) (1994) (not
treating profit on sale of depreciable property between husband and wife as capital gain). Professor
Anne Alstott argues that focusing on the family unit is the most accurate and fair method for measuring
income because one person's income alone does not tell us about the other resources available and the
financial responsibilities that come with living in a household. Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax
Credit and Some Fundamental Institutional Dilemmas of Tax-Transfer Integration, 47 NAT'L TAX J.
609, 611 (1994).
90. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 36-65 (1994).
91. See, e.g., BERGMANN, supra note 41, at 211-12 (noting that men as primary wage-earners have
retained control over consumption patterns); Hartmann, supra note 41, at 376 (arguing that men have
more power than women over household decisions regarding income). There is also a vast literature
indicating that resources are not equally shared among family members. See, e.g., Christine Delphy &
Diana Leonard, Class Analysis, Gender Analysis and the Family, in GENDER AND STRATIFICATION 57,
65-66 (Rosemary Crompton & Michael Mann eds., 1986) (arguing that there is "marked hierarchy of
consumption within families"); Meredith Edwards, Individual Equity and Social Policy, in WOMEN,
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 95, 98-99 (Jacqueline Goodnow & Carole Pateman eds., 1985)
(noting that all members of household do not equally share income); Diana Wong, The Limits of Using
the Household as a Unit of Analysis, in HOUSEHOLDS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 56, 56-63 (Joan Smith
et al. eds., 1984) (challenging premise that household members equally share resources or even live
similar class styles); Michael Young, Distribution of Income within the Family, 3 BRIT. J. SOC. 305,
305-06 (1952) (noting that historically men disproportionately benefit from family resources). Although
many legal scholars have noted problems associated with focusing on the family unit, they have failed
to examine consumption patterns. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 5, at 348-54 (discussing question of
whether couples pool their resources, but failing to analyze consumption patterns).
92. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 93-3, FACTS ON WORKING WOMEN 5 (1993)
[hereinafter WOMEN'S BUREAU REPORT] (indicating that 52% of all families below poverty level in 1989
were maintained by women with children).
93. JAN PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE 1-2 (1989) (stating that women married to wealthy men often
live in poverty); Jan Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequality within Marriage,
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In high-income families, gender relations shape the circulation and control of
money within families, often with the man in control. Heterosexual married
couples that undertake conventional gender-based roles often allocate economic
power to the man. Studies indicate that often married women working in the
home are given only enough resources to pay for the family's necessities such
as food, clothing, and utility bills.94 In this type of allowance system, women
rarely have access to personal spending money. Thus, for married women
undertaking a conventional caretaking role, a greater level of disposable income
resulting from the nontaxation of household labor will not necessarily translate
into more resources for the woman.
Married women who earn a wage in the market are more likely to maintain
some control over the family's resources. Most studies, however, indicate that
the level of economic control corresponds to the level of each family member's
market wage. 95 Individuals who bring in a greater portion of income generally
have more control over resources. The continuing gendered wage gap almost
ensures that women bringing home a wage will have less control over the
family's disposable income than men.
Additionally, married women in the waged labor force tend to use their entire
salary for the family's necessities such as food and childcare, while men often
seek to reserve a part of their income for their own leisure activities and
savings. 96 Indeed, even some men acknowledge these unequal spending pat-
31 Soc. REv. 237, 245-57 (1983) [hereinafter Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of
Inequality within Marriage]; Jan Pahl, The Allocation of Money within the Household, in THE STATE,
THE LAW, AND THE FAMILY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 36, 40-44 (Michael D.A. Freeman ed., 1984)
[hereinafter Pahl, The Allocation of Money within the Household]. Documentation of wife and child
abuse as well as evidence of unequal food distribution within the family undermines the assumption of
equal sharing of resources and power. See Diana Strassmann, Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of
Disciplinary Authority in Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS
54, 58 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993) (noting that economists frequently make
faulty assumption that patriarch acts in interest of each individual within household).
94. Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequality Within Marriage, supra note 93,
at 244-52; see also Young, supra note 91, at 313-19 (discussing allowance system in historical context).
95. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTwz, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEx 53-56 (1983)
(noting that intrafamily power disparities are related to relative income levels); Philip Blumstein &
Pepper Schwartz, Money and Ideology: Their Impact on Power and the Division of Household Labor,
in GENDER, FAMILY, AND ECONOMY: THE TRIPLE OvERLAP 261, 267, 273-78 (Rae Lesser Blumberg ed.,
1991) (noting women with significant wages gain more power within household but nevertheless
remain responsible for providing bulk of household labor); Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the
Structuring of Inequality Within Marriage, supra note 93, at 252 (noting generally that the greater a
woman's salary, the greater her spending power).
96. Ann Whitehead argues that it is important to distinguish between earning and spending patterns.
She notes that women often act as "maternal altruists" who purchase the family's necessities before
spending on themselves. Ann Whitehead, 'I'm hungry, mum': The Politics of Domestic Budgeting, in
OF MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET: WOMEN'S SUBORDINATION INTERNATIONALLY AND ITS LESSONS 93,
111-12 (Kate Young et al. eds., 2d ed. 1984) (noting women all over world tend to privilege family's
need over their own). Whitehead also notes that numerous sociological studies indicate that husbands
tend to keep more of their earnings for personal expenditures while women pay for family necessities.
Id. That childcare costs are assumed to come from women's wages and not men's wages also
underscores the data indicating that women use their salaries for necessities while men do not. See
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terns. After a discussion at a congressional hearing concerning the definition of
women as secondary workers, a married man noted that he anticipated his
wife's salary would enable him to undertake his own expensive hobby. Af-
firming the concerns about intrafamily power disparities, the married man made
the following comment after the hearing: "My children are now all in school,
and on Monday my wife is going back to work.... [I] was thinking to myself,
when my wife goes back to work, we will buy an outboard motor.", 97 Of course,
to understand the extent of the power disparities within the family, it is
important to ask whether the leisure activity does, in fact, reflect only the
husband's preferences or whether the entire family stands to gain from the
expenditure.98 The above example, however, reflects the likelihood that some
married men assume their wives' market participation will alleviate some of
their own responsibility for purchasing family necessities, thereby enabling men
to use more of their own salary for their leisure activities and savings.
Even women who have complete control over the family's resources may
have only illusory economic power. In low-income families, for example, the
woman is often the manager of the family's finances.99 Because money is scarce
in low-income households, however, this role cannot be seen as a source of
power. Indeed, low-income families often perceive economic problems as their
greatest worry and responsibility over these matters is often a source of stress.' °
Although Congress's distinction between market and nonmarket labor unam-
biguously leaves greater disposable income for the family unit, it cannot be
assumed that all women benefit from the increased availability of the resources.
By disaggregating the family and analyzing women as distinct individuals it
becomes clear that, in general, women do not have equal access to the resources
made available because of nontaxation of household labor. Indeed, while Con-
gress's failure to tax unwaged labor might increase household income, it is
likely that nontaxation disproportionately benefits men over women.
2. Social Welfare Benefits Tied to Taxation
Commentators have described taxation as the means of distributing the
Becker, supra note 47, at 154 (noting when many families calculate parental income, childcare costs are
subtracted from women's wages, not men's wages).
97. Martha W. Griffiths, Can We Still Afford Occupational Segregation? Some Remarks, in WOMEN
AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION 7, 9 (Martha Blaxall &
Barbara Reagan eds., 1976).
98. I thank Sean Fox, an Articles Editor at The Georgetown Law Journal, for this point. He raised
the question of whether the example in the text necessarily reflects that only the husband desired to purchase the
boat or if, in fact, the wife and children might have obtained utility from the purchase as well.
99. Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequality within Marriage, supra note 93,
at 249-52, 257 (noting women in poverty are more likely to undertake managing and budgeting chores);
Pahl, The Allocation of Money within the Household, supra note 93, at 40-45 (noting low-income
women tend to be managers of household resources).
100. WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKING WOMEN CouNT!: A REPORT OF THE NATION
24 (1994) (stating that many taxpayers see themselves as being on edge of poverty and worried about
homelessness).
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burdens and costs of our government and as necessary to enjoy the "privileges
of living in an organized society."Ol Although this vague notion of the benefits
taxpayers receive when paying their tax burden aptly describes income taxes,
the benefits tied to payroll taxes are much more direct. Unlike federal income
tax revenues, payroll tax revenues are separated from the government's general
operating budget and deposited into a trust fund, the proceeds of which are paid
to the taxpayers during periods of disability and retirement. These social
welfare benefits, the level of which is tied directly to taxation, provide many
citizens essential resources, especially in old age. Because household labor is
not taxed, women's access to these critical resources is greatly restricted.
Unlike the income tax, which provides for a standard deduction and a
personal exemption to all wage earners, the payroll tax applies to the very first
dollar earned by a taxpayer. 10 2 Consequently, the payroll taxes represent a much
greater economic burden than the income taxes for low-and middle-income
taxpayers. 10 3 These payroll taxes, however, are returned to the taxpayer in the
form of social security, disability, and medicare benefits. By failing to impose a
tax on household labor, Congress enables the family unit to avoid paying
income and payroll taxes on the housework, but it denies women access to
social security, disability, and medicare benefits.
Studies indicate that the social security program is an important source of
income for many elderly persons. Most taxpayers are unable to save or to
participate in a private pension plan. In fact, social security benefits increase
many taxpayers' retirement income and are the sole source of income for many
retirees-especially women. 14 Thus, for many workers, social security benefits
serve as the only protection against poverty in old age and in times of disability.
Currently, women must participate in the market to receive independent
social security benefits. 10 5 The extent of the benefits that women receive for
101. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522 (1937); see also MUSGRAVE &
MUSGRAVE, supra note 21, at 257 (noting governments may impose taxes to provide social goods and
services to public).
102. Employees and employers must pay social security and medicare hospital insurance taxes
(collectively known as "FICA") at a rate of 7.65%. The social security tax is 6.20% of gross wages up
to $61,200 of the employee's wages. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (1994); SOCIAL SECURrY ADMIN.,
BASIC FACTS ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY 11 (1995) [hereinafter BASIC FACTS]. An additional medicare tax
of 1.45%, again payable by both the employer and employee, is imposed on all wages. I.R.C.
§ 3101(b), 3111(b); see also BASIC FACTS, supra at 11.
103. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 997.
104. Martha N. Ozawa & Tae Sung Kim, Distributive Effects of Social Security and Pension
Benefits, 63 Soc. SERv. REV. 335, 342 (1989) (noting that for many workers, social security constitutes
the "first line of defense against old-age income insecurity because they do not receive pension
benefits").
105. Women, of course, are entitled to spousal benefits under the current social security rules.
Although these benefits are key to some women's economic well-being in retirement, they are
inadequate for many. First, to obtain spousal benefits, one must be married. Second, as Mary Becker
has pointed out, due to severe limitations found in the rules, many married women fail to ever get the
benefits. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. Finally, I argue Congress should not force women
to depend on a spouse for derivative benefits, but should be entitled to the benefits for the work they
actually perform regardless of marital status.
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their market activities is tied to the level of taxes paid. Market laborers pay
payroll taxes on their earned income at a rate of 6.2% for social security and
disability benefits and 1.45% for medicare.10 6 Upon reaching retirement or in
cases of disability, market workers are entitled to benefits based on the number
of years worked and the average amount earned. High wages and high levels of
market participation, therefore, correspond to greater social security and disabil-
ity benefits for the taxpayer. 10 7 As women begin to spend more time in the
waged labor force, the number of women entitled to social security benefits
based on their own work records increases. In 1960, just five percent of women
secured independent benefits; the remaining ninety-five percent of women were
either not entitled to social security benefits at all or secured them only through
marriage. 10 8 By 1993, twenty-five percent of women had begun receiving social
security benefits based on their own work record.' 0 9
Despite the high numbers of women in the waged labor force, they have not
reached benefit parity with men. Because women continue to earn less than men
in the market, frequently work part-time, and often leave the workforce com-
pletely to care for children and elderly parents, few women earn significant
benefits. The structural, psychological, and biological factors discussed above,
therefore, prevent women from securing the level of retirement and disability
benefits that men obtain through market labor. Although the social security laws
entitle married women to derivative social security benefits based on their
husbands' waged labor, women often fail to obtain such benefits due to divorce,
death, or because their husbands do not qualify for social security. Consequently,
women, particularly women of color, suffer high poverty rates in old age." 0
As Mary Becker has argued, these high levels of poverty partly result from
the structure of the social security system, which benefits waged laborers and
not household workers." By refusing to count unpaid household labor in the
106. I.R.C. § 3101 (a)-(b) (1994).
107. See Richard V. Burkhauser & Karen C. Holden, Introduction to A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL
SECURITY: THE CHANGING ROLES OF WOMEN AND MEN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1, 1-4 (Richard V.
Burkhauser & Karen C. Holden eds., 1982).
108. Barbara A. Lingg, Social Security Benefits for Aged Women, 57 Soc. SEC. BULL. 71 tbl. 2
(1994).
109. Id.
110. For example, in the 1980s over 40% of older black women had incomes below the poverty
level. Julianne Malveaux, Low Wage Black Women: Occupational Descriptions, Strategies for Change,
35 (January 1984) (unpublished paper prepared for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Funds,
Inc., on file with The Georgetown Law Journal); see also ROMERO, supra note 4, at 87 (noting women
of color and immigrant women in particular perform bulk of domestic labor in market); Alice
Kessler-Harris, Designing Women and Old Fools: The Construction of the Social Security Amendments
of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY IS WOMEN'S l-fISTORY: NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 87, 92 (Linda K. Kerber et al.
eds., 1995) (noting that Social Security Act originally excluded more than three-fifths of fully employed
African-American workers); Marc Linder, What Hath Zoe Baird Wrought? The New FICA Amendments
on Domestic Service Employees, 66 TAX NOTES 113, 114 (1995) (stating that employers of domestic
workers need not pay social security taxes if employee is not paid $1000 per quarter, denying thousands
of household workers disability and old-age pension coverage).
111. Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security and Stone,
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calculation of retirement benefits and by tying such benefits only to wages,
Congress has almost guaranteed that women will live in poverty at higher rates
than men.' 1 2 Thus, although studies indicate that women's combined market
and nonmarket labor hours are greater than men's," 3 the social security laws
treat women as undeserving of equal benefits.
Although most women participate in the waged labor force, their caretaking
responsibilities in the home contribute to a higher incidence of poverty for
women than men. Exempting women's household labor from taxation enables
the family to avoid the burden of income and payroll taxes but results in women
having less access to social welfare benefits. As a result of nontaxation, the
family unit has greater disposable income; however, during retirement, a time
when many women live alone, women's income often falls to poverty levels. In
short, by performing untaxed household services, women enhance the economic
position of their families in the short term to the impoverishment of their own
economic well-being during old age.
III. MARKET INCENTIVES
Tax scholars concerned with women's economic status argue that Congress's
failure to tax household labor encourages women to undertake a conventional
role in the home. Consequently, scholars have devised tax reform proposals that
will counter the current behavioral bias in the Code by encouraging women's
participation in the market. 1"4 In an effort to expand women's career options
and to increase salary and advancement possibilities in the market, commenta-
tors have focused on two areas of the Tax Code: the childcare provisions and the
joint tax return provisions."l 5
Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 264, 276-85 (criticizing
viewpoint that sex-discrimination within social security laws is cultural problem of past and not found
within structure of laws).
Alice Kessler-Harris has found evidence in the congressional record indicating that Congress
intended women to rely on men for the retirement benefits; such benefits were arguably not for the
support of women, but to ensure men felt dignified by providing at least some support for their
dependents. Kessler-Harris, supra note 110, at 91-95. Not only were the Social Security laws designed
for men, but Congress also intended to prevent people of color from obtaining benefits. Id. at 91, 93-94.
At the time the laws were adopted, 80% of fully employed African-American women were denied
participation and coverage. Id. at 92.
112. Becker, supra note 111, at 278-79.
113. Silbaugh, supra note 40, at 11.
114. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 1497, 1543-60 (1983) (discussing legal reforms intended to enable women to participate more
freely and effectively in workplace); Carol Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE WELFARE STATE 231, 237 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988) ("Paid employment has become the key to
citizenship, and the recognition of an individual as a citizen of equal worth to other citizens is lacking
when a worker is unemployed.").
115. This article focuses on commentators who seek tax reforms that urge women into the market.
Once in the market, numerous other tax analysts have noted the problematic nature of other aspects of
the tax structure. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence
and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275, 1283-85 (1991) (critiquing Employee Retirement
Income Security Act's provisions).
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With regard to childcare services, scholars have argued that because women
perform the bulk of the services, expenses associated with childcare must be deduct-
ible if women are to have a fair chance to compete in the market." 16 Commentators
have pointed out that the joint tax return provisions impose high tax burdens on
married women in the market, thereby discouraging married women's market partici-
pation.117 The feminist voice in the tax literature, therefore, has encouraged Congress
both to repeal the joint return provisions and to expand the childcare provisions.
The market-oriented approach to reducing women's economic vulnerability
recognizes that some women's decisions to enter the marketplace are tax
sensitive. This approach, however, provides only a partial solution to the
problem. As noted above, women's labor decisions seem less sensitive to
taxation than many think. More than forty-five percent of women participate in
the market force, and women's participation rate is expected to grow over
twenty-five percent by 2005.118 Although these statistics do not indicate women
are entirely unresponsive to taxation, they do circumscribe the extent of the
problem. Thus, decreasing women's effective tax rate may only affect the
employment decisions of women on the margins. Additionally, market-based
tax reform fails to acknowledge the value of women's household labor.In this Part, I first illustrate the operation of the current tax structure and
outline proposed market-based amendments to that structure. I then evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Finally, I conclude that femi-
nist goals might be furthered if we turn our gaze around and examine unpaid
labor in the home as well as women's paid labor in the market.
A. CHILDCARE EXPENSES UNDER SECTIONS 21 AND 129 OF THE TAX CODE
In this section, I briefly describe the technical aspects of the childcare
provisions currently in the Tax Code. I then explain the feminist critique and the
traditional defense of the provisions. Finally, I suggest how the debate has
ignored sociological data and examine the limitations inherent in using tax-
driven childcare support programs.
1. Tax Benefits
Since the adoption of the Tax Code in 1913, Congress has distinguished
between business and personal expenses, allowing deductions only for business
expenses. Tax commentators generally support the personallbusiness distinc-
tion, arguing that a taxpayer's personal habits of consumption should not affect
the income tax paid. When a person exchanges income for personal consumption, his
or her total welfare has arguably increased or the taxpayer would not have made the
purchase. When money is spent solely in pursuit of additional income, however, the
expense does not increase welfare unless it produces additional income and thus only
116. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 145-62 and accompanying text.
118. WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 92-1, FACTS ON WORKING WOMEN 1 (1992).
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the profit should be taxed. "9 Although the distinction is easily stated, it is often
difficult to distinguish between personal and business expenses in practice. Childcare
expenses are particularly difficult to identify. Many taxpayers have argued that such
expenses are associated with women's ability to work in the market and thus should
be characterized as a business expense. Courts, however, have deemed childcare
expenses to be personal in nature and therefore nondeductible.' 20
In 1954, Congress amended the long-standing judicial rule prohibiting the
deduction of expenses incurred in hiring childcare. Although Congress did not
explicitly recharacterize the expense as business related, taxpayers are now
permitted to deduct the expenses to the extent they, are incurred to "enable
gainful employment."' 12 ' By allowing the deduction of childcare expenses,
Congress has recognized that time-consuming and costly childcare activities can
interfere with participation in the market. 122 The Code currently provides a tax
subsidy for costs associated with childcare through two different provisions-
section 21, which provides taxpayers a nonrefundable tax credit and section
129, which allows a deduction for childcare expenses.
Section 21 provides a tax subsidy equal to thirty percent of the cost of
childcare. 2 3 The total amount of expenses that can be taken into account in
calculating the credit, however, is just $4800 if the taxpayer has two or more
children. Congress, intending the subsidy for low-income taxpayers, phases out
the credit as the taxpayer's income increases. The credit decreases by one
percent for every $2000 the taxpayer earns over $10,000 until the tax credit is
reduced to twenty percent.12 4 A taxpayer earning $12,000, therefore, could only
119. David A. Steele, The Deductibility of Childcare Expenses Re-examined: Symes v. R., 7 CAN.
FAM. L.Q. 315, 324-25 (1991).
120. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039 (1939), affd, 113 F2d 114 (2d Cir.
1940) (per curiam).
121. I.R.C. § 129 (1994).
122. The deduction was not intended to encourage all women into the market, but only low-income
women who could not afford everyday necessities. Blumberg, supra note 5, at 70-72.
123. I.R.C. § 21 (1994).
124. I.R.C. § 21 (a)(2) (1994). The following chart indicates the tax credit Congress permits
taxpayers to take:
Percentage of Childcare Expenses
Adjusted Gross Income Percent of Expenses
Over- But not over- Allowed as a Credit
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deduct twenty-nine percent of her childcare costs. Thus, if the hypothetical
taxpayer, Ellen, pays $10,000 per year in childcare, she is entitled to offset her
taxes by $960 pursuant to section 21.125
Section 129 of the Code also provides a subsidy for childcare. Pursuant to
section 129, a woman who participates in an employer-established "dependent
care assistance program" is entitled to take up to a $5000 deduction for
expenses.' 26 Like section 21, section 129 is extremely limited. Because it
governs expenses connected with childcare plans set up by an employer, few
employed women obtain the benefits of section 129, and unemployed women
seeking a job obtain no benefits under the provision. Additionally, because
section 129 provides a deduction to taxpayers, the provisions benefit high-
income households more than low-income households. 27 Finally, as a deduc-
tion, section 129 allows the taxpayer to avoid paying taxes on the childcare
expenses; it does not operate to reimburse the taxpayer for such expenses. Thus,
even if the taxpayer is in the highest tax bracket, excluding $5000 from taxation
will enable the taxpayer to obtain a tax savings of approximately $2000, an
amount far below actual childcare costs.1
2 8
Many commentators have noted Congress's intent to foster women's entry
into the waged labor market. Tax scholars, however, also point out that Con-
gress has limited the childcare deduction provisions, unlike other business
expense provisions found in the Code. Section 162, for example, permits a
deduction for expenses associated with one's business regardless of the profitabil-
ity of the business.' 2 9 In contrast, section 21 reduces the tax credit for childcare
expenses for taxpayers earning more than $10,000. Given the reality that
women provide unpaid childcare, the Code effectively requires working women,
but not working men, to show they are economically constrained to obtain the
tax benefit associated with the "business" expense. Although men are assumed
to work to obtain the highest amount of wealth, section 21 seems to indicate that
women are understood to work only for economic survival. Additionally, there
is generally no ceiling imposed with regard to the total amount of a business
deduction.' 30 By limiting the amount of the childcare deduction to $5000,
125. Assuming Ellen earns $30,000 in the market, she is entitled to a credit equal to 20% of her
expenses up to $4800. I.R.C. § 21 (a), (b), (c) (1994). Thus $4800 x .20 = $960.
126. I.R.C. § 129 (1994).
127. A deduction is worth more to high income bracket taxpayers because it alleviates a higher
amount of tax. A $5000 deduction to a woman in the 15% marginal tax bracket, for example, will save
$750 while a woman in the 28% tax bracket saves $1400. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX
POLICY 91 (4th ed. 1983) (noting tax benefit associated with deduction depends on tax rate); STANLEY S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 22 (1973) (characterizing
phenomenon as "upside-down" deduction).
128. Employed mothers with one child younger than five years old, for example, paid approximately
$63 per week in 1990 for childcare. WILLER ET AL., supra note 45, at 31.
129. I.R.C. §§ 163, 263 (1994).
130. Although most business expense provisions do not impose a ceiling or decrease the tax benefit
as taxpayer income increases, the Code limits entertainment expense deductions to 50% of the actual
costs. I.R.C. § 274(n) (1994).
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sections 21 and 129 impose a limitation on childcare expenses that Congress
has deemed inappropriate for business expenses incurred in other contexts. In
these ways, Congress has restricted the coverage of the childcare provisions.
2. The Limitations of Tax-Driven Child-Support Programs
Feminists noting the limitations in the childcare provisions have argued that
Congress should expand sections 21 and 129. Professor Grace Blumberg, for
example, has persuasively argued that treating childcare as a "true" business
expense would accomplish important behavioral and distributional goals.' 3 '
According to Blumberg, by making childcare expenses fully deductible, Con-
gress would encourage women to leave the home to enter the paid labor
force.' 32 Once in the market, the tax benefits would redistribute resources to
women by decreasing their tax burden. 133
In response to the feminist criticism that the childcare provisions are unfairly
limited, other commentators have attempted to justify the limitation by arguing
that childcare services are personal in nature. Lawrence Zelenak, for example,
in his recent article critiquing the joint tax return provisions, notes that all
taxpayers must pay for the personal services they are no longer able to perform
themselves due to time spent in the waged labor market.' 34 The limited nature
of the childcare provisions, therefore, is Congress's recognition of the expense
as personal and not business.
The debate over the proper characterization of childcare expenses has fo-
cused scholars on narrow doctrinal questions to the exclusion of important
sociological data. Professor Zelenak and others who focus on the personal
nature of childcare expenses ignore the gendered division of labor in the
household. Countless studies indicate that women provide the bulk of the
unwaged labor in the household, regardless of the family's race or income
level. 1 35 Although men undertake certain household tasks, they tend to do jobs
that can be done at any hour of the day and that can be postponed if necessary.
Mowing the lawn or fixing the car, jobs overwhelmingly undertaken by men,
need not be done at a specific hour each day of the week. 136 The demands on
women's labor, on the other hand, tend to be quite inflexible. Children's meals
must be provided within a specific time frame, and, until children reach a
certain maturity level, they may not be left alone in the home. 137 Because men
tend to undertake limited household labor that does not interfere with time spent
131. Blumberg, supra note 5, at 63-91.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Zelenak, supra note 5, at 375; see also Chanoch Shreiber & Aaron Yoran, Child Care
Expenses: A Proposal for a More Equitable and Efficient Tax Treatment, 54 TAXES 345, 349 (1976)
(noting child care deduction questionable because expenses personal in nature).
135. See supra notes 40-4 1.
136. Demo & Acock, supra note 7, at 325-26.
137. See id. (noting mothers perform bulk of household chores except for outdoor work and car
repairs).
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in the waged labor force, the need to hire substitute labor is less pressing.
Women's extensive household responsibilities, however, do not enable women
to perform waged labor in the market without substitute childcare. Conse-
quently, the limitation of sections 21 and 129 affects men and women dispropor-
tionately, imposing economic hardship on women to a much greater extent than
men. In short, strict adherence to the personal/business distinction in the context
of childcare expenses might cause tax scholars unintentionally to perpetuate the
gendered nature of the Code that in practice provides greater tax benefits to men
than women.
Similarly, Professor Blumberg's position that treating childcare expenses as
business expenses will have positive behavioral and distributional impacts is
true only to the extent women are responsive to changes in the effective tax
rates. Many women make the decision to enter the market independent of the
financial incentives found in the Code. As discussed above, low-income women
and women of color of all income levels have had high market participation
levels despite the limited childcare provisions.138 In addition, a significant
number of women continue to think that children suffer emotional harm when
their mothers work in the paid labor force. 139 Because many women view their
nurturing and caretaking responsibilities to be of primary importance, they will
stay home regardless of the tax benefits available to them by entering the market
workforce. Characterizing childcare expenses as business expenses, therefore,
will most likely have a behavioral effect only upon women who do not have
strong views on women's role in the home or do not have serious financial need.
Characterizing childcare expenses as business expenses also will have only a
limited distributional effect. Although women are theoretically entitled to the
section 21 tax credit, in practice, many women do not qualify to take the entire
credit. Nonrefundable tax credits entitle a taxpayer to offset only the amount of
taxes actually owed. As Edward McCaffery has noted, because lower- and
middle-income women's salaries do not generate heavy tax burdens, the corre-
sponding credit available is often quite small.1 40 Indeed, a low-income family
earning $14,800 incurs a tax burden of only $75. The credit, therefore, would
entitle the family to save just $75 in taxes. Section 21 offers little financial
assistance to lower- and middle-income women. Instead, as McCaffery notes,
they are able to save on childcare expenses only to the extent that they can find
inexpensive childcare. Although section 21 provides more of a benefit to
upper-income women, even these women save only a small portion of their
childcare costs. Thus, the credit may reduce a disincentive to work for some
women, but it does not come close to offsetting the tax costs associated with
childcare for most women.141
138. See supra notes 80-83.
139. Zelenak, supra note 5, at 369-70.
140. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1017-18 (explaining why credit fails to offset low income families'
childcare costs).
141. Id. at 1019.
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Even if childcare expenses were completely deductible as a business expense
or Congress adopted a provision permitting a refundable tax credit, the subsidy
would still fail to provide benefits to many women. Low-income women often
cannot afford to purchase childcare in the market and instead must rely on
family members to provide free services. 4 2 A subsidy awarded through the Tax
Code for childcare expenses would therefore provide no benefit to some
women. 143
By enacting sections 21 and 129 of the Code, Congress has recognized that
childcare responsibilities impinge upon women's market participation and hinder
their possibility of economic independence. These limited provisions, however,
fail to provide meaningful assistance to many women. In addition, expansion of
the provisions arguably would have a minimal effect on many women's labor
decisions that are largely insensitive to changes in the Tax Code. For these
reasons, the current childcare tax provisions prove to be inadequate mechanisms
for improving women's economic security.
B. THE JOINT RETURN PROVISIONS UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE TAX CODE
In recent years, tax scholars have shifted attention from the childcare provi-
sions to the joint return provisions as a means to promote women's economic
independence. These scholars argue that the joint return provisions impose
higher tax burdens on married women than married men, thereby discouraging
married women from entering the paid labor force. To offset these distributional
and behavioral biases, many commentators, including Professor McCaffery and
Professor Zelenak, have called for the repeal of the joint return provisions.144
In this section, I briefly explain the historical context in which Congress
adopted the joint return provisions and the manner in which the provisions
affect married couples' tax burdens. I then outline Professor McCaffery's and
Professor Zelenak's argument concerning the economic harm women suffer
under the joint return provisions. While McCaffery and Zelenak identify a
behavioral bias in the Code, the bias, in -fact, affects only women on the
margins. This section concludes, therefore, by arguing that while repealing the
joint return provisions will provide a benefit to some women, Congress could
142. See BARBARA OMOLADE, THE RISING SONG OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 74-75 (1994)
(discussing family networks and traditional kinship ties of black families that work as major support
system for many mothers); see also CAIZOL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A
BLACK COMMUNITY 53-54 (1975) (discussing kin networks that provide childcare in low-income black
neighborhood); Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 59, at 132-33 (discussing cooperative
networks in which extended family provides communal childcare).
143. WILLER ET AL., supra note 45, at 34 fig. 8 (providing statistics indicating that families with
income of over $50,000 are most likely to claim tax credit under § 21 of Code).
144. Although many tax scholars have analyzed the problematic nature of the joint tax return
provisions, I focus on Professors McCaffery and Zelenak because they have most recently addressed
the problem. See McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1041-46 (arguing that traditional economic welfare
perspective argues for separate rate schedules perhaps even with different rates); Zelenak, supra note 5,
at 365-69 (arguing for separate filing with identical marginal rates for men and women).
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provide more broad-based support to women by focusing on women's unpaid
labor in the home.
1. The Joint Return Provisions: A Brief History
145
When Congress adopted the individual income tax in 1913, it mandated that
tax liability be assessed on an individual basis for all taxpayers regardless of
marital status. 146 At its inception, therefore, the Code required husbands and
wives to file as two separate individuals. Due to the diversity of state property
laws, however, the individual filing system often resulted in unequal tax bur-
dens for married taxpayers with identical incomes in different states.
In states with community property laws, a one-half interest of all community
property automatically vested in each spouse regardless of who earned the
wage. 147 As a result, each could claim half the income on a separate tax return.
By dividing income between two people, the couple could take advantage of a
lower marginal tax rate than would be applicable if the couple's income was
aggregated on one tax return. In short, by filing two returns, a couple could
decrease its overall tax liability.'
48
Property laws in common-law states dictated a different result. Because
property remained separately owned in common-law states, couples were not
permitted to divide their income and file two individual tax returns. Conse-
quently, unlike community property law states, common-law states required the
spouse who actually earned the income to pay tax on the full amount earned.
149
Often, this resulted in the imposition of a higher tax burden than if the taxpayer
lived in a community property state.
This phenomenon can easily be shown with a simple example. Under the
current rate structure, a couple earning $40,000 is subject to a twenty-eight
percent marginal tax rate, and a couple earning $20,000 is subject to a fifteen
percent marginal tax rate.1 50 If the couple earning $40,000 filed two separate
returns, each showing an income of $20,000, each spouse would be subject to
the fifteen percent tax rate. In short, the community property law system would
enable the couple to avoid paying the additional thirteen percent in taxes that
they would have paid on a portion of their income if they aggregated their
145. Numerous articles discussing taxation and the family provide a detailed history of the develop-
ment of the joint return system. Rather than reproduce these detailed studies, I simply outline the
material that has been extensively analyzed elsewhere. For a more detailed treatment of the issue, see
Bittker, supra note 1, at 1399-1417; Blumberg, supra note 5, at 50-59; Gann, supra note 5, at 10-24;
Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW
& HiST. REv. 259, 259-60 (1988); McCaffery, supra note 1, at 989-91.
146. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1400.
147. Gann, supra note 5, at 13.
148. This is possible due to the progressivity of the marginal tax rates. As the spouses' adjusted
gross income increases, they are more likely to fall within a higher tax bracket. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text for an example of this phenomenon.
149. Gann, supra note 5, at 15.
150. I.R.C. § 1 (1994).
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income and filed a single joint return.' 5 '
Aware of the tax benefits of living in community property states, married
couples living in common-law states challenged the fairness of a tax system that
imposed tax burdens based on residency rather than on income level. 152 In
response, Congress amended the Code in 1948 to allow married taxpayers to file
jointly. Pursuant to the joint return provisions, Congress no longer required each
individual to pay tax on his or her own earnings; rather, they considered married
taxpayers to be a taxable unit.153 The amendment gave couples in common-law
states the same benefits as those obtained in community property law states. In
addition to insuring that couples with equal income have equal tax burdens,
Congress's decision to treat married couples as the taxable unit fit with the
assumption that husbands and wives pooled their income and shared expenses.
In short, because married couples were perceived to act like a single economic
unit, Congress treated them as a single unit for tax purposes.' 54
2. Aggregation Under the Joint Return Provisions
Pursuant to the joint return provisions adopted in 1948, spouses may aggre-
gate their income and pay tax as a single unit according to the tax rate schedule
for married couples filing jointly. Of course, married couples are not required to
file jointly. Each spouse may file as an individual who is single and subject him
or herself to the tax rates applicable to married individuals filing singly, which
are the highest rates applicable to any taxpayer. 55
Although tax rates increase with income, the various schedules are not
identically progressive. The joint return provisions incorporate the least progres-
sive marginal tax rate schedule, often enabling couples filing jointly to have a
lower tax burden than if each filed as single individual taxpayers. Imagine, for
example, that Ellen is married and Deborah is single. Ellen and Deborah both
have an adjusted gross income of $30,000 a year, and each is the sole wage
151. Of course, the 28% tax rate will not apply to every dollar earned but only to income that
exceeds the 15% bracket. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
152. Consequently, many common-law state legislatures amended their property laws to conform to
community property law standards. Gann, supra note 5, at 15-16. In states in which the property laws
were not amended, couples sometimes formed husband and wife business partnerships to achieve the
same tax consequences as couples in community property states. Spousal partnerships enabled couples
to divide their income evenly, thereby allowing the couple to file separate tax returns and lowering the
effective tax liability of the household. See Jones, supra note 145, at 259-60 (arguing that by adopting
joint return provisions, Congress made spousal partnerships obsolete, thereby erasing economic power
women gained through use of such spousal partnerships; husbands and wives could simply file joint tax
return to obtain lower tax burden rather than setting up partnership, giving both spouses legal rights to
partnership income and property).
153. Gann, supra note 5, at 18.
154. Lawrence Zelenak, however, argues that Congress did not adopt the joint return system in an
effort to recognize couples as economic units. He argues that this is simply an argument that advocates
of the system have put forward after the adoption of the joint return provisions. Zelenak, supra note 5,
at 344-54.
155. I.R.C. § 1(d) (1994). Unmarried individuals and individuals who are heads-of-household have
separate marginal tax rate schedules. I.R.C. § l(b), (c) (1994).
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earner in the household. Because Ellen is married, she will use the marginal tax
rate applicable to married couples and will be subject to a fifteen percent tax
rate. 5 6 Deborah, on the other hand, is subject to the rate schedule applicable to
single individuals, and a portion of her income will be taxed at a twenty-eight
percent tax rate. 157 Consequently, Ellen will have a lower tax bill. This differ-
ence in tax liability is arguably justified because a married couple's salary
presumably supports at least one more person than does a single taxpayer's
salary.
The benefit obtained by a married couple with a single wage earner, however,
begins to evaporate when both spouses participate in the waged labor market.
Although filing under the joint return provisions entitles a couple to be taxed at
lower rates, these rates are still progressive. Thus, when both spouses are in the
waged labor market, the secondary wage earner's income can push the couple
into a higher marginal tax rate. For example, a married couple is subject to a
fifteen percent tax rate on all income up to $36,900, and income exceeding that
amount is subject to a twenty-eight percent marginal tax rate. Therefore, if both
Ellen and her spouse have an adjusted gross income of $30,000, a significant
portion of their income (everything over $36,900) will be taxed at the twenty-
eight percent rate; they would owe $11,867 in taxes.
In contrast, if Ellen and her spouse were entitled to file as two single,
unmarried individuals who each earn $30,000, they would be subject to a tax
burden of only $10,900. Although the rate schedule under the joint return
provisions is less progressive than any other schedule, because it requires a
couple to aggregate their income, the couple might be thrown into a higher tax
bracket than would apply if they could file separately. Consequently, income
aggregation under the joint tax return provisions does not always work to
benefit married couples; instead it sometimes imposes an additional tax burden
on married couples, commonly called a "marriage penalty."
3. The Market-Oriented Critique of the Joint Tax Return Provisions
Because the majority of couples were dual-income families in 1994, many
couples suffered a marriage penalty under the joint return provisions. Professors
McCaffery and Zelenak, however, point out that the marriage penalty imposes
tax burdens along gender lines. When the family is disaggregated and men's and
women's tax burdens are analyzed separately, it becomes clear that women, not
men, suffer the marriage penalty. 
158
156. I.R.C. § l(a) (1994).
157. I.R.C. § 1(c) (1994).
158. See supra note 144. McCaffery also argues that the joint. return provisions effectuate a loss of
the earned income tax credit under § 32 of the Tax Code. Under this provision, low-income wage
earners are entitled to a refundable tax credit based on the income level and the number of children in
the household. The joint tax return provisions will prevent a couple from obtaining the earned income
tax credit if their joint income exceeds the phase-out point. Because the credit is phased out as income
rises, aggregation under the joint tax return provisions will cause couples with one child who earn over
[Vol. 84:15711608
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The gendered nature of the tax burden is associated with the difference in
many men's and women's market participation rates. Professor McCaffery notes
that married women's market hours are often discretionary or marginal, while
married men's market salary is generally key to the family's economic survival.
McCaffery points to structural and biological factors that cause women to be the
family's secondary wage-earner. Women who have children, for example, are
likely to leave the labor force to give birth. When deciding whether or not to
return, many women will opt to stay home in light of the gendered wage gap,
the cost of childcare, and the tax structure that causes women to be taxed at the
highest marginal rate of their husbands. '
59
To understand the prevailing argument that women suffer a greater tax burden
than men, reconsider our hypothetical taxpayer, Ellen. Because the joint return
provisions require that the couple aggregate income, Ellen's wages will be
"stacked" on top of her husband's and taxed at her husband's highest marginal
rate. If Ellen's husband, for example, has an adjusted gross income of $30,000
per year, his salary will be taxed at the fifteen percent marginal tax rate. Imagine
Ellen undertakes a job that pays $10,000, a low-paying but flexible job that
enables Ellen to undertake childcare responsibilities in the home. Under the
joint return provisions, the couple is taxed at fifteen percent up to $36,900 and
twenty-eight on all income past that amount. Thus, every dollar Ellen earns that
causes the couple to earn collectively over $36,900 will be subject to a
twenty-eight tax rate.
McCaffery and Zelenak note that the effects of aggregation are beneficial to
men thanks to their abiding commitment to the waged labor market. Women, on
the other hand, are arguably less committed to the market and thus more likely
to move in and out of the waged labor force. McCaffery and Zelenak argue that
because women's labor rates are more flexible, women, in deciding whether or
not to go into the market, will consider the additional tax burden imposed by
aggregation under the joint return provisions. This additional tax burden could
often discourage women, but not men, from entering the market. ' 60
Professors McCaffery and Zelenak and many others have argued, therefore,
$11,250 to lose a portion of the credit until it is completely lost when income reaches $21,200. If the
couples were entitled to file as individuals, their low income levels might entitle them to a greater
benefit under § 32. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 995-96.
While McCaffery's insight is important, the economic problems associated with the loss of the
earned income tax credit (EITC) arguably do not lie with the joint return provisions. Rather, the
problem is associated with § 32's phase-out scheme and could easily be remedied by amending the rate
at which the phase-out occurs. Indeed, when Congress adopted § 32 in 1975, the joint return provisions
had been a part of the Tax Code for almost 30 years. Presumably, Congress was aware of the effects of
aggregation at the time it adopted § 32. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1412-13 (noting joint return
provisions were adopted in 1948). If Congress repeals the joint return provisions it would not
necessarily mean that it would continue to allow individual taxpayers to claim the credit under the
current EITC provisions in light of the limited benefits that they are intended to offer. A repeal of the
joint return provisions might, therefore, cause Congress to make corresponding amendments to § 32.
159. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 993-94.
160. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 993-94; Zelenak, supra note 5, at 369.
1996] 1609
HeinOnline -- 84 Geo. L.J. 1609 1995-1996
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
that it is the primary wage-earner who obtains the benefit of a zero percent tax
rate on a portion of income sheltered by the personal exemptions and standard
deductions and then gets the benefit of a fifteen percent tax rate on income up to
$36,900. When secondary wage-earners enter the market, they will not get the
benefit of the zero percent tax rate, and if the primary wage-earner has income
equal or close to $36,900, a portion of the secondary wage-earner's income will
be taxed at a twenty-eight percent marginal rate. Thus, McCaffery and Zelenak
argue that the joint return provisions impose a financial deterrent upon second-
ary wage-earners that does not affect the primary wage-earner, thereby discour-
aging women's, but not men's, market participation. Because McCaffery and
Zelenak perceive this unequal treatment as a violation of longstanding prin-
ciples of tax neutrality and as inconsistent with notions of optimal taxation,'
6
'
they conclude that Congress should tax individuals rather than couples. 
162
4. The Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Repealing the Joint Return
Provisions
The prevailing market-oriented critique of the joint tax return provisions
concludes that women suffer unfair distributional effects because the aggrega-
tion of income often increases their tax burden and discourages their market
participation. By focusing on the gendered nature of the rate structure, Profes-
sors McCaffery and Zelenak have sparked much debate about the fairness of the
joint return provisions. While the Code was once perceived to be a gender-
neutral statute, this argument can no longer stand in light of the previous
analysis. -
Our focus, however, should not be limited only to the negative effects of the
joint return provisions on women. It is important to note, for example, that
because only legally married women are affected by the joint return provisions,
only legally married women benefit or suffer under the provisions. By focusing
solely on the joint return provisions, therefore, we might fail to account for
single women, particularly women of color who are more often unmarried.
63
161. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1035-46; Zelenak, supra note 5, at 365-69.
162. Although market equality is an important feminist goal, some argue that market labor incen-
tives will not ensure equal treatment of waged laborers. The assumption that women with children will
ever be able to have the typical experience of middle-class men is problematic to some scholars. See,
e.g., Strassmann, supra note 93, at 60-63 (noting that constraints and interdependence stemming from
mother-child relationships do not enable individualized market behavior that economists and tax
theorists often assume). Additionally, while the argument that women must have choices just like men
appears to be a liberating approach to the Tax Code, such an approach does not necessarily alleviate
women's oppression. Joan Williams notes that the imagery of choice endorses self-interest, while "the
ideology of conventional femininity condemns mothers who pursue self-interest over their children's
needs as 'selfish.' "Williams, supra note 40, at 1561.
163. For example, while 65% of white women over the age of 18 are married, only 39% of
African-American women are married. See CivrL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 82, at 28 tbl. 2.13; see
also WOMEN'S BUREAU REPORT, supra note 92, at 2 (providing data indicating that 47% of black
families are maintained by single women, while 25% of hispanic families and 14% of white families
are maintained by single women).
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Tailoring tax amendments for married women, therefore, would work more to
the benefit of white women than women of color.64
There are additional reasons for considering issues beyond the joint return
provisions. As this section will show, although the joint return provisions
impose a financial disincentive for married women to work in the market, the
provisions do not, in fact, keep the majority of women from the market. 165
Additionally, in light of the unequal sharing and spending patterns within
families discussed above, the potential to redistribute income from men to
women by repealing the joint return provisions is quite limited.
a. Behavioral Effects. The prevailing argument that the joint return provi-
sions discourage women from entering the waged labor market assumes that
most women are secondary or marginal wage-earners who easily move in and
out of the market. Economic studies show this is true for some, but not all,
women. Indeed, commitment to the paid labor force is often more closely tied to
income level and race rather than marital status.
Women married to high-income wage earners, on the one hand, are often
unable to earn a market wage equal to their husband's salary. Because they can
earn only a fraction of what their husbands earn in the market, women in
high-income families often consider their wages optional or marginal to the
family's economic well-being.1 66 Low-income women, on the other hand, are
highly committed to the workforce and consider themselves coproviders whose
income is central to the family's economic survival. 67 Many low-income
women, for example, view waged and unwaged labor as inseparable aspects of
mothering, each equally important to providing for their children. Employment
in the market provides the resources for necessities such as rent, food, and
clothing that cannot be provided by the husband's salary alone. An empirical
study of married couples located in the Detroit area found that women in
164. McCaffery legitimates this focus on married women by taking the position that married women
are more economically vulnerable than single women. He argues that because single women are in the
waged labor market at much greater levels than married women, they are more likely to have wage and
benefit parity with men. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1039. Data, however, does not support the position
that single women are more likely to have economic equality with men; indeed, single mothers are the
most economically vulnerable of all women. Almost 20% of all families with children are headed by
women, yet they constitute 36% of all poor families. WOMEN'S BuREAu REPORT, supra note 92, at 2, 6;
see also Pateman, supra note 114, at 233 (citing 1982 statistics that women headed 20% of all families
with children, but women-headed families constituted 53% of all poor families). Although female-
headed households are far more likely to earn less and to live in poverty, they are subject to higher marginal tax
rates than are married couples. Focusing only on married women's marginal tax rates, therefore, does not seem
to address the concerns of the very women who are the most economically marginalized.
165. As discussed above, although the rate structure might cause some women to leave the
workplace, most women are not sensitive to the tax laws. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
166. See JANE C. HOOD, BECOMING A Two JOB FAMILY 188 (1983) (noting that society often
considers work by upper-income women as not necessary to family's survival, thereby relegating them
to "junior partner" status).
167. Id. at 186 (noting that working wives with family incomes below $15,000 contribute 47% to
62% of that income while wives with family income over $25,000 contribute only 33% of the total).
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low-income households were far more likely to contribute at least fifty percent
of the family's income from waged labor than women in middle- and upper-
income households.' 68 Consequently, many low-income women are highly
committed to working in the waged labor force and do not appear to be deterred
by the current tax laws.
t69
Women of color at all income levels have also participated in the waged labor
force at high levels. In 1990, for example, seventy-three percent of married
black women were in the waged labor force compared to just sixty-four percent
of white married women.170 In addition, many African-American women are
not the family's marginal wage-earner; in fact, despite their low wages, black
women's earnings have often constituted a larger share of total family income
than white women's earnings. A 1990 study undertaken by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights found that overall, married black women in the
market contribute fifty-one percent of the family's income while white women
only contribute thirty-nine percent.' 7 ' African-American women, therefore, are
less likely to perceive themselves as having an "option" to move in and out of
the paid labor force depending on the marginal tax rates Congress imposes.
Indeed, black women's waged labor historically has been critical to the
survival of their families in light of the racial discrimination in the market that
black men suffer. For example, black men suffer much higher unemployment
rates than white men, thereby making the income of black women especially
important.' 72 Black women are often in the waged labor force in greater
numbers than black men.' 73 Data indicates not only that women of color
historically have been highly committed to the workforce, but they sometimes
act as the family's primary wage earner. 17 4 Thus, to the extent that the joint
168. Suzanne Model, Housework by Husbands: Determinants and Implications, 2 J. FAM. ISSUES
225, 233 (1981).
169. Cf ROMERO, supra note 4, at 13 (noting poor immigrant women's high level of market
participation and relationship between paid employment and mother's obligation to provide for her
children).
170. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 82, at 105; see also WOODY, supra note 81, at 41 (noting that
marriage has contrasting influences on white and black women; marriage discourages white women's
market participation in the waged labor force, but it often produces an increased level of market
participation for black women).
171. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 82, at 100 tbl. 8-6. The contributions of women to family income
have increased dramatically over the past 30 years. See SwEET, supra note 81, at 192 (indicating that in 1964
nonwhite wives contributed 17% of family income, while white wives contributed 12% of the family income).
172. WOODY, supra note 81, at 38; Martha E. Gimenez, The Dialectics of Waged and Unwaged
Work: Waged Work, Domestic Labor and Household Survival in the United States, in WORK WITHOUT
WAGES 25, 30-32 (Jane L. Collins & Martha Gimenez eds., 1990) (discussing importance of women's
waged labor during times of economic downsizing).
173. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 90-4, FACTS ON WORKING WOMEN 8 (1991); U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS 395 tbl. 615 (1989) [hereinafter EMPLOY-
MENT & EARNINGS]. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see AMOTr & MATTHAEI, supra note 4, at 181.
174. See WOODY, supra note 81, at 40 (noting that many black men have dropped out of workplace,
transferring "work responsibilities to black women"). Economists predict that by the year 2005, black
women in the waged labor force will substantially outnumber black men. WOMEN'S BUREAU REPORT,
supra note 92, at 2.
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return provisions provide significant tax benefits to a couple with just one
spouse in the market, the provisions might provide financial assistance to some
black families during economically vulnerable periods.
Of course, it is not universally true that upper- and middle-income white
women perceive waged labor as optional or that women of color (of all income
levels) and low-income women uniformly have high levels of market participa-
tion. We cannot assume, however, that all women are marginal wage-earners in
light of the data indicating that many women do have high and steady levels of
market participation and contribute important resources to the family.
Although the joint return provisions tend to discourage dual-income families,
many women are in the market. Thus the joint return provisions and the
childcare provisions effect only some women. For example, women who have
strong views about the importance of mothering responsibilities will more often
stay in the home regardless of the financial incentives or disincentives found in
the Code. On the other hand, low-income women who are unable to meet the
cost of day-to-day living on their husband's salary alone will work in the market
despite the existence of work disincentives found in the Tax Code. In sum, only
women without strong views on a women's role in the home or serious
economic need will enter the waged labor force because of provisions in the Tax
Code.
Thus, although the Tax Code theoretically discourages women's waged labor,
empirical evidence does not establish that the Code has actually caused most
women to leave the waged labor force. Indeed, in addition to currently available
data, historical trends in the labor supply indicate that the tax structure has had
only a marginal effect upon women's labor supply. Although the joint return
provisions impose costs upon women and provide tax benefits to men, labor
trends since the adoption of the provisions are exactly the opposite of what we
would predict. The labor force participation rate of men has decreased, while
the rate for women has sharply risen.' 75 The potential to effectuate broad-based
behavioral goals by repealing the joint return provisions therefore appears quite
limited.
Indeed, to the extent that our tax goals are behavioral, there might be much
more direct methods to encourage women out of the home and into the market.
Many studies indicate that it is the need for cash income that pushes taxpayers
out into the waged labor market. This phenomenon can be observed in low-
income families in which women tend to be in the waged labor force in much
175. Indeed, commentators in every discipline discuss the phenomenon of the increased labor rates
of women and the decreasing rates of men in the waged labor force. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAx POLICY 77 (5th ed. 1987); Randall McGuire & Cynthia Woodson, Making Ends Meet:
Unwaged and Domestic Inequality in Broome County, New York, 1930-1980, in WORK WITHOUT
WAGES, supra note 172, at 168, 168-72 (discussing waged labor patterns of men and women in rural
New York over 50 year span); see also WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTS ON WORKING
WOMEN No. 92-1, WOMEN'S WORKERS: OUTLOOK To 2005, at 2 tbl. 1 (1992) [hereinafter OUTLOOK TO
2005] (providing data on men's and women's market participation rates over 30-year span).
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higher numbers than women in high-income families. As Professor Zelenak
notes, the traditional family with the man in the market and the woman working
in the home continues to be the prevailing model except when there is serious
economic need. 1
7 6
b. Distributional Effects. Although data indicate that many women do not
change their labor decisions in response to the high tax rates resulting from
aggregation under the joint tax return provisions, repealing the provisions might
nevertheless have important distributional effects. To the extent that the joint
return provisions impose a higher marginal tax rate than Congress would
impose under a system of individual taxation, repealing the provisions could
lower families' tax burdens, which would produce a greater amount of dispos-
able income.
While the market-oriented reform will benefit some women, Zelenak and
McCaffery both note that many women will not receive the benefits. Most
important, only married women seeking greater market participation will benefit
from tax reform that produces an individual filing system. 1 77 Single women or
married women who refuse to move into the market because they perceive it to
be their duty to undertake caring and nurturing responsibilities will not receive
the tax benefits.
1 78
Repealing the joint return provisions would enable only market-oriented,
married women to obtain higher after-tax income. A lower tax burden, however,
does not necessarily translate into greater disposable income for married women.
As discussed above, access to and control of family resources is often tied to the
gender hierarchy. Although women who work in the paid labor force usually
have control over their own income, often they use their entire salary for family
expenses such as childcare, rent, and food. Thus, even if women have greater
income due to a lower tax rate, the benefits will likely be distributed throughout
the whole family. Repealing the joint return provisions might simply enable women to
undertake a greater responsibility for living expenses, leaving men more disposable
income for their own leisure activities and luxury items. In short, an individual
filing system might, therefore, serve to benefit men more than women.
C. PRIVILEGING WOMEN'S MARKET LABOR OVER HOUSEHOLD LABOR
The childcare provisions and the proposed repeal of the joint tax return
provisions are both tax-based market incentive programs. This market-oriented
176. Zelenak, supra note 5, at 370-71 (citing Gallup poll taken in 1990 that suggests most women
work in the paid labor force only because their families need additional monetary income).
177. Married women may benefit because they arguably suffer the burden of the increased marginal
tax rates due to the joint filing system.
178. See McCaffery, supra note 1, at 663 (noting that some women will choose to stay at home
regardless of the pay offered in waged labor market); Zelenak, supra note 5, at 370-71 (citing 1990
Gallup poll showing that 63% of people polled believed that children benefit from stay-at-home
mother).
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approach to tax reform has both behavioral and distributional goals. In general,
these provisions aim to encourage women to substitute market labor for house-
hold activities, thereby increasing women's market participation levels and
ensuring women's greater access to economic resources. While market indepen-
dence is an important feminist goal, 179 the valuable nature of women's house-
hold labor should not be ignored. In this section, I explore the reasons why it is
important to value both market and nonmarket labor rather than privilege the
former over the latter. I do not mean to suggest that market-equality is unimpor-
tant. Instead, I argue that Congress should value all work regardless of where it
is performed.
Many theorists have discussed the benefits of greater social recognition of the
value of housework. Professors Martha Fineman, Patricia Hill Collins, Dorothy
Roberts, and Regina Austin have all argued that nurturing and caretaking
responsibilities can be satisfying and politically empowering. 80 The policy goal
of encouraging women to substitute market labor for their household labor can
only be achieved, therefore, by changing the behavior of women who do not
experience household labor as demeaning and oppressive. 181 Rather than simply
ignoring women's household activities, our feminist goal should be to maintain
the positive aspects of the work by helping ensure that society values house-
work as well.
While focusing on market equality is important, the market-oriented solutions
to promote women's economic security ignore the sociological data indicating
that women do not substitute marketwork for household responsibilities. Women
continue to be responsible for the bulk of the household labor even after moving
into the waged labor force. As a result, focusing only upon women's market
labor might increase the burden on women by encouraging women to work
full-time in the waged labor market and full-time in the home.
Additionally, by focusing solely on market labor, we define nonmarket
laborers as dependent individuals and wage-earners as economically indepen-
dent and autonomous individuals. 182 Many wage earners, however, remain
economically vulnerable and are often in poverty due to low wages and limited
benefits. A market-oriented conceptualization of equality, therefore, draws on a
weak relationship between market participation and economic independence,
and as a result, might promote misguided solutions that fail to ensure women's
179. But see Roback, supra note 59, at 123-25 (arguing that equalizing earning potential of men and
women is flawed social goal because economic resources are not adequate measure of well-being or
happiness).
180. See supra notes 59-74.
181. See Dorothy Roberts, Deviance, Resistance, and Love, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 179, 185 n.37
(arguing that working in waged labor market can be seen as sign of vulnerability, not strength and
independence).
182. Commentators often conceptualize dependency as intricately related to labor force participa-
tion. See JUNE AxtNN & MARK J. STERN, DEPENDENCY AND POVERTY: OLD PROBLEMS IN A NEW WORLD
38 (1988); see also FINEMAN, supra note 62, at 67-68 (noting that women cannot act as independent
economic actors in light of nurturing roles undertaken).
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economic independence. 83
The single mother's experience demonstrates that market participation does
not always translate into economic independence. Single mothers with children
are more likely than any other women to participate in the market; seventy-five
percent of divorced women with children are in the waged labor force. Despite
this high participation rate, this group suffers the greatest incidence of pov-
erty. 184 Additionally, many women do not perceive the marketplace to be
compatible with their needs. Women at every income level report that they
experience extreme stress and fatigue when they struggle to balance
waged work with household responsibilities. 8 5 It is not exclusion from the
market that seems to cause economic impoverishment and vulnerability, but
rather the conditions under which women operate in the market and in the
household. '
86
By identifying market labor as the only means for women to achieve eco.
nomic independence, many commentators fail to acknowledge that economic
vulnerability results primarily from the difference between the wages and
benefits provided for market and domestic labor. The reasons to favor atomistic,
market-oriented roles over caring, nurturing, and relational roles often depend
on cultural values that are not universally shared; our society unfortunately
recognizes economic value in marketwork but not housework.1 87 As a result,
defining women's dependence in terms of the market/nonmarket dichotomy
183. Focusing only on the extent to which women are in the paid labor market ignores the data
indicating that women's labor has never been as highly valued as men's labor. Indeed, women have
long argued that they obtain lower wages and fewer benefits because of their sex. See, e.g., Siegal,
Home at Work, supra note 4, at 1129 (noting that early feminists argued women are paid lower salary in
market simply because they are women). Simply calling for women to move into the waged labor force
does not ensure wage and benefit parity with men in light of the pervasive racism and sexism in the
market. See Barbara F. Reskin, Bringing the Men Back In: Sex Differentiation and the Devaluation of
Women's Work, 2 GENDER & Soc. 58 (1988). Historical evidence bears this out. Data indicates that
when women move into a male dominated occupation, men get out, resulting in a pay and a status
decrease. Rosemary Hunter, Afterword: A Feminist Response to the Gender Gap in Compensation
Symposium, 82 GEO. L.J. 147, 155 (1993) (arguing that once women get into labor force "there is no
guarantee that gender segregation will not reconstitute itself in a different pattern, with women still
clustered in relatively low-paid labor market ghettoes").
184. WOMEN's BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTS ON WORKING WOMEN, No. 89-3, WORKING
MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 2 (1989) [hereinafter WORKING MOTHERS]; WOMEN'S BuREAu, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTS ON WOMEN, No. 93-3, WOMEN WHO MAINTAIN FAMIItES 5 (1993) [hereinafter
MAINTAIN FAMILIES].
185. Lucie White, On the "Consensus" to End Welfare: Where Are the Women's Voices?, 26 CONN.
L. REv. 843, 846-47 (1994) (discussing work/family dilemma that women at all income levels suffer);
see also RHODE, supra note 2, at 134 (asserting that although domestic sphere has been source of
oppression, so have public institutions).
186. See Peter Pitegoff, Child Care Enterprise, Community Development, and Work, 81 GEO. L.J.
1897, 1921 (1993); see also Pateman, supra note 114, at 244 (noting that women in waged labor force
are seen or see themselves primarily as wives and mothers and their wage is considered "supplemen-
tal," justifying reduced wages and benefits).
187. See generally Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modem Friendship: Dislocating the Commu-
nity, in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 49, at 145-53 (discussing communitarian and
individualistic conception of identity and social attachments).
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casts the issue as one of how to assimilate women into the traditionally male
sphere rather than how to value the work women do in the home.
Encouraging women to participate in the market to ensure independent access
to the wages and benefits that are currently offered to men might also further
devalue domestic labor. Commentators advocating a formal equality approach
concerning women's labor and benefits might unintentionally accept the male
norm of achievement, which tends to sanction oppressive arrangements. 88 For
example, encouraging women to perform market labor will not necessarily
alleviate their household responsibilities or the double workload women endure
while participating in the market workforce. Focusing only on women's limited
market participation relative to men's fails to acknowledge that women are
currently performing work in the home worth at least twenty percent of the
gross national product, or $145 billion. 189 Viewing women's economic dependence as
caused by insufficient market labor might promote the belief that nonmarket house-
work is not valuable. Women who choose to care for their children must be recog-
nized as making a valid choice and as contributing valuable labor to the economy.
Most important, that choice must not hinder their economic independence.' 90
Finally, women's entry into the market may not work to break down the
current gender hierarchy. As Reva Siegal has noted in an historical context,
facilitating women's entry into the market can potentially exacerbate gender
inequality as well as race and class exploitation. Upper-middle income women,
for example, use their economic power to escape the double-day syndrome by
reassigning childcare duties to low-income women, often of a different race.' 9 '
And regardless of whether the domestic worker performs the labor in the
employer's home or in the market in day-care centers, the labor is primarily
performed by women for low wages and few or no benefits.' 92 Thus, when
188. Finley, supra note 3, at 1152-59 (discussing formal equality and "male norm"). While
Professor McCaffery argues that married women should be subject to lower marginal tax rates than
married men, his goal is to enable women to have the same market options that men have, not to
account for their greater levels of housework. See McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1053-59.
189. QUAH, supra note 41, at 89 (citing 1973 estimate of value of labor).
190. For an insightful and extremely interesting account of how the development of the market
economy causes many to believe women are not actually engaging in "work," see Nancy Folbre, The
Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought, 16 SIGNS 463, 465
(1991); see also Siegal, Home at Work, supra note 4, at 1092-94. See generally BORIS, supra note 4
(discussing homework and challenging popular work/home divide).
191. Siegal, Home at Work, supra note 4, at 1198-202 (discussing early feminists who sought to
arrange cooperative housekeeping, which would result in high-income women paying low-income
women to do their housework). For a discussion of this phenomenon today, see ROMERO, supra note 4,
at 29 (hiring domestic worker frees woman to pursue her own occupation--employment at much higher
salary than will be paid to domestic worker).
192. See AMOTr & MA-rrHAEI, supra note 4, at 323-26 (providing data over course of 80 years on
women who perform domestic services for pay); ROMERO, supra note 4, at 98 (upper-income women
generally hire low-income women of color to provide extensive physical and emotional labor for very
little pay and under harassing conditions); Glenn, supra note 68, 1350-53 (providing detailed data on
overrepresentation of women of color in service and cleaning industry and noting that white women
tend to be employed as supervisors while wonen of color are disproportionately assigned to less-skilled
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women hire childcare assistance, the gendered organization of the household
can simply be reproduced in a new form as a relationship between women of
different socioeconomic statuses. Regardless of the tax structure, therefore,
domestic labor will most likely be undertaken by women, and the work is
generally divided along race and class lines as well as gender lines.
IV. VALUING AND TAXING WOMEN'S HOUSEHOLD LABOR
The previous discussion demonstrates that past efforts to increase women's
economic security through tax reform have had limited success. Women, for a
variety of reasons, have not responded to incentives aimed at encouraging their
market participation. As a result, feminist scholars must shift their attention to
other means for achieving the goal of economic independence.
In particular, scholars must seriously consider the advantages of broadening
the tax base to include the benefits of women's unwaged labor. As discussed
above, taxation provides access to substantial, independent social welfare ben-
efits in retirement and disability. Tying the benefits to household labor as well as
market labor would ensure greater resources for women and would represent a
congressional recognition of caretaking responsibilities as valuable and produc-
tive labor. 193 Broadening the tax base to include nonmarket labor, therefore, is
an attempt to ignore the market/nonmarket dichotomy that, in effect, labels
household endeavors simply as gratuitous acts undertaken by women out of
love and commitment to their families. 1
94
This tax reform proposal builds on the traditional conception of income,
positions such as cleaning and building maintenance); Linder, supra note 110, at 113-18 (noting that
Congress adopted legislation that would eliminate social security benefits to household workers in
effort to reduce paperwork for family that hire domestic help). For an interesting discussion of the wage
deflation in the service industry, in general, see Marc Linder, Closing the Gap Between Rich and Poor:
Which Side Is the Department of Labor On?, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 22-23 (1993-94)
(noting that in light of Department of Labor's exemption of salaried employees from Fair Labor
Standards Act, fast-food restaurants and convenience stores have more than quadrupled their supervi-
sory positions seeking to increase hours and at same time avoid paying overtime to their staff).
193. See Charles O'Kelley, The Parenting Tax Penalty: A Framework for Income Tax Reform, 64
OR. L. REv. 375, 406 (1986) (advocating tax deduction to offset negative income from parenting and to
recognize parenting as service to society); see also Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 47, at 166
(arguing that by failing to speak of women's household labor, we ignore and devalue it).
194. If Congress recognizes the value and importance of household labor in the federal income tax
context, perhaps it would be more likely that the work would be valued in every area of the law. For an
excellent discussion of the invisibility of housework throughout the law, see Silbaugh, supra note 40. I
do not mean to suggest that tax-based reform is the only road to women's economic independence.
There are, of course, countless other legal mechanisms that could be devised to address the problem of
women's economic vulnerability caused by the division of labor along gender lines. See, e.g., OKIN,
supra note 56, at 180-81 (suggesting that employers make out wage checks equally divided between
earner and household laborer); Katharine K. Baker, Comment, Contracting for Security: Paying
Married Women What They've Earned, 55 U. Ctn. L. REV. 1193, 1220-23 (1988) (proposing formula
for spousal compensation in divorce based on notions of contract and taking into consideration amount
of time women work in home and in waged labor force). But see SARAH HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETHIcs
(1990) (arguing that state should have less rather than more input into our private lives).
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which theoretically includes all increases in the taxpayer's economic wealth.' 95
By refusing to make a distinction between labor performed in the private and
public spheres, Congress would recognize the value of household labor and the
individual laborers regardless of the location of the labor. Rather than viewing
women only as nurturing caregivers providing gratuitous services to the home
out of love, duty, and custom, women would be treated as autonomous individu-
als with economic rights. Finally, by taxing household labor, Congress would
follow the lead of other areas of law in which the public/private distinction has
been seen as both false and problematic. 196
In this Part, I examine the widely held objections to imposing a tax on
household labor. Since the adoption of the individual income tax in 1913, the
primary objection to taxation of nonmarket labor focused on the administrative
difficulties of valuing the work. 197 Although the economics literature once
reflected agreement on the impossibility of valuing nonmarket labor,198 numer-
ous economists have since devised methods by which the labor could be valued
in market terms for tax purposes. The second objection economists and tax
scholars have raised involves concerns about distributional unfairness. 99 If
Congress taxed nonmarket activities, it would impose a financial burden on
taxpayers engaged in noncash transactions. Taxpayers performing nonmarket
services, therefore, might not have the economic resources to pay the tax. In
response to this difficulty, I suggest technical amendments to the Code that
would mirror the currently available tax credits, thereby ensuring low-income
taxpayers will not be further impoverished by the imposition of a tax on
household labor. Finally, I examine the potentially demeaning effects of monetiz-
ing or "commodifying" women's household labor.200 Although using market
terminology to value nonmarket activities is problematic, I find that because it
195. Tax reform has long centered on a comprehensive tax base that would tax all forms of
economic income. See SURREY, supra note 127, at 15 (arguing that use of tax expenditure analysis is
grounded in value of identifying departures from comprehensive tax base); Louis Kaplow, Human
Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REv. 1477, 1500 (1994) (noting that income tax fails to
include everything of economic value within its definition of income); Paul B. Stephan HI, Federal
Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REv. 1357, 1385 (1984) (noting that both liberal and
conservative tax reformers have sought broad tax base).
196. See Wendy Brown, Finding the Man in the State, 18 FEMINIST STUD. 7, 18 (1992) (noting that
law has reached into private sphere establishing marital rape as rape, wife battery as battery, and child
abuse as abuse). For a critique of the public/private distinction, see, e.g., Roberts, Racism and
Patriarchy, supra note 69, at 7-22 (discussing black women's labor and noting inappropriateness of
public/private distinction as theoretical construct for capturing black women's life experience and
history).
197. See infra notes 201-41 and accompanying text.
198. See 1 SIMON KUzNETs, NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS COMPOSImONS, 1919-1938, at 6-11 (1941)
(discussing exclusion of nonmarket goods from concept of national income); ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 76 (8th ed. 1948) (stating that self-provided services are not included in the
definition of income); A.C. Picou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 32-34 (1932) (arguing that self-
provided services should not be considered part of national income).
199. See infra notes 240-61 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 263-83 and accompanying text.
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would value work otherwise considered economically worthless, taxing wom-
en's household labor could, on balance, empower rather than oppress women.
A. VALUATION CONCERNS
1. Distinguishing Productive Labor from Leisure Activities
Taxpayers obtain significant "psychic" income from many nonmarket house-
hold activities such as watching the sunset, smoking a cigarette, balancing a
checkbook, and recycling paper and cans. By providing self-supplied services,
such as mowing a lawn and preparing a meal, the taxpayer also provides
valuable economic benefits to the household. Theoretically, because Congress
seeks to tax all items that improve the taxpayer's well-being, an ideal Tax Code
would include the value of these activities within the tax base.2°' Of course, if
Congress attempted to tax all benefits the household received from each family
member's labor and leisure, enormous administrative complications would
arise. The benefits derived from labor and leisure within each household would
vary and the value assigned to such benefits could be wildly disparate. In short,
it would be impossible for the Internal Revenue Service to assess accurately and
to collect tax liabilities without offensive intrusion into each taxpayer's pri-
vacy.20
2
Rather than attempting to capture the value of all labor and leisure, Congress
could focus only on the productive aspects of household activities. Although
long viewed as simply an expression of love and commitment, the productive
nature of nurturing and caregiving activities has recently gained wide accep-
tance outside of the law. Sociologists and economists have begun to generate
extensive scholarship discussing and analyzing the productive nature of house-
work, and many scholars have argued that by understanding the nature of
women's contribution to the household, we will have a better understanding of
the economy outside of the home. 0 3
Joan Smith, for example, notes that the availability of nonwage labor helps
shape the nature of technological advances in the market. Smith points to the
design of washing machines to make her point. Rather than designing large
communal washers and dryers, the industry, assuming that household labor
necessary to operate a private machine will be available, has designed appli-
ances that accommodate the average size family.2° Gary Becker's work also
illustrates the interrelationship between women's labor in the home and the
competitive market. Becker notes that by combining labor with goods pur-
chased in the market, the household operates as a "small factory" producing
201. SIMONS, supra note 23, at 110 (arguing that list of benefits from household activities is literally
endless, making taxation impossible).
202. KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 23, at 121.
203. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 40.
204. Joan Smith, Nonwage Labor and Subsistence, in HOUSEHOLDS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 64,
73 (Joan Smith et al. eds., 1994).
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such items as meals, clean clothes, and made beds.2°5 Finally, Euston Quah
argues that understanding the value of productive household labor would give
us a better understanding of our overall welfare, would provide policymakers
with a better understanding of the labor supply, and would enable us to better
understand the distribution of wealth between households with different levels
of nonmarket labor.206
Economists and sociologists have, therefore, "unquestionably allowed for an
interpretation of household activities that both highlights the productive nature
of housework and institutionalizes the idea that unpaid work must be analyzed
if the economy outside the house is to be properly understood., 20 7 Because
women perform the bulk of the productive housework, analyzing the nature of
this labor means focusing upon women's unpaid labor in the home.
Although economists and sociologists have uncovered the productive aspects
of women's labor, much of the work in the home could be described as having
elements of both labor and leisure. A number of economists, however, have set
forth theories for distinguishing between women's productive labor and leisure
activities. Gary Becker, for example, defines household production in terms of
commodities produced.20 8 Becker argues that commodities are produced through
a combination of time and goods purchased in the market. The consumption of
those commodities yields utility to the household, the value of which is argu-
ably equal to the value of the household services provided by women. 20 9 By
applying this valuation method, the market value of cooked meals and childcare
services could be estimated and then taxed by Congress.
Economists have devised numerous other methods to distinguish valuable
labor from leisure. Kathryn Walker and Margaret Woods, for example, argue
that productive activities are those performed in individual households to create
the goods and services that make it possible for a family to function.210 Rueben
Gronau argues that productive household labor has a close substitute and
generates utility similar to market labor while leisure is all other activities. 2 1,
205. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of lime, 75 ECON. J. 493, 496 (1965). For an
explanation of the impact Becker's work has had on traditional microeconomic theory, see Richard A.
Berk, The New Home Economics: An Agenda for Sociological Research, in WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD
LABOR, supra note 41, at 113, 113-28.
206. QUAH, supra note 41, at 22-23.
207. Silbaugh, supra note 40, at 23.
208. Becker, supra note 205, at 516-17.
209. Id. But see QUAH, supra note 41, at 33 (criticizing this approach as too broad because nothing
would be excluded as leisure).
210. KATHRYN E. WALKER & MARGARET E. WOODS, TIME USE: A MEASURE OF HOUSEHOLD PRODUC-
TION OF FAMILY GOODS AND SERVICES 261 n.4 (1976).
211. Rueben Gronau, Home Production-A Forgotten Industry, 62 REv. ECON. & STAT. 408, 408-16
(1980) (proposing method for identifying and estimating productivity and value of household produc-
tion); Rueben Gronau, Leisure, Home Production, and Work-The Theory of the Allocation of lime
Revisited, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1099, 1104-13 (developing model that estimates value of housework); see
also QUAH, supra note 41, at 34-35 (citing Gronau study and criticizing it as failing to acknowledge that
people enjoy some aspects of their jobs and experience differences in utility between jobs).
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Finally, Oli Hawrylyshyn argues productive labor is labor that could be pro-
duced by a third person hired in the market without changing their utility to the
members of the household.21 2 For example, the utility the household gets from
having a clean floor is presumably not reduced when a person outside the
household performs the task, while the same cannot be said of attending a jazz
concert.
Although economists have not uniformly agreed to a single approach for
distinguishing valuable household labor from leisure, and much literature has
been devoted to problematic assumptions underlying each approach, they gener-
ally agree that separating productive labor from leisure is possible. Thus,
although it would certainly not be an easy task, current economic literature
indicates that household labor can be distinguished from leisure.
2. Quantifying Household Labor
In addition to distinguishing labor from leisure, Henry Simons raised a
concern with quantifying women's labor in different households in his classic
work, Personal Income Taxation. Simons, who was concerned with tax fairness,
argued that while imputing an identical value for household chores to each
household would not create administrative complications, it would produce
unfair results in light of the varying amounts of productive labor each house-
hold produces. Simons concluded that it would be impossible to ensure tax
fairness between households by independently valuing each household task
without suffering enormous administrative difficulties and government intrusion
into the private lives of the taxpayers.213
Of course, a detailed and thorough measurement of the time each woman
spends on productive household labor would be administratively impossible.
Productive household labor, however, could be quantified based on the number
of children in the household, the presence of a husband, and the women's
market participation. Time-use studies providing detailed data about the number
of hours each family member spends performing unwaged labor in the house-
hold could be used to estimate the amount of labor produced.214 Thus, there is
no need to measure the precise amount of unpaid labor in each household.
Indeed, Congress has balanced the fairness and administrative concerns that
Simons raised in similar contexts. Section 151 of the Code, for example,
permits taxpayers to take a $2000 deduction for each household dependent.
215
Through the deduction, Congress recognizes economic expenses the taxpayer
212. OLI HAWRYLYSHYN, STATISTICS CANADA, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE,
CANADA, ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF HOUSEHOLD WORK IN CANADA 1971, at 14-19 (1978).
213. SIMONS, supra note 23, at 41-58.
214. See, e.g., Demo & Acock, supra note 7, at 325-27. For a brief discussion of the available
time-use studies, see HAWRYLYSHYN, supra note 212, at 19-29; QUAr, supra note 41, at 39-42
(discussing studies quantifying household labor). See infra notes 304-07 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how these factors affect the number of hours women spend on domestic tasks.
215. I.R.C § 151 (1994).
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incurs when supporting a dependent. The provision offsets at least a portion of
the costs incurred in caring for children, elderly parents, and other depen-
dents.216 Actual expenses within each household are presumably quite disparate
and largely dependent on the family's income level. Congress, however, chose
to allow a deduction of just $2000 because it would be administratively
impossible to determine the costs of providing dependent care in each house-
hold. Congress, therefore, chose to balance the competing public policy con-
cerns by permitting each household a minimum deduction, despite the fact that
actual expenses could far exceed the amount allowed to be deducted.
Section 32 of the Code also reflects a congressional balancing of fairness and
administrative concerns. Section 32 permits low-income taxpayers to take an
earned income tax credit ("EITC"). 2 17 Congress's intent in adopting section 32
was in part to encourage taxpayers to work in the waged labor force by
offsetting a portion of the tax burden associated with earning income in the
market.21 8 Taxpayer preference for market versus nonmarket activities are, of
course, quite varied. To operate effectively, the amount of the credit should vary
according to each taxpayer's personal preference for unwaged and waged labor.
Congress would need to provide a large credit to some taxpayers to induce a
substitution of market labor for nonmarket labor. Other taxpayers might only
need a small credit to be pushed into the market. Despite the impossibility of
designing a program that would reflect each taxpayer's individual preference,
Congress adopted the EITC provisions. It balanced the public policy concern
for reducing the low-income wage earner's tax burden against the desire for
administrative ease by creating an EITC program that permits a small tax credit
that is phased out as taxpayer's income rises. 21 9 As Anne Alstott has recently
noted, the EITC program may provide work incentives for some taxpayers, but
the program is far from perfect and may even provide market disincentives for
others. 220 Nevertheless, Congress opted for the program despite the inevitable
constraints and limitations that result when it balances competing public policy
concerns.
Similarly, Congress could devise a system that seeks to capture a rough
estimate of the time women spend in the home on household tasks and the value
of the labor. Congress, for example, could impute a value -to the labor based on
the number of dependents in the household, the presence of a husband, and the
216. SIMONS, supra note 23, at 137, 140 (noting fairness issues that would arise if tax structure
imposed identical tax on two families with same adjusted gross income but with different number of
dependents).
217. I.R.C. § 32 (1994).
218. George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to
Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 225, 230 (1994) (noting goals of
program are both distributional and behavioral).
219. See infra note 288 and accompanying text (outlining phase-out schedule for family with one
child).
220. Alstott, supra note 78, at 546-59.
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level of women's market participation. 22' Although this would not be a precise
measure of the value of women's household labor, it would account for at least
a portion of the value the household receives.222
Although the fairness and administrative concerns that Henry Simons and
others have raised are certainly relevant to the task of determining the appropri-
ate quantity of labor to be imputed to household, these concerns do not render
taxation a practical impossibility. Congress has balanced these same concerns in
many other related and unrelated contexts throughout the Code.2 23 Indeed, just
as Congress adopted the EITC and the dependent exemption provisions, it could
adopt provisions that estimate the extent and value of household labor to ensure
women's access to the social welfare programs.
3. Imputing a Market Value to Household Labor
Finally, Michael McIntyre and Oliver Oldman have argued that even if
Congress could identify and measure productive labor, additional problems still
exist with determining and assigning a market value to household labor.22 4 First,
in contrast to waged work, the actual tasks that women perform vary from
household to household. Second, women respond to the demands of spouses
and children, as well as other social institutions (such as children's school, the
transportation system, and health authorities) when providing labor in the
home.225 Third, standards of performance are obscure and are often set by each
221. See John P. Robinson, Housework Technology and Household Work, in WOMEN AND HOUSE-
HOLD LABOR, supra note 41, at 53, 58 (providing data indicating that a woman spends more time on
household labor when she is married, has children, and does not work in paid labor force); see also
infra notes 303-15 and accompanying text (discussing implementation of tax tied to these factors).
222. See infra notes 303-15 and accompanying text (discussing how imputing income from house-
hold labor would likely affect the tax burden of three hypothetical taxpayers).
223. The tax expenditure budget is another well-known example in which fairness concerns pre-
vailed over administrative hurdles. In an effort to uncover the hidden or buried tax subsidies within the
tax structure, the Treasury Department first published a list of tax expenditures in 1968. See SURREY,
supra note 127, at 30-40 (discussing tax expenditure budget from historical perspective and effects it
has had on tax reform). Tax analysts consider a tax expenditure to be any provision in the Tax Code that
departs from the "normal" structure of the income tax or one that results in revenue losses due to a
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income, a credit, preferential tax rate, or a
deferment of tax liability. Id. at 15-24. Devising a tax expenditure budget, however, generated a vast
literature with many tax scholars taking the position that it was administratively impossible to devise a
method that would accurately measure and compute the value of each tax expenditure. See, e.g.,
Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
79, 79-83 (1980) (noting voluminous and "contentious" literature that developed in response to
problem of defining tax expenditure); Gene Steuerle, Reflections on the Status of Tax Expenditures, 68
TAX NOTES 485, 485-86 (1995) (noting inadequacy of tax expenditure method, but arguing it is
important for testing tax fairness); Edward Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic
Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 315, 315-16 (1988) (arguing Code's treatment of qualified
plans is consistent with terms of normative income tax and should not be characterized as tax
expenditure). Despite the number of commentators taking the position that it was administratively
impossible to devise a tax expenditure budget, Congress now requires a list of tax expenditures in the
federal budget. See The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.
224. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 17, at 1609-13.
225. Joan Acker, Class, Gender, and the Relations of Distribution, 13 SIGNS 473, 488 (1988).
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women individually. Consequently, the value of the housework could vary
dramatically between households. In light of these complications, many tax
theorists have taken the position that income from nonmarket labor cannot be
valued by applying a formula based on objectively observable factors. Because
the services cannot be valued in market terms, many argue the labor is impos-
sible to value accurately and fairly. 226
Although valuation raises fairness and administrative problems, these compli-
cations do not prevent taxation. Congress currently does not limit taxation to
benefits that taxpayers can easily value in market terms. Indeed, the value of
many assets is taxable even when no market exists on which the taxpayer can
trade the asset. Employees in the corporate context, for example, receiving
unique stock options that cannot be sold in the market or even used as collateral,
are nevertheless subject to taxation.227 The nonexistence of a market, in this
context, has not prevented Congress from taxing the stock options, nor have
commentators argued the stock options should be excluded from the tax base.
Rather, the options are recognized as valuable assets raising the economic status
of the taxpayer.
Although Congress has failed to impose a tax on household labor-labor for
which a market does exist---economists have devised numerous valuation meth-
ods that produce meaningful estimates of the worth of household production. 28
The replacement value method is the most widely accepted method used to
value household production. This approach involves equating the value of the
household labor with the cost of hiring another person in the market to perform
the same work.2 29 Determining the replacement value of household labor is
easy because the market now provides services formerly available only in the
home. These new services include childcare centers, laundry services, and
restaurants providing "home-cooked" meals. 230
. Professor Daniel Shaviro and others, however, have criticized the replace-
ment value method as being unable to capture accurately the value of self-
supplied services. He argues that many taxpayers would not purchase the
services at the going market rate.2 3 1 Although he argues against valuation and
226. See Thuronyi, supra note 23, at 60-61 (noting practical difficulties of assessing a fair tax). But
see Thomas Chancellor, Imputed Income and the Ideal Income Tax, 67 OR. L. REv. 561, 562 (1988)
(arguing that benefits of self-performed services should not be characterized as income even in world
with ideal income tax).
227. Kaplow, supra note 195, at 1482 n.11; see also I.R.C. § 83(a)(2) (1994) (noting property is
includable in gross income at time it is received).
228. For a discussion of the various methods of valuing household labor, see HAWRYLYSHYN, supra
note 212, at 14-19; see also Euston Quah, Valuing Family Household Production: A Contingent
Evaluation Approach, 19 APPLIED EcON. 875, 878-80 (1987) (discussing "contingent evaluation"
method that determines households' maximum willingness to pay for different levels of housework).
229. QUAH, supra note 41, at 50.
230. Id. at 53-54.
231. Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the Measurement of
Taxable Consumption, 45 TAx L. REv. 215, 228-29 & n.53 (1990) (arguing against taxing value of
household labor).
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taxation of imputed income, Professor Shaviro notes that if the replacement
value method were used, one approach to ensure greater accuracy and fairness
would be "simply to discount fair market value by an arbitrary fixed percent-
age." 2
32
Alternatively, Gary Becker has suggested that household labor could be
valued according to the individual's opportunity cost of time.233 Under Becker's
theory, individuals will allocate time to housework until the value of the labor
equals the opportunity cost of a market wage. 234 Thus, by determining the
amount women could earn in the market, Becker argues that the value of their
household labor could also be ascertained.
The third and most simple approach would be to estimate the number of
hours per week women spend performing household labor and value the labor
according to the minimum wage. 35 Although this approach would impose an
arbitrarily low limit on the value of household services, it nevertheless would
ensure women who work exclusively in the home have some access to eco-
nomic resources during periods of retirement and disability. The full-time
minimum wage was $4.25 in 1995.236 If minimum wages were imputed to a
woman with one child for every year the child is considered a minor, and she
then worked in the waged labor force earning just $10,000, she would be
entitled to approximately $520 every month in Social Security benefits upon
retirement; these monthly benefits substantially exceed the amount most women
receive in social security benefits today.23 7
Not only have economists shown that it is possible to define, quantify, and
value women's household labor in theory, but in nontax contexts women's
household services are routinely assigned a value. For example, many econo-
mists have undertaken to determine the magnitude of household services in an
effort to understand the full extent of the gross national product and to gain a
better insight into our overall economic well-being.238 In tort cases involving
the injury or death of a wife, courts and juries routinely listen to expert
testimony on the value of women's services and award damages based on those
valuations.2 39
232. Id. at 229.
233. Becker, supra note 205, at 516-17.
234. Id.
235. George V. Launey, Appraisal of Housewife's Services, 29 RES GESTAE 306, 306 (1985)
(discussing methods used by expert witnesses in courtroom to value household service).
236. DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE
MINIMUM WAGE 6 (1995).
237. Ozawa & Kim, supra note 104, at 352 tbl. 5 (indicating women, on average, earn between
$304 and $402 per month in social security insurance).
238. See QUAH, supra note 41, at 96-101 (citing 15 different studies providing estimates of market
value of women's household services and effect inclusion of nonmarket activities would have upon
gross national products).
239. See, e.g., Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961) (holding that, when wife
died because of negligent mismatching of blood during cesarean section, household entitled to recover
for loss of wife's domestic services); Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different
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The tort context, however, provides another disturbing example of how
women's household labor continues to be unfairly treated by the law. Paralleling
Congress's denial of traditional employee benefits and tax credits to women for
their household labor, courts often deny women monetary awards for the loss of
their ability to provide household labor, despite allowing family members to
collect awards stemming from the loss of those services. In wrongful death
cases, for example, the reward goes to the homemaker's family.240 Similarly, if
an accident causes a woman to be incapacitated, many courts do not view the
woman as having lost anything of value entitling her to damages, yet her spouse
may have an action for loss of consortium. 24' Women's household labor,
therefore, is left largely unrecognized in the courts just as it is in the Tax Code.
If Congress were to treat women's household labor similarly to market labor
for taxation purposes, women would have access to social security and disabil-
ity benefits that could serve as the basis for recovery of monetary awards in tort
actions. Such awards would parallel those made for recovery for waged labor-
ers' loss of potential earnings. In this way, taxation of household workers would
increase women's access to resources when they perform housework and when
a third party renders them incapable of doing the work.
B. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS
1. Policy Considerations: Imposing a Tax on Noncash Transactions
The second major policy objection to taxing household labor is based on the
long-held belief that consumption of goods, services, and leisure activities
purchased with income earned in the market largely determines economic
well-being.242 Because it is monetary income that enables one to consume,
many argue that it is the most appropriate measure of economic well-being.243
Consequently, many tax theorists take the position that the tax base should be
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1162 (1981) (noting courts' willingness to value women's services
outside of marriage); Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., How Much is a Good Wife Worth?, 41 B.U. L. REV. 328,
328 (1961) (discussing courts' willingness to value household services); Launey, supra note 235, at 306
(an economist who has testified as expert witness about valuation of women's services for over 20 years
discussing valuation methods).
240. Finley, supra note 54, at 52-53 (noting that "[mlost tort books and tort cases are silent about
why unpaid but crucially productive and important services such as household management and
childrearing are consistently undervalued or overlooked in a system which gauges damages to the
market economy"); see also Martha Charnallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 817 (1988) (citing 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861) for the
proposition that the loss of a wife's services has traditionally been characterized as a material loss,
whereas loss of a husband creates only "mental" or "emotional" loss).
241. Finley, supra note 54, at 53.
242. Berk, supra note 205, at 113-17 (discussing traditional microeconomic theory as ignoring
activities of household members and assuming only work in the market yields utility).
243. RicHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INcoME TAx 11, 21 (1975) (acknowledging that monetary
income does not represent all taxpayer's wealth but defending income as primary index of one's ability
to pay tax burden).
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limited to monetary income. 4
Although numerous economists now recognize that household labor as well
as a market wage enables the family to consume, tax scholars continue to argue
that only market transactions should be taxed. 4 5 By imposing a tax only when
the taxpayer voluntarily converts labor into a marketable form, Congress implic-
itly recognizes that only under those circumstances does the taxpayer have
resources to pay a tax liability. 246 Many tax analysts, therefore, adopt the
"ability to pay" theory of taxation and argue that the income base is the fairest
method for determining tax liability.
247
The ability to pay theory, in its most basic sense, means that the taxpayer
possesses resources that can be turned over to the State. Congress's concern that
taxpayers do not unfairly suffer a tax burden without the ability to pay the tax is
reflected in numerous contexts. Taxpayers, for example, are not required to pay
tax on appreciated property until the property has been sold and the taxpayer
realizes or "cashes out" the gain.24 8 Additionally, section 1031 of the Code
exempts from taxation a "like-kind" property exchange. The qualifying section
1031 "like-kind" property exchange frees the taxpayer from an immediate tax
burden even if the fair market value of the property received far exceeds the
basis or the cost of the original property.249
Although the policy considerations associated with a taxpayer's ability to pay
capture an underlying concern for tax fairness, Congress has ignored the
taxpayer's financial status in many circumstances.25 0 For example, employee
compensation in the form of retirement benefits is taxable when the retirement
244. See, e.g., Thuronyi, supra note 23, at 56 (stating that "taxes are paid in money and tax equity
is, therefore, appropriately based on monetary factors").
245. See sources cited supra note 23.
246. Although this article is concerned with taxpayer liquidity problems, many tax analysts have
addressed the "ability to pay" theory in the context of marginal tax rates. The argument for progressive
taxation, for example, is based on the notion that the utility curve for income slopes down as income
rises. Higher marginal tax rates for higher wage earners, therefore, take into consideration a taxpayer's
ability to pay and imposes an equal tax burden on taxpayers at all income levels. See BLUM & KALVEN,
supra note 77, at 29-45 (discussing fundamental principles of progressive taxation); Bankman &
Griffith, supra note 77, at 1910-18 (analyzing moral underpinnings and effects on societal welfare of
progressive taxation); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465, 490-518 (1987) (contrasting traditional
philosophies justifying flat taxation with feminist perspective favoring progressive taxation); see also
M. Slade Kendrick, The Ability-to-Pay Theory of Taxation, 29 Am. ECON. REv. 92 (1939) (discussing
alternative justifications for progressive taxation based on preference for certain social consequences
over others).
247. See sources cited supra note 23.
248. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (imposing realization requirement upon definition of
income). In certain circumstances, however, taxpayers must pay a tax without regard to liquidity.
Taxpayers who choose the accrual method of accounting, for example, are required to pay tax on
income to which they have a legal right but may not have received.
249. I.R.C. § 1031 (1994).
250. In addition to tax fairness, tax theorists and reformers generally agree that good tax policy
incorporates notions of administrative feasibility and soundness of economic effects or economic
rationality. KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 23, at 19. But see Thuronyi, supra note 23, at 45-53 (noting
that tax scholars subordinated fairness issues when formulating definition of taxable income).
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fund fails to satisfy certain Employee Retirement Income Security Act require-
ments regardless of whether the employee has access to income to pay the
tax.25 ' Taxation in this context is not related to the availability of cash but turns
on important public policy concerns, such as the low-income worker's access to
retirement funds. Barter exchanges, in which taxpayers exchange property or
services, also can produce a tax liability despite no money ever exchanging
hands in the transaction.252 Finally, original issue discount bonds accruing
interest over the course of years are also immediately taxable, even though the
investor may not have access to the interest for several years.253
Not only does Congress in some cases .impose a tax when no money has
exchanged hands, but it fails to tax numerous transactions that improve a
taxpayer's financial status. For example, income obtained through gift transfers
and property inheritances is not taxable, despite the donee's improved economic
position. 4 In addition, recoveries in tort for personal injury are also exempt
from taxation under section 104 of the Tax Code, even though the monetary
recovery would enable easy payment of a tax burden. 5 Therefore, although the
transfer of cash may reflect a taxpayer's ability to pay a tax burden, access to
monetary resources is often irrelevant to Congress's decision to impose a tax.
Thus, Congress could make the policy choice to tax household labor without
violating any firm principle embodied in the Tax Code.
2. Low-Income Taxpayers' Ability to Pay the Increased Tax Burden
Taxing nonwaged household labor has the potential to impose extreme
economic hardship on low-income families. Imputing income to households for
women's domestic labor would increase families' tax burdens and possibly
cause a loss of refundable earned income tax credits along with other tax
benefits.256 In some cases, an increased tax burden may decrease the resources
needed to purchase everyday necessities. Under those circumstances, low-
income women might prefer to forgo potential future security to avoid paying
an increased tax burden in the short run, despite losing the long-run economic
251. Section 501 of the Code exempts from taxation pension arrangement trusts that meet the
requirements of I.R.C. § 401. I.R.C. § 501 (1994).
252. I.R.C. § 61 (1994); Treas. Reg. 1.61-2(2)(d)(1) (1995).
253. I.R.C. § 1272 (1994) (requiring taxpayer to include interest from debt obligation with original
issue discount into gross income whether or not taxpayer actually receives interest payment).
254. I.R.C. § 102 (1994) (excluding most gift transfers from income); I.R.C. § 1014 (1994) (noting
basis of property acquired from decedent is fair market value at time of decedent's death).
255. I.R.C. § 104 (1994). Numerous policy justifications, however, exist for the exclusion of
recoveries due to pain and suffering. It could be argued, for example, that because the award is a
replacement of human capital, it should not be taxed because the taxpayer has, in fact, enjoyed no real
gain.
256. The earned income tax credit under § 32 and the childcare credit available under § 21, for
example, are tied to the taxpayer's level of income. As income reaches a certain level, the tax credit
available begins to phase-out. I.R.C. §§ 21, 32 (1994); see also infra notes 284-90 and accompanying
text (discussing phase-out aspect of these provisions).
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benefits in retirement.2 57 Imposing a tax on household income has the potential,
therefore, to further impoverish the most vulnerable women in our society.
Some feminists have avoided the problem of an increased tax burden by
arguing that Congress could simply tie social security credits to household
labor, thereby ensuring women's access to the benefits for the work they
perform. 58 These proposals recognize the productive nature of women's house-
hold labor, while at the same time providing women with access to economic
resources through the tax structure.
In adopting the first social welfare programs, early policymakers attempted to
ensure cash transfers to women in recognition of the division of labor in the
home along gender lines.259 Many policymakers, however, no longer seek to
subsidize women's role in the home; instead, they question the very legitimacy
of these social welfare programs. They argue women must now "earn" their
benefits by working in the waged labor force to some extent. 6° Indeed, women
who obtain income through the current welfare programs without working in
the paid labor force are perceived to have deviant family values, to be lazy, and
to be undeserving of the cash transfers.2 6' In the current political climate,
proposals that award benefits without burdens could potentially fall into the
welfare conundrum that characterizes women with children as unworthy of state
assistance.
Incorporating the value of women's labor into the current tax structure has
the potential to transcend the current social welfare discourse. If Congress
broadened the tax base to include nonmarket labor, both waged and unwaged
257. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act's antidiscrimination rules have been criticized
for precisely this reason. Congress adopted the ERISA antidiscrimination rules to ensure that both
low-income and high-income wage earners have access to pension benefits under the employer-
established pension fund. As Bruce Wolk has pointed out, low-wage employees have greater immediate
consumption needs than high-wage employees and thus are less willing or able to save. Indeed, "[flor
such employees a mere dollar-for-dollar substitution of retirement savings for wages would not
maintain their level of satisfaction; wages would have to be increased." Bruce Wolk, Discrimination
Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REv. 419,
430-31 (1984); see also Joseph Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-and-
File Compensation, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 603 (1994) (noting that low-income wage earners often
prefer to have access to immediate income rather than to defer access to funds until retirement under
employer pension fund, thus potentially prompting employers to hire high-wage earners who are
willing to forgo immediate wage).
258. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 111, at 285-88 (1989) (discussing number of methods devised to
ensure women have access to social security based on work performed in home).
259. See Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in the Historical Perspective, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 879,
883-87 (1994) (discussing "maternalists' " approach to welfare reform and arguing that early reformers
naturalized gendered division of labor).
260. Alstott, supra note 78, at 536-44 (discussing bipartisan support for earned income tax credit
program because it has largely been seen as work-based welfare reform and not free "handout"); Mink,
supra note 259, at 881 (noting that when politicians call for "ending welfare as we know it," they
generally mean society must force poor women into marketplace).
261. Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 817,
836-37 (1994) (discussing negative images and how those images have been used by social critics to
demean women, especially black women).
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laborers would suffer the same burdens and have access to the same benefits
derived from taxation. In short, Congress would treat women who perform
household labor as having earned their benefits in the same manner as waged
laborers.262
Rather than declining to tax nonmarket labor altogether, Congress could
offset the financially burdensome effects of taxation on low-income taxpayers
by extending the current tax structure that has been established precisely for this
purpose. Congress adopted the earned income tax credit program ("EITC") to
offset the burden of taxation on low-income wage earners. Congress could
adopt a program similar to the EITC to offset the tax on value imputed to the
household for self-supplied services. The proposed "household income tax
credit" ("HITC") is discussed in Part V.
C. BEHAVIORAL AND CULTURAL CONCERNS
In addition to the practical problems of taxing household labor discussed
above, many theorists have concerns about the "commodifying" effects of
valuing nonmarket goods and services in market terms.2 63 In this section, I
explain the debate over commodification of household services and the three
issues upon which it has centered. First, some theorists have taken the position
that by taxing nonmarket labor, Congress will push women into the market to
pay the tax, thereby forcing them to commodify their services. Taxing nonmar-
ket services could, therefore, impose the demeaning effects of the market upon
women who would have chosen to stay out of the market absent the tax. The
second difficulty with taxation involves the impossibility of capturing the value
of the labor in market terms, or its incommensurability. Finally, some feminists
argue that problems exist with the mere use of market rhetoric to describe
household labor. In particular, the description of nonmarket labor in market
terms could demean women by reducing them to an "abstract fungible unit. ,
264
Mark Kelman has articulated the behavioral incentives associated with valu-
ing or commodifying unwaged labor and has noted that they are related but not
identical to the ability to pay issue. Valuing and taxing a service for which the
taxpayer receives no wage would impose a financial burden that could, in effect,
encourage people to sell their labor for money simply to pay the tax. Unlike the
traditional concern with taxpayer liquidity, Professor Kelman's concern is that
262. See Nancy J. Altman, The Reconciliation of Retirement Security and Tax Policies: A Response
to Professor Graetz, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1419, 1424-34 (1988) (discussing connection between public
conception of earned benefits and viability of social welfare programs).
263. Although many commentators acknowledge philosophical problems associated with commodifi-
cation, not all agree it is a bar to taxation. Thomas Griffith, for example, acknowledges the problems
associated with commodification but argues that a resistance to commodification does not underlie the
exclusion of most imputed income from the tax base. Rather, most objections are based on the assertion
that "imputed income" is not income at all and therefore has no place in the tax base. Thomas D.
Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 383 n.208 (1989).
264. Radin, supra note 30, at 1885 (observing that universal market rhetoric undermines our
conception of personhood).
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taxation of household labor would force taxpayers into the market against their
will.265 By imposing a tax only when laborers voluntarily convert their labor
into marketable form, Kelman argues, Congress respects the libertarian prin-
ciple that the state should not require people, directly or indirectly, to engage in
particular activities. Kelman also takes the position that by adhering to the
market/nonmarket distinction, the current tax system respects a person's refusal
to treat potentially marketable resources as commodities-"a desirable anticapi-
talist strain in our market obsessed culture."
2 66
Kelman is concerned with the tax structure's potential to influence behavior
and the commodifying effects of those influences. As he notes, taxing citizens
on their earning capacity poses serious problems. Congress should not, for
example, force a beach bum to work as a doctor even if she has a medical
degree.267 While the argument is persuasive with regard to the beach bum, it is
less persuasive in the context of women's household labor. Unlike a tax on the
beach bum, a tax on the benefits from household activities would not force most
taxpayers to undertake a different type of activity, but instead would recognize
the labor as valuable. Taxing earning capacity is far more problematic than
imposing a tax on earned income.
Professor Kelman, however, argues against taxation in both circumstances.
With regard to taxation of household labor Kelman approves of the very
influences that disturb market-oriented scholars. While Kelman advocates non-
taxation because it enables taxpayers to stay out of the market, the market-
oriented scholars argue it is precisely that influence that leads to the economic
impoverishment of women. Kelman, however, fails to distinguish between the
Code's behavioral incentives and the actual effects of the incentives, and as a
result, seems to overstate his case in the very same way the market-oriented
theorists do. The Code might encourage taxpayers to commodify their labor, but
empirical data is needed to determine the extent to which the Code actually
causes commodification.
As discussed above, data does not support the argument that nontaxation
enables women to stay out of the market. Although a small number of women
might respond to a change in taxation, most women are currently in the market
for a variety of reasons, including the personal preference to hold a waged job
or simply economic need. By declining to value and tax nonmarket labor,
therefore, Congress probably has little success in protecting women from
commodification. Indeed, as the market-oriented scholars note, even if Congress
does enable some women to avoid the market, it is not at all clear that women
benefit from staying out of the waged labor force.
265. Kelman, supra note 28, at 841-42 (noting that although taxation based upon earning capacity
may be ideal measure of ability to pay, it would result in forced marketing).
266. Id. at 880; see also Stephan, supra note 195, at 1365 n. 12 (arguing Kelman's acceptance of tax
on market laborers because such labor exchanges are "voluntary" ignores Marxist perspective on
influence of social structures over individual choice).
267. Kelman, supra note 28, at 842.
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Feminist commentators outside the tax area have not focused on the manner
in which valuation and taxation might force women into the market; rather, they
are concerned that valuing and taxing household labor would commodify and
demean women even if they stay in the home. These feminists argue that
because there is no true market replacement for women's household labor,
valuing it in market terms would be inappropriate because it could only lead to
inaccurate congressional estimates of the labor's worth. 68
In numerous other contexts, society has debated whether it is appropriate to
use market terminology to value nonmarket goods and services. In Morals and
Markets, Viviana Zelizer articulately describes the problems associated with
characterizing human value in market terms during the development of the life
insurance market. 6 9 She explains that although religious leaders, politicians,
and most American citizens were initially offended by the notion of valuing
human life in market terms, most have come to support the insurance indus-
try. 27 This acceptance was, in large part, due to the distinction made between
valuing human life and providing economic protection primarily for widows
and children. The insurance industry took the position that it was only attempt-
ing to ensure financial security for unwaged laborers. Indeed, the companies
argued to the public that paid protection for widows and children was not only
efficient, but a "morally superior system. ' ' 27 1 This approach provides a worth-
while model for the taxation of housework-Congress could acknowledge the
incommensurability of women's household labor, while still tying economic
resources to the artificial market value imputed to the work.
In response to this approach, Margaret Jane Radin argues that merely using
market rhetoric and terminology to describe and analyze women's work might
cause people to regard women as fungible waged laborers rather than willful
persons worthy of respect.272 Radin concludes that market rhetoric can do
268. I thank the participants at the Columbia Law School Feminist and Legal Theory Workshop in
February 1995 for clarifying my thoughts on this point. For a more extensive discussion on the
incommensurability of women's labor, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19
PHIL. & PUa. AFF. 71, 80-87 (1990).
269. VIVIANA A. RoTmAN ZELIZER, MORALS & MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1979) [hereinafter ZELIZER, MORALS & MARKETS]. For a discussion of similar
issues raised in the context of children, see VIVIANA A. RoTmAN ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD:
THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985) [hereinafter ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD].
270. ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS, supra note 269, at 91-117 (discussing widespread social
criticism of life insurance and its eventual acceptance).
271. Id. at 94-95 ("Institutionalized charity and bureaucratized altruism were depicted as the
necessary and positive developments of a higher stage of mankind.").
272. Radin, supra note 30, at 1885 (describing harmful effects of universal market rhetoric); see also
Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 295-96, 304 (1991) (concluding
that people could have difficulty perceiving friendship with dignity if we begin to think of each other as
having only limited value or only as a means to pursue ends). Although "[p]erceiving the use of humans as
resources might alter sensibilities through association of persons with objects; preventing us from thinking of
others as humans," id at 304, Altman notes that this ignores real-life counterexamples. See id at 308-11
(asserting that although people purchase pets for varying prices based on preferred characteristics, most
people do not perceive their pets as investments, but develop personal relationships with their animals).
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violence to our notion of personhood.273 She notes:
Universal market rhetoric transforms our world of concrete persons, whose
uniqueness and individuality is expressed in specific personal attributes, into a
world of disembodied, fungible, attribute-less entities possessing a wealth of
alienable, severable "objects." This rhetoric reduces the conception of a
person to an abstract, fungible unit with no individuating characteristics....
Market rhetoric invites us to see the person as a self-interested maximizer
in all respects. Freedom or autonomy, therefore, is seen as individual control
over how to maximize one's overall gains.274
By using market rhetoric to describe and value women's household services,
therefore, taxation could lead society to view women as profit-maximizers
worth only the dollar value of the services.
Valuing women's household labor in market terms, however, does not neces-
sarily mean the unique and irreplaceable character of the labor will be mini-
mized. As Radin notes, some housework (such as making the bed or cooking a
meal) is fungible and can easily be bought in the market. Yet, the existence of
paid domestic laborers has not caused us to ignore or devalue the personal or
individualized aspects of unwaged labor, such as love and caring.275
Indeed, nonmarket and market aspects of labor exist simultaneously in many
contexts. Labor performed outside of the household, for example, is valued in
market terms, and market rhetoric is used to describe such aspects of our lives,
yet the labor is not completely commodified. In addition to a wage, for example,
many market participants like their jobs and obtain significant "psychic" ben-
efits despite exchanging their labor in the market for money. Thus, as Professor
Radin acknowledges, what we derive from our work and the importance we
attach to it cannot be understood entirely in terms of money.276 Market valua-
tion and taxation of waged labor has not led to a complete commodification of
waged laborers; therefore, there is no reason to believe that valuation and
taxation of women's household labor would lead to complete commodification.
Indeed, the unique and irreplaceable aspects of women's household labor would
remain outside the scope of any attempt to value the work.27 7
273. Radin, supra note 30, at 1885 (arguing commodification fosters social context that disregards
personal values and impairs our ability to think and feel in way that makes what is sold more
meaningful than its exchange value).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1923 n.260 (noting that domestic services market coexists with "parallel class of unpaid
providers").
276. Id. at 1918-21 (observing that even though a "house has market value and we can express our
investment in terms of dollars, there is a nonmonetizable, personal aspect to many people's relation-
ships with their homes").
277. Id. at 1923 (noting that many relationships have both market and nonmarket aspects); see also
Silbaugh, supra note 40, at 28-31 (arguing there is no need to reject emotional aspects of housework to
recognize economic similarities between housework and marketwork).
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Although market terminology is incapable of capturing all aspects of wom-
en's labor and has the potential to lead society to value women only as fungible
objects, valuing and taxing household labor could also be a source of empower-
ment. In particular, if Congress taxed housework, women who perform services
for their homes would have access to employee benefits and retirement funds.
This step would do much to alter the existing gender hierarchy for women who
are unable to be full participants in the market economy.
278
Finally, refusing to value women's household labor in market terms will not
protect women from commodification. As Stephen Schnably notes, the family
has become a source of commodification, not a refuge from it. In fact, the "cult
of domesticity" relegating women to the private sphere played an integral part
in the rise of our consumer-oriented culture. 27 9 Household services are per-
formed with commodities sold in the market and women are often the targeted
audience for the advertising campaigns.280 Therefore, unpaid labor in the
household is not safe from market influences, but "is deeply entrenched in the
entire system of commodity production. ,
281
Indeed, many Marxist scholars have argued that market employers have
already indirectly commodified women's unpaid labor in the determination of
men's market wages. Alejandro Portes argues that market wages are not just
payment for productivity, but are determined by the costs of maintaining and
reproducing the labor force, which are tasks usually undertaken by women in
the household.28 2 Thus, the level of men's wages are dependent on women's
role in the traditional gendered division of labor in the home. If women perform
free labor in the household, the market wage for men's labor remains deflated.
The market economy, therefore, accounts not only for the labor of the waged
278. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1715-45 (1993) (tracing
historical notions of racial identity and property, and noting that although the consumer culture is
offensive because it is often based on racist and sexist notions, women and people of color have also
been denied access to economic benefits available only in market and in market terms); Radin, supra
note 30, at 1915-17 (observing that universal noncommodification might only exacerbate economic
disparities between classes and genders by preventing needy groups, especially poor women, from
selling their services for food and shelter). But see Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique
of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REv. 347, 369 (1993) (noting that commodification
might only embed women deeper into existing structures of race, gender, and class discrimination).
279. Schnably, supra note 278, at 390 (linking woman as homemaker with rise of consumer culture).
280. Stephen J. Schnably, Normative Judgment, Social Change, and Legal Reasoning in the Context
of Abortion and Privacy, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 715, 860 (1984-85). However, as Radin
notes, closely analyzing the problematic nature of commodification might cause us to question our
current market orientation and our tolerance of objectification. There is, therefore, moral value to
limiting further objectification because it could result in decommodification. Margaret Jane Radin,
Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 341, 343 (1991).
281. Schnably, supra note 278, at 390 (commenting on role of unpaid domestic labor in consumer
culture).
282. Alejandro Portes, The Informal Sector and the World-Economy: Notes on the Structure of
Subsidized Labor, in URBANIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 53, 54 (1985) (noting that formal
economies depend on informal sector, and this dependency is tied to availability of women's unwaged
labor in home); see also Acker, supra note 225, at 474 (arguing that women's unpaid labor is essential
to meet needs of capitalist system).
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workers, but for the labor of their family as well.283
Radin, Kelman, and others articulate the dilemma involved in commodifying
nonmarket activities. Valuation of housework in market terms threatens to
demean women by promoting the idea that women are fungible objects. At the
same time, however, commodifying the labor could help ensure women have
access to valuable social welfare benefits. Taxation of housework implicitly
recognizes the productive nature of women's labor and therefore, on balance, is
more likely to empower than oppress women. Although moving away from a
consumer-oriented culture is an important feminist goal, that goal must be
pursued in a manner that does not impoverish the very women who are the
intended beneficiaries.
V. LIMITING THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFEcTS OF TAXATION: A PROPOSED
HOUSEHOLD INcoME TAX CREDIT
In this Part, I return to the financial difficulties that low-income women will
experience if Congress broadens the tax base to include the value of household
labor. Although taxation of household labor has the potential to ensure women's
access to independent social welfare benefits, it will simultaneously impose an
immediate financial burden upon women and their families. This additional
burden is particularly problematic for low-income women who often need every
available dollar to purchase necessities, such as food and childcare. Because this
burden might outweigh the value of future benefits, some women will prefer to
forgo long-term social welfare benefits to avoid taxation in the short-run.
This same trade-off is present when women are in the waged labor force.
Low-income women must pay income and payroll taxes that take resources
needed for everyday living expenses. Congress, in response to the problems
associated with the burdens of taxation on low-income wage earners, has
rejected the conclusion that low-income taxpayers must choose between long-
term and short-term financial stability. In 1975, Congress created the earned
income tax credit ("EITC") program, which aims to offset the tax burden of
low-income workers while maintaining access to social welfare benefits.
The EITC, found in section 32 of the Code, entitles a low-income wage
earner to a refundable tax credit based on income level and the number of
children in the household. For example, the program entitles a family with one
child earning $6000 to a subsidy of thirty-four cents for every dollar earned.284
The credit is capped at $2040 and phases out at a rate of sixteen cents for every
dollar earned over $11,000.285 The credit completely phases out when taxpayer
283. Portes, supra note 282, at 53, 58 (arguing that informal sector subsidizes costs of capitalist
enterprises).
284. I.R.C. § 32 (1994).
285. To be more precise, the credit begins to phaseout at a rate of 15.98% for every dollar earned
over $11,000. I.R.C. § 32(b) (1994).
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earnings equal $23,760.286 As a refundable credit, the EITC not only reduces or
eliminates federal income tax liability, it also pays cash to low-income taxpay-
ers whose EITC exceeds the tax owed.287 Therefore, the EITC program has
greater redistributional potential than the nonrefundable childcare credit provi-
sions, which only permit the taxpayer to offset tax liabilities.
Despite some criticism, the EITC has gained widespread support because of
its distributional effects and behavioral incentives.288 The EITC program redis-
tributes income by providing financial support to low-income families. In
addition, because families only receive the EITC for income earned in the market, the
program gives taxpayers an incentive to work in the paid labor force. Indeed, at very
low income levels, the credit increases as income rises. Graph 1 demonstrates how the
E1TC increases, plateaus, and phases-out for a family with one child.
Graph I: EITC
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To ensure low-income women are not harmed by the inclusion of household
labor in the tax base, Congress could adopt a household income tax credit
("HITC") that parallels, but does not mirror, the EITC. The distributional and
behavioral effects of the HITC would be far more limited than those found in
the EITC. The purpose of the HITC would be to offset only the increased tax
286. The credit for a family earning $23,760 would be zero because (.34 x 6000) - [.1598 x (23,760-
11,000)] = 0. See Alstott, supra note 78, at 541 & n.38 (discussing tax credit for low-income family
with two children and calculating available benefits); Timothy J. Eiler, Comment, The Earned Income
Tax Credit As a Tax Expenditure: An Alternative to Traditional Welfare Reform, 28 U. RICH. L. REv.
701, 713-15, 750-55 (1994) (discussing tax credit for families of various sizes and income levels).
287. Alstott, supra note 78, at 534 (describing policy goals of EITC); Yin et al., supra note 218, at
230 (outlining objectives of EITC).
288. Alstott, supra note 78, at 533-92 (outlining prevailing arguments for and against EITC and
critically evaluating program).
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imposed on household labor and not to operate as a tax-based social welfare
program similar to the EITC. An HITC, therefore, should have a distributional
character similar, but not identical, to the EITC. An HITC, like the EITC,
should base eligibility on income-level and family size. The HITC, however,
should be a nonrefundable rather than a refundable tax credit. Thus, while the
HITC could decrease or eliminate the tax burden, it would not provide a cash
transfer similar to the EITC program.
Additionally, because the HITC will not reward women for entering the
market, it will lack the incentive structure found in the EITC. The HITC would
be tied to the tax imposed on household labor, and thus the credit would provide
almost no behavioral incentive for the taxpayer to move into the market.289
Indeed, by tying the credit to nonwaged labor, an HITC would arguably provide
an incentive for women to stay in the home.
The structure of the HITC must ensure women at low-income levels and
women who depend on social welfare programs have a credit that entirely
offsets the increased tax burden imposed on household labor. Like the EITC, the
HITC should begin to phase out as income rises. The speed at which the credit
phases out will, of course, depend on the value Congress imputes to the household
labor and the resultant tax. Graphs 2 and 3 demonstrate how the HITC could
provide financial assistance to a family with one child based on income level.
Graph 2: HITC
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289. The failure of the HITC to provide a market incentive, however, might pose significant political
hurdles. As many commentators have noted, the public is often more willing to support work-based
programs than need-based programs. See Alstott, supra note 78, at 536-44 (discussing the conception of
EITC as work-based tax program and widespread support for this type of tax reform); Minnow supra
note 261, at 817-38 (discussing "new consensus" on welfare reform and notion that responsible social
welfare means providing market incentives).
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This hypothetical HITC would avoid the imposition of an additional income
or payroll tax on nonwage earning families and on all families entitled to any
credit under the EITC program. Thus, as Graph 2 indicates, taxpayers with
earned income between $0 and $23,760 will be entitled to a credit that com-
pletely offsets the tax on household income. Taxpayers with income that
exceeds $23,760 will be within the phase-out range. Of course, the greater the
tax, the slower the credit should phase out. Graph 3 represents an HITC worth
$1392 that would phase out at a rate of approximately twelve cents for every
dollar that exceeds $23,760, fully phasing out at $35,000.290
Graph 3: HITC
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The household income tax credit, like the EITC, will ensure that low-income
women avoid a tax liability while still gaining access to social security benefits.
The HITC, however, will offer little or no income assistance to middle- and
upper-income women29' and may potentially decrease middle- and upper-
290. The HITC is calculated to offset a tax burden of $1392. As discussed later in the article, a single
woman with one child who does not work in the paid labor force performs approximately 42 hours per
week of household labor. Calculated at minimum wage levels, she provides approximately $9282 of
household income to her family. If she paid social security at a rate of 15% on this amount, she would
owe $1392 in payroll taxes. See infra notes 308-15 and accompanying text.
A credit that is equal to $1392 will completely phase-out at $35,000 because [(35,000-23,760) x
.1238] - 1392 = 0.
291. Because single women with children are by far the most economically impoverished, Congress
could provide a credit that offsets the entire tax burden associated with the imputed value of household
services. Adopting an HITC that provides a complete tax credit for single women will not only ensure
against further economic vulnerability under the proposed tax, but would also offset the burdens single
women currently suffer under the Code and in the market. Payments for social security and private
pension benefits, for example, are calculated to assure availability of derivative spousal benefits.
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income women's disposable resources. But this would occur only if women had
access to such income prior to the imposition of the tax.292 Households,
however, do not equally share income and expenses. Married women tend to
use a large portion of their income for family necessities, leaving greater
disposable income for their husbands. If the new tax burden is, by necessity,
paid out of the disposable income, then the taxation of housework might work
more to the detriment of married men than married women.
If the household unit equally shares income and expenses among its mem-
bers, the burden of the new tax will be shared by the entire household, including
the woman. Under these circumstances, this approach will arguably cause less
economic hardship on women than the current approach that leaves women
without significant economic resources in old age. Women generally live longer
than men and often have a low level of social security benefits; as a result,
women frequently spend the last years of their lives in poverty. By taxing
housework, Congress would require the entire family to contribute to women's
economic security in retirement.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATING THE VALUE OF WOMEN'S
HOUSEHOLD LABOR INTO THE TAx BASE
Although Congress's distinction between market and nonmarket gains may
have once reflected good tax policy, this dichotomy no longer withstands close
scrutiny. First, economists now generally recognize the productive nature of
household activities and have devised methods for valuing the labor that
mitigate administrative concerns associated with taxation of nonmarket labor.
Second, Congress could deal with legitimate distributional concerns by provid-
ing a tax credit to offset the additional burden imposed on low-income wage
earners. Finally, concerns about commodifying effects on the taxpayer are less
persuasive when compared to the impoverishment women suffer due to their
inability to secure social welfare benefits. In short, the problems associated with
taxing housework no longer justify categorical rejection of the idea.
Consequently, single women are required to pay higher rates into the system yet do not have a spouse
receiving the benefits, nor do single women obtain increased benefits themselves. In short, single wage
earners subsidize married wage earners' spousal benefits. See, e.g., Rolande Cuvillier, The Housewife:
An Unjustified Financial Burden on the Community, 8 J. Soc. POL'Y 1, 1-27 (1979) (arguing that
housewife should pay tax on housework). But see McCaffery, supra note 1, at 996-1001 (noting that
married women are penalized by social security structure, which taxes them but does not provide
significant independent benefits). The HITC could alleviate some of the burden Congress and employ-
ers have imposed upon single women by ensuring that women are entitled to social security and
disability benefits while not subjecting them to taxation. Thus, a modified tax base that includes the
value of household labor would theoretically impose an additional tax burden on single women. The
HITC, however, would offset the tax while ensuring single women access to income in retirement and
in times of unemployment.
292. Upper-income single women will undeniably have a loss of disposable income. They presum-
ably have complete control over the family's resources but will not be entitled to the credit under the
HITC.
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Resolving valuation, liquidity, and commodification difficulties does not,
however, address a number of other tax policy issues that would arise if
Congress taxed the value of household labor. In this Part, I briefly address two
policy issues that my proposal raises: taxpayer identification and aggregation of
household income and income obtained from market activities. I then illustrate
the potential effects of taxing housework using three hypothetical taxpayers.
A. IDENTIFYING THE APPROPRIATE TAXPAYER
1. Income Taxation
Pursuant to section 61 of the Tax Code, Congress requires individuals to pay
an income tax on all economic gains. Congress does not distinguish between the
receipt of cash and the receipt of property or services when imposing a tax on
the recipient of the economic gain. The benefits of women's household labor
easily fall within these tax principles.293 The services women provide to the
family when they cook meals, shop for groceries, and pay the bills are widely
perceived to increase the family's overall economic status. The labor is valuable
in market terms, and most families would seek a market substitute if the wife or
mother were unable to provide the services. Women's household labor, there-
fore, provides an economic benefit to the family that should be subject to
taxation under section 61 of the Code.
Congress, however, must still identify the appropriate taxpayer. Generally,
the tax structure imposes a tax on the taxpayer with control over the resources.
The wage earner or the owner of the income-producing property is generally
responsible for paying the income tax.294 It is difficult, however, to exercise
control over the benefits of household labor. Unlike a wage in the market that is
earned and consumed by one family member, the entire family receives the
material benefits of women's labor.29 5 Because each member of the family
obtains an economic benefit, each should be responsible for a portion of the
income tax liability associated with household services.2 96 Under this approach,
parents and children will theoretically each incur an income tax burden. Section
6201(c) of the Code, however, holds the parent responsible for the child's tax
293. Indeed, if the labor were performed for a taxpayer outside the woman's family, the benefits
from the labor would be taxable. Treas. Reg. § 1.61 (1994).
294. Michael J. McIntyre, Tax Justice for Family Members After New York State Reform, 51 ALB. L.
REV. 789, 792-93 n.17 (1987) (discussing recent studies on issue of marital sharing of economic
benefits).
295. Although the woman could refuse to perform household labor in the same way a man can
refuse to share income, to the extent the chore is undertaken, it benefits the entire family. House
cleaning, for example, provides benefits to every family member living in the home. See Silbaugh,
supra note 40, at 12-14.
296. This is consistent with current taxation under the joint return system that assumes shared
consumption of resources. See Zelenak, supra note 5, at 354-55 (differentiating between shared
consumption and shared control). Although this assumption is erroneous in some situations, see supra
notes 87-100 and accompanying text, households, in fact, do share the benefits of women's labor.
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burden when the child is unable to pay.297 In practice, therefore, parents will be
primarily responsible for paying the tax on the household income.
2. Payroll Taxation
Unlike the income tax, which Congress imposes upon all economic gains,
Congress imposes the payroll tax only upon earned income. Wages and salaries,
therefore, are subject to both payroll and income taxation while investment
income is subject only to income taxation. Although the family receives income
from women's household services, it is not clear that women themselves receive
compensation that should be subject to the payroll tax.
Some courts and commentators have contended that women receive compen-
sation for their household labor in the form of food and shelter.298 This
characterization, however, assumes women work only in the home and rely
upon a wage earner for economic resources. Although some women fit within
this traditional gender role, many work in the paid labor force and use their
salaries to purchase the family's everyday living necessities. In short, many
women provide the food and shelter as well as the household services. Not only
does this characterization of the home fail at a descriptive level, but it also
creates normative problems. Imputed wages would vary from household to
household depending on spousal income, and tax administrators would see
single women as deserving nothing in exchange for the services they provide.
Rather than assuming women receive a wage in the form of food and shelter
for their domestic service, Congress could impute a wage to women based on
the value imputed to the household labor.2 99 Imputing a wage to women subject
to payroll taxation fits within the underlying conceptual basis of the social
security program. Congress designed the system as a social insurance program,
intending to ensure income security for retired taxpayers. By paying into the
program, women attain economic security that the current system fails to
297. I.R.C. § 6201(c) (1994).
298. See Wolk, supra note 19, at 1249-50 (1980) (discussing Tax Court's position that shelter, food,
and living needs provided by a man to a woman for her domestic services is compensation for those
services). But see Rucci v. Rucci, 181 A.2d 125, 127 (Conn. 1962) (noting that wives have duty to
perform domestic services without compensation).
299. It is not unusual for the Internal Revenue Service to impute a wage to taxpayers for payroll
purposes. In the corporate context, for example, the IRS will impute a wage to a taxpayer seeking to
evade taxes. Corporation shareholders, for example, serving as officers, directors, or employees are
often entitled to both shareholder's distributions and compensation for services provided to the
corporation. Because compensation is subject to both income and payroll taxes, often the shareholder
seeks to forgo a salary in lieu of a larger shareholder distribution. In response to this maneuver, the IRS
has taken the position that the shareholder will be deemed an employee receiving a wage subject to the
federal employment taxes. See, e.g., Radtke, S.C. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989),
afftd, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that dividends paid to sole shareholder/employee were
wages subject to payroll taxes). Even when the shareholder/employee receives no immediate payments,
he or she might be responsible for income and payroll taxes. Pension benefits that do not qualify under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, for example, may spark an immediate income and
payroll tax even though the taxpayer will not receive the benefits until retirement. I.R.C. §§ 402-03
(1994) (exempting pension funds from taxation if fund satisfies statutory requirements).
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Additionally, Congress has tied social security benefits to wage levels and the
length of the taxpayer's employment in an effort to provide benefits that would
approximate the taxpayer's standard of living during the years in which he or
'she was physically able to perform productive labor.30 ' Household services are
productive because they raise each family member's standard of living. By
subjecting household labor to payroll taxes Congress would acknowledge the
value of the labor and at the same time provide old-age and disability benefits
that more accurately reflect earlier standards of living.
B. AGGREGATION OF MARKET INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME
In addition to the policy questions that arise with identifying the appropriate
taxpayer, there will be tax effects if Congress requires aggregation of imputed
income from household activities and income obtained from market transac-
tions. Stacking household income on market income, for example, could cause
some taxpayers to experience the following externalities: to lose tax credits tied
to their income level (such as the childcare credit or the earned income tax
credit discussed above); to be thrown into a higher marginal tax rate imposing
significant tax increases; or to lose entitlements to cash-transfers under various
social welfare programs.
Congress could avoid these effects by mandating taxpayers use a separate
form for reporting income imputed to the household for women's nonmarket
labor. By separating market and nonmarket income, Congress could prevent the
imputed economic gain associated with household services from having signifi-
cant derivative effects on each person's tax status. The household income tax
credit would offset only the income declared on the separate form used for
reporting household income. Indeed, Congress could impose varying income
tax rates according to whether the income is derived from a wage in the market
or from household services. Because taxing household income is not intended to
produce additional revenue, Congress could impose a minimal, flat tax upon
household labor.302
C. THREE HYPOTHETICAL TAXPAYERS
To understand the consequences of taxing women's household labor, we must
first estimate the number of hours women work in the home and attach a market
value to the labor. In this section, I briefly describe time-use studies that
estimate the amount of time women spend on household labor. Using these
300. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (explaining how women's household responsi-
bilities prevent attainment of significant social security benefits).
301. Altman, supra note 262, at 1427-32 (discussing legislative intent underlying adoption of social
security program).
302. If Congress imposes the same marginal tax rate schedule upon household income as that used
for earned and unearned income, it could decrease the overall rate structure in light of the revenue
potential with a modified tax base that includes household income.
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estimates and valuing them at the minimum wage, I then discuss the benefits
and burdens taxation will have on three hypothetical taxpayers.3 °3 By examin-
ihg hypothetical taxpayers with diverse individual and family characteristics,
we can see the potential impact of taxing housework.
Sociological studies indicate the number of hours women spend on domestic
tasks (or the level of economic benefits women provide to the home) are tied
primarily to three variables: (1) women's marital status; (2) the number of
children in the household; and (3) and the level of participation in the waged
labor force. 304 A time-use study conducted by Beth Anne Shelton illustrates
how quantities of household labor vary in relation to these factors. Examining
the effects of one characteristic at a time, while holding all other variables
constant, Shelton found that marriage increases women's household labor by
approximately ten hours per week. While married women perform forty-two
hours of household labor per week, single women perform thirty-two hours of
such work.3°5
Shelton also found that the level of household labor increases with the
number of children in the home. Women without children work thirty hours in
the home, while women with one child work approximately forty-four hours,
and women with two children work approximately fifty-one hours per week in
the home.3°6
Finally, Shelton found that the level of women's unwaged labor in the home
decreases as the level of market participation increases. Women who stay home
or work part-time in the waged labor force perform approximately fifty hours of
housework per week, and women working full-time in the waged labor force
undertake thirty-five hours of housework every week.30 7
303. Congress may decide to value the labor using the replacement value method or the opportunity
cost method.
304. See, e.g., BETH ANNE SHELTON, WOMEN, MEN AND TIME 67-73 (1992) (noting that marital
status, employment level, and number of children cause women to perform different levels of house-
hold labor); Robinson, supra note 221, at 58-59 (providing data indicating housework levels vary with
different factors). There are also a number of other variables that might affect time spent on domestic
tasks. Nancy Hauserman and Carol Fethke, for example, have noted that a woman's age, education, the
size of her house, and the location of her home in an urban or rural setting can all affect the number of
hours a woman spends on housework. Nancy R. Hauserman & Carol Fethke, Valuation of Homemaker's
Services, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 249, 250-65 (1978) (discussing methods for valuing women's house-
hold labor).
Interestingly, while the level of women's household labor changes according to women's lifestyle
and family structures, the level of men's household labor remains relatively constant. See SHELTON,
supra at 62-109.
305. See SHELTON, supra note 304, at 67 (providing data on household labor by gender and marital
status). Shelton's study, like other sociological studies, however, examines the impact of marriage,
children, and labor force participation as single variables. By controlling for individual and household
characteristics associated with time spent in the market, these studies fail to examine how women are
affected by the presence of multiple factors. For a more precise understanding of women's housework
levels, Congress must commission a study investigating the effects upon women's household labor of
multiple variables present at one time.
306. See id. at 68 (providing data on household labor by gender and number of children).
307. See id. at 69 (providing data on household labor by gender and paid labor time). Because the
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Based on Shelton's time-use study, we can approximate the number of hours
that each hypothetical woman works in the home. For purposes of this discus-
sion, I value benefits of the household labor at the minimum wage level. I do
not mean to suggest that Congress should value household labor at such a low
amount. I use the minimum wage to demonstrate that even at an artificially low
level of valuation, women would have greater economic security than under the
current system.
Consider Ellen, Deborah, and Martha, three hypothetical taxpayers:
(1) Ellen is married and has two children. Her husband works full-time in the
waged labor force earning $42,500 per year, while Ellen works part-time in the
paid labor force earning $7500 per year. According to the time-use studies,
Ellen undertakes between forty-two and fifty-one hours per week of household
labor. If we assume Ellen spends forty-seven hours each week undertaking
productive labor in the home and then value Ellen's time at the 1995 minimum
wage, °8 Ellen increases her family's annual income by approximately $10,387.
If each family member is responsible for an equal portion of the household
income, Ellen, her husband, and two children must each pay an income tax on
$2596 of income. Because most married couples file jointly, Ellen and her
husband will most likely aggregate their household income, jointly sharing the
income tax burden. Additionally, although each of Ellen's children will theoreti-
cally be responsible for paying the tax, in practice, Ellen and her husband will
probably bear the additional tax burden. 3°
bulk of childcare is purchased to enable women to work in the waged labor market, reducing the
imputed income from housework when the woman works in the market will prevent the tax fairness
problems that could arise if women were required to pay tax on household labor that they do not
themselves provide but purchase in the market. In short, reducing imputed income will ensure women
do not have the double burden of paying a tax on the labor as well as incurring the costs of hiring
childcare. The fairness issue, however, will not be completely eliminated because some women
purchase childcare to enable leisure activity. Under the proposed tax structure, therefore, some women
will not only incur the cost of the childcare, but will also incur an increased tax burden associated with
the imputed income from household services that they have not even performed.
Women who purchase childcare in the market, however, are less likely to suffer a double burden than
might appear at first blush. As discussed above, women who are financially able to purchase childcare
services continue to perform extensive household tasks themselves. Women must still spend time
employing, scheduling, and instructing the hired caregiver. Hiring childcare help, therefore, cannot be
assumed to relieve women of their household responsibilities.
Although women continue to perform household tasks despite the purchase of childcare in the
market, it is arguable that families purchasing the services will incur a double burden. Women who
perform the services themselves or rely on free services through kinship circles will be subject to
taxation, while women who purchase the services in the market will be subject to taxation as well as
childcare expenses. The childcare provisions found in §§ 21 and 129, however, alleviate some of this
burden. By providing a tax credit and a tax deduction for costs incurred in the purchase of childcare,
§§ 21 and 129 offset a portion of this burden. Indeed, taxing household income might cause Congress to
resolve, once and for all, the debate involving the personal versus business characterization of childcare
expenses. Congress could simply allow a complete deduction for all childcare expenses that would
correspondingly decrease the taxable income associated with household services.
308. The 1995 minimum wage was $4.25.29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994).
309. I.R.C. § 6201(c) (1994).
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If Ellen is subject to the fifteen percent payroll tax that self-employed
taxpayers must pay, Ellen must also pay $1558 every year in payroll taxes.
According to the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration,
Ellen will be entitled to between $520 and $860 each month in future social
security benefits.31 ° Under the current tax structure, which excludes household
income from the calculation of these benefits, Ellen would most likely fail to
obtain independent benefits, and would instead be forced to rely on her husband
for spousal benefits earned through his market wages.31'
Finally, because Ellen and her spouse's aggregate market income is $50,000
per year, they would not be entitled to the household income tax credit.
(2) Deborah is a single woman with one child. She works full-time in the
paid labor force earning $30,000 per year. According to the sociological studies,
Deborah provides between thirty-two and forty-four hours per week of house-
hold labor to her family. If we assume Deborah provides thirty-seven hours of
productive labor per week and calculate the value of the services according to
1995 minimum wage, Deborah provides approximately $8177 of income to her
family each year. Although both Deborah and her child will be responsible for
an equal portion of the tax liability, in practice, Deborah will most likely pay the
tax burden on the $8177 of household income.
Deborah will also be subject to the fifteen percent payroll tax. Based on
imputed income of $8177, she will incur an additional tax burden of $1226 each
year. Upon retirement and after having paid into the social security program,
Deborah will be entitled to social security benefits each month between $860
and $1200. 3 12
If Congress adopted a household income tax credit similar to that discussed
above, Deborah could offset $619 of her social security tax while at the same
time maintaining full access to benefits upon retirement.
(3) Martha is single with one child. She is unemployed. According to the
time-use studies, Martha provides between thirty-two and fifty hours per week
of household labor. If we assume Martha provides forty-two hours of labor and
calculate it according to minimum wage, Martha's services are worth $9282 per
year. After subtracting the standard deduction 3 13 and the personal dependent
exemptions,314 Martha has $882 of income and will owe $133 in income taxes.
If the value of Martha's labor was incorporated into the social security system,
she would owe approximately $1392 per year in payroll taxes. She would then
be entitled to approximately $520 each month in social security benefits.315
310. BASic FACTS, supra note 102, at 9.
311. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 996-1001.
312. See BASIC FACTS, supra note 102, at 9.
313. I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(B) (1994).
314. I.R.C. § 151 (1994).
315. This assumes that as her household labor decreases her waged labor will increase to equal
approximately $10,000 per year. See BASIC FACTS, supra note 102, at 9.
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Under the current tax structure, Martha's household labor does not count
towards social security benefits. Consequently, Martha's unemployment could
cause her to have benefits far below the $520 allowed under the proposed
system or to be completely without social security or medicare benefits in old
age. Taxation in this case could ensure Martha's economic security in old age.
Because Martha has no income from market activities, under the household
income tax credit proposed above, her entire social security and income tax
would be offset.
CONCLUSION
Scholars in many disciplines have recognized that women suffer economic
vulnerability due to the division of labor in the home along gender lines.
Because many women undertake the time-consuming tasks of bearing and
rearing children, they often are unable to participate in the waged labor force at
the same level as men. Tax analysts, noting the manner in which the tax
structure reinforces this traditional gendered division of labor, have almost
uniformly responded by proposing tax reform intended to encourage women to
substitute marketwork for household labor. Many argue that by substituting a
traditionally "male" role in the market for the conventional "female" role in
the home, women are more likely to reach economic parity with men.
While this market-oriented approach recognizes women's economic vulnerabil-
ity, it fails to acknowledge that many women who participate fully in the market
remain economically vulnerable. This economic vulnerability depends in part
on women's continued responsibility for household work even while in the
waged labor force. Although some women view this division of labor as
oppressive, this view is not universal. Many women welcome household respon-
sibilities and view the labor as an important contribution to the family and to
society. Many women, for example, consider nurturing and caring responsibili-
ties in the home as closely tied to the elimination of discrimination and the
empowerment of their community.
This article has argued that to improve women's economic security, house-
work must be recognized as valuable and productive. In particular, I have
argued that Congress should value and tax household activities to ensure
women have access to social welfare benefits typically tied to waged labor, such
as social security, disability, and medicare benefits. Taxation would mark an
important step toward the formal recognition of women as important economic
and political actors. This reform, together with the market-oriented reform,
would go far toward changing society's views of the value of productive
activities carried out both in the home and in the market, and more importantly,
it would represent a critical step in achieving greater economic security for
women.
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